FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

DUPLICATE

APRIL
1951

VOL·29 NO·3 $1·50 A COPY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Across the U.S. and overseas... you can depend on TWA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1951

Britain in World Strategy . . . . . *Anthony Eden* 341
America and the Russian Future . . . . . *George F. Kennan* 351
Sea Power: Abstraction or Asset? . . . . . *Walter Millis* 371
The Impact of Rearmament on the Free World Economy
Richard M. Bissell, Jr. 385
The Philippines: Where Did We Fail? . . . . *Albert Ravenholt* 406
South Africa in Afrikaner Hands . . . . . *G. H. Calpin* 417
Israel: The Emergence of a Democracy . . . . . *Abba Eban* 424
The Functional Approach to European Integration
Dirk U. Stikker 436
Crisis and Reform in French North Africa . *Charles-André Julien* 445
Canada, Free and Dependent . . . . . *John A. Stevenson* 456
Indo-China on the Razor's Edge . . . . . *Seymour Topping* 468
Economic Bases of Unrest in Burma . . . . . *Peter Ady* 475
The Thirty-Eighth Parallel . . . . . *Arthur L. Grey, Jr.* 482
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 488
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 507

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

BYRON DEXTER
Managing Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE — DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER — CHARLES H. McILWAIN
JOHN W. DAVIS — GEORGE F. KENNAN — CHARLES SEYMOUR
ALLEN W. DULLES — WILLIAM L. LANGER — HENRY M. WRISTON

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 McGovern Ave., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

Vol. 29, No. 3.

Copyright 1951, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in U. S. A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

ANTHONY EDEN, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1935–38 and 1940–45; also, on occasion, Lord Privy Seal, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and Secretary of State for War; Conservative M.P. since 1923 * * * *GEORGE F. KENNAN*, on leave from the Department of State, where he served as Counsellor and head of the Policy Planning Staff; formerly Minister-Counsellor at the American Embassy, Moscow * * * *WALTER MILLIS*, editorial writer, New York *Herald Tribune;* author of "Road to War," "This is Pearl!" and other works * * * *RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.*, Deputy Administrator, Economic Coöperation Administration * * * *ALBERT RAVENHOLT*, former United Press correspondent in the Far East; staff member in the Far East of the Institute of Current World Affairs, 1948–1950 * * * *G. H. CALPIN*, former editor of the *Natal Witness*, contributor to the London *Economist* and other periodicals, author of "Third Parties in South Africa" * * * *ABBA EBAN*, Ambassador of Israel to the United States * * * *DIRK U. STIKKER*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands; Chairman of the Council of the O.E.E.C. * * * *CHARLES-ANDRÉ JULIEN*, Professor of History at the Sorbonne, Counsellor of the French Union; author of "Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord" * * * *JOHN A. STEVENSON*, Ottawa correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* * * * *SEYMOUR TOPPING*, staff correspondent of the Associated Press in Saigon; previously stationed in Nanking and Hong Kong * * * *PETER ADY*, of the Institute of Statistics, Oxford, recently in Burma as adviser to the Burmese Government * * * *ARTHUR L. GREY, JR.*, joint author with G. M. McCune of "Korea Today."

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Vol. 29 APRIL 1951 No. 3

BRITAIN IN WORLD STRATEGY

By Anthony Eden

PRESIDENT TRUMAN, in his message on the State of the Union, described the principles for which the United Nations are fighting in Korea as "the foundations of collective security." He was stating, in my view, a simple truth. But that it should be uttered by the Chief Executive of the United States at this time of decision in world history is a matter of profound significance. Until now, collective security has never been more than a concept, idealistic but abstract. Its effective interpretation, as we in Europe have confirmed in the acid test of experience, insists that the diplomacy of the peacemakers must have the backing of arms. Only in such a way can collective security perform its essential function, which is to avert war instead of merely permitting some to survive it.

The first invocation of collective security was in the days of the League of Nations. Maybe it did not fail by a very large margin. But it did so because of a reluctance, understandable enough though misguided, to use force. A contributory factor throughout the League's history was the nonparticipation of the United States. I do not think that there would be much dispute today as to the immense psychological influence which America's absence brought to bear on the calculations of potential aggressor and potential defender alike. It is therefore not surprising if present events are seen by some Americans as nearly a complete reversal, in a comparable situation, of the pre-1939 relationship between America and Europe. We in Europe now appear, in the eyes of the pessimists, to be the "absent," while the burden, psychological and actual, of giving effect to collective security seems to them to rest solely on the United States. This feeling is understandable, but it is not justified. Yet even as a minority view it deserves attention.

No country has better reason than Britain to know the reasons for such a mood in America today. We have had long ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perience of being both overburdened and misunderstood. For centuries Britain, as both a European and a World Power, was accustomed to provide security—almost single-handed in proportion to the heavy obligations of that rôle—to territories both of family and of friends. Britain's boundaries of responsibility and influence may seem to have shrunk in recent years, and phrases such as "the sun never sets . . ." gain no more than an occasional backward glance.

Yet are they so outmoded, after all? It does not seem so when we look, even now, at the dispersal of British strength in Korea, Hong Kong and Malaya, in the Middle East, in Austria and Trieste, and nearest home in Germany. It is at once obvious that these British forces are stretched, in relation to the availability of trained men and modern arms, more tautly than those of any other country, ally or enemy.

I would be the first to admit that we must improve upon this contribution to the collective security of the free world. At the recent Pilgrims' dinner in London to welcome Ambassador Gifford I urged that we must pitch our defense efforts at the maximum, not the minimum; that we must marshal all our resources and unite our endeavors in every sphere and at every level. We are not doing that yet. However, a review of the disposition of Britain's armed forces at this moment may be salutary for those who decry the extent of our present efforts, and at the same time it may provide the most realistic basis on which to plan priorities in expansion.

But first there must be a preface. If the free nations of the world are to recognize the part which the British peoples can play, the nature of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the way its strength can best be applied must be fully understood. Two-thirds of the area of the Commonwealth and Empire lie in lands whose shores abut on the Indian Ocean; there are parts of three Dominions and other vast territories which touch the Pacific; yet the chief centers of its skilled manpower, industry and war potential face the North Atlantic.

Britain is the heart of this unique complex of free peoples, and as the strength of our island lies in its command of the approaches to Western Europe, so also does its vulnerability. Our very proximity to the Continent stresses the dangers of a mortal blow by sea or air. Moreover, it must be remembered that Britain is not likely to become, at the very best, more than 60 percent self-sup-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

porting in foodstuffs. By far the greater part of our meat, wheat and fats comes from such far-flung sources as Australia, tropical Africa, the East Indies, Canada and the United States. Nor must our staple comforter, tea, be forgotten. Of raw materials, coal alone is normally produced in quantities sufficient to meet the needs of British industry. Yet the products of these raw materials, when converted into machinery, and in war into warlike stores, are vital both for the existence of many of the nations which supply them and for the fighting services wherever they may be in action. It is therefore true to say that the crucial aim of our strategy is the maintenance of the nerves and arteries of our family of nations—the lines of communications. But there are also other factors which exert a special influence.

Although oceanic in its general nature, our Commonwealth system has to take account of nearly 20,000 miles of land frontiers with foreign nations. Sometimes there are smaller nations behind the frontiers, as there are behind India and Pakistan, and these are liable to be influenced or even absorbed by other Powers. Siam, Tibet and Afghanistan, for example, stand in such a relation to Communist China and Soviet Russia. Indeed, some of our most important naval bases have land frontiers with foreign countries; Gibraltar and Hong Kong are both so situated. Lastly, the great area and variety of the Commonwealth produce diverse social and economic problems which Communism has persistently sought to exploit through the fevered readjustments of the postwar world.

Let me then summarize the main framework of the strategy which governs the siting of our forces. We must recall that there also exist, beyond this essential framework, our commitments in support of the United Nations, our obligations for mutual defense under the North Atlantic Pact, as well as our special bilateral treaties such as that with Jordan. Outside these commitments the vital points are as follows:

a. The maintenance of free movement on the oceans.

b. The defense of Britain, the heart of the Commonwealth and Empire, primarily from the air.

c. The defense of the land frontiers of the Empire.

d. The maintenance of internal security, with which is linked to some extent defense of important Commonwealth interests in certain foreign lands.

Look for a moment at what is involved in sea power alone.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This depends upon the security of naval and air bases and of harbors for merchant ships. Since the main shipbuilding and industrial center is Britain, the destruction by air attack of our major war potential would cripple our sea power throughout the world. The treaty arrangements with the Western European countries impose upon us responsibilities for the provision of forces on the Continent. To that extent they are liabilities, but when viewed against the background of Commonwealth defense they may also be advantageous in providing depth to the air defense of the British Isles. Finally, unrest in certain colonial areas, or failure to uphold significant interests in other parts of the world, may deprive ourselves and our friends of some vital raw material without which our efforts would be hamstrung.

It is the direct responsibility of the British Government to control the foreign and defense policies of those colonial territories that fall under its authority. These comprise colonies which are at various but incomplete stages in their progress towards self-government; the protectorates which are, generally speaking, the least developed areas; and the trust territories under British administration. The self-governing Dominions, on the other hand, have of course absolute control over their own defense and foreign policy. Concerted action between them and Britain, together with the colonial group, is obtained only by consultation and agreement. Nevertheless, certain general principles have been formulated at Imperial conferences and other meetings between our statesmen. Perhaps the most important of these is the maxim that the defense of the whole Commonwealth is of common concern to all its members, but that the primary contribution of each must be its own local defense.

In order to carry out our responsibilities towards the colonial group, and for the additional reason that in peacetime the Dominions group can hardly raise naval forces sufficient for more than their immediate local defense in war, Britain has to maintain a large standing navy and air force. This must be remembered in considering the extent of the land forces Britain can raise, their rôle and locations. The British Army is the only force in the Commonwealth which contains a large "regular" core. On this regular army, assisted by trained national service men during the latter part of their two years' compulsory service, fall the following important tasks—apart from any occupation forces stationed in Europe:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a. The provision of garrisons at naval and air bases and defended ports along our sea and air lines.

b. The provision of forces needed for the land defense of certain overseas territories to the extent required by our interest in those territories and the possibility of a threat to them.

c. The maintenance in the United Kingdom of a highly trained nucleus in a state of readiness to take the field. This force has to be available for immediate dispatch wherever it may best be employed to hold the danger until the territorial army formations can arrive to help.

To fulfil these tasks, where must our army be located and what are the appropriate numbers employed today for that purpose? The enormous geographical range can be seen from a brief review of only one set of commitments: the garrisons for naval and air bases on the main lines of communications. These include Bermuda and Kingston in the West Indies; the defended port of Freetown in West Africa, flanking the routes to South Africa; Gibraltar, at the opening of the Mediterranean, and Malta, Aden and Suez; Ceylon, where under the Independence Act of 1947 the United Kingdom may station such forces as are required to assist in the joint defense of port installations and communications; Singapore, the gateway to the Far East proper and to the Pacific, but so closely connected with its hinterland, Malaya, that the British garrison will be included, for my purpose here, in the estimate for Malaya as a whole; and Hong Kong.

Although for security reasons it is impossible for anyone outside government circles to be in possession of the full military facts, and although the situation changes from day to day as requirements in one theater necessitate movements of men and matériel from another, it is yet possible to give an approximate picture of the way in which we are fulfilling our varied commitments. These are round figures:

Bases, etc. (excluding Singapore and Hong Kong)	20,000
Areas of vital interests: Malaya 17,000, Hong Kong 20,000 (including certain elements for Korea)	37,000
Middle East	45,000
Great Britain (including strategic reserve being built up after certain units had been sent to Korea)	230,000
Germany (existing units being brought up to strength and another division being formed)	50,000
Austria and Trieste	10,000
Korea	12,000
	404,000

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States is proposing such an enormous increase in its defense expenditure that there is danger some Americans may feel that our contribution falls short of their own high standard. It must be remembered, however, that the British economy is already fully stretched, with a higher level of taxation than any other country in the world. Before we begin to pay for our rearmament program, 43 percent of the total national income is already being taken in taxation by the local and central government. This can be compared with something over 35 percent of the national income which will be taken by the United States taxation authorities if new taxes are voted to cover the proposed budget of 71.6 billion dollars. What this means in terms of the individual can be understood when it is remembered that income tax and surtax in the United Kingdom on the highest range of incomes is 19/6d. in the pound, and this excludes substantial local taxation. There are now only 86 people in this country with a net income of over £6,000 a year, compared with 6,560 in 1939. Indirect taxation, which more particularly affects lower income groups, is levied on such necessities as soap, stationery, razor blades, and in fact on practically all commodities except food and some clothing and furnishing fabrics.

It is clear, therefore, that there is no reserve of taxable capacity on which to draw. Setting entirely aside any question of hardship, an increase of taxation over and above its present level would have a directly inflationary effect. I use the word inflationary advisedly, for in my view existing British taxation has already passed the stage at which it can achieve the effect of deflation. On the contrary, a further increase in taxation must result in individuals drawing on either capital or savings in order to try to balance the rising cost of living against their diminishing resources. Furthermore, such an increase would undoubtedly have a seriously disheartening effect on effort in every range of income. More particularly would it discourage overtime by workers who are not now liable for direct taxation but whose extra earnings would immediately put them into the range of those who pay 5 shillings in the pound income tax. It is understandable that men and women are unwilling to do this even in conditions of crisis, short of actual war. All this does not mean that Britain cannot afford to pay for rearmament, but it does mean that our problem is different from that facing the United States.

Not only are the budgetary difficulties appallingly complex in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this country, but the diversion of physical resources from civilian to military production is also more intricate than in the United States. Both men and machines are fully employed, and in neither is there a reserve capacity as there was in 1939. If men are to be transferred to the armaments industry and its auxiliaries, some reduction in exports will probably be necessary as well as a cut in expenditure.

The diversion of some of our production from exports to armaments must have an adverse effect upon our balance of payments problem. As must be only too well known to everyone in America, this has been our dominating economic preoccupation since 1949. The year 1950 saw a temporary solution. For the first time since the war the United Kingdom had a surplus in her balance of payments, even without Marshall Aid. This is threatened, however, by the rearmament program. It is true that in 1950 there was a surplus of something like £250,000,000 in our overseas account, but the terms of trade have steadily moved against us. A volume of imports such as we bought in 1950 would cost something like £300,000,000 a year more today, and the rearmament inevitably calls for increased imports.

I do not think it is generally realized that, while the enormous rise in prices of raw materials produced in the Commonwealth has been an aid to us in that it has increased our gold and dollar reserves, these belong to the sterling area. The position of the United Kingdom has thus, in certain respects, been made more, not less difficult. Huge sterling balances have accumulated in London in the accounts of countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Malaya. It is perfectly true that these balances are held chiefly by Australia and New Zealand, nations which have always exercised the greatest restraint and showed the greatest consideration for the interests of Great Britain and of the Commonwealth as a whole. But debts are debts, even when they are owed to creditors within the family. The demands of rearmament will fall first upon the engineering and vehicle-producing industries and must, even with a yet stricter rationing of civilian consumption, mean some drop in our exports. The balance of payments may once again become a serious problem. Connected with this question is the shortage of raw materials which hits the United Kingdom as hard as any other country in the world—or harder—since, with the exception of coal, all our raw materials have to be imported.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States is bravely accepting a heavy sacrifice, and no doubt many Americans, tormented by anxiety about husbands or sons in Korea, feel inclined to blame the United Kingdom for a seeming unwillingness to face the facts of the international situation. But they can be assured that now that the extent of the effort needed is known to the British people they will respond freely and fully. They can also be assured that even apart from those who are called up to serve in the armed forces, every citizen of the United Kingdom will be bearing an extremely heavy burden in taxation and other spheres.

For many years now a peculiar strength of Anglo-American relations has been the knowledge that we can speak our minds to each other, and this not merely because we speak the same language. But this does not absolve us from the responsibility to choose our words. There are, no doubt, critics in Britain who feel that the United States is comparatively inexperienced in international affairs. But it is still less than a century ago since the American people fought on their own soil one of the greatest and most gallant wars in history and achieved through it a miracle of unity. To recall this is to realize that no nation could come through such an experience without putting adolescence far behind. Leaders of the caliber of Lincoln and of Lee brought a luster to the young American tradition which has shone more brightly rather than faded with the years. Such men as these, who showed themselves willing to fight to the death for a principle, laid the foundations of America's maturity.

The whole trend of events, whether we view them from Europe or America, points to the supreme importance of Anglo-American unity. This is no longer an idealistic conception of small groups but a practical policy of governments. If it can be founded upon that rare intimacy which enables good friends to be also each other's severest critics, so much the better. The growth of interdependence between nations cannot be carried too far so long as it develops by free consent.

On this side of the Atlantic those nations which are determined that the cradle of Western civilization shall not also be its grave turn today to the United States. Nothing, in my view, can be more natural, for there is little in the American way of life which cannot trace a way back to European origins. I believe that the United States turns equally naturally to us, understanding that if either should fail in the supreme tests ahead, both must lose im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measurable treasure of freedom and send the world reeling back to an age of darkness.

I use the word "darkness" deliberately, for I believe that if we fail to meet and turn the challenge that confronts us, all the peoples of the world must live and have their being without hope. And what is darkness but utter hopelessness? And where, if the bastions of the free world should fail, could there be any hope for those who remain?

The most effective means of meeting any danger is first to comprehend its nature. By this I do not mean abstruse academic analyses of this or that philosophy, but a down-to-earth understanding of the facts of the matter. I believe that there are four types of people who easily respond to the appeal of the destructive Communist faith. There are certain idealists, sensitive to any blueprint promising a better world. There are the immature, who crave a crusade and to whom the sacrifices demanded of a Communist seem a kind of personal fulfilment. There are the discontented and the dupes who will accept any theory which throws responsibility upon others and guarantees uniformity for all. And there are the seekers after power who know that they can win command over others only through common desires or common fears.

To all these Communism is designed to appeal. Its doctrine has been presented as some species of philosopher's stone, as a glittering revelation of fundamental truths about society which gives to believers the keys to both understanding and action. The glitter is spurious, but so dazzling that the disciples are blinded and the truth hidden from them.

It is perhaps not irrelevant to mention the one kind of man who invariably rejects Communism almost without a second thought. The true nonconformist finds no appeal in Marxist dogma. He is inherently against subjection to any hierarchy and spontaneously rejects all doctrines of infallibility. To him, democracy is a necessary form of human dignity. By instinct he understands that the decision to become a Communist is usually the last decision a man ever makes for himself.

Communism stalks men in the guise of a religion; it demands sacrifice and self-denial for an ultimate, collective redemption. Communism enlists men in the uniform of militancy; it imposes discipline and austerity and spreads a skein of subterfuge. And so the needs of both the mystic and the practical man appear to be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

met. Once a man has been "indoctrinated," even seeing is not believing. A Communist cannot be convinced by argument because he cannot imagine such an anomaly as an adversary in good faith; to him, anyone who dissents is merely disloyal.

The Communist-led millions—and they are nearly half the world—are not permitted to see that it is they and their institutions which are in chains. How can they realize that it is not the citizens or workers of the West who are fettered, but those of the Communist states? By the rule of the system the faults of the system must go unquestioned and unchecked. Within a true democracy the individual is still free to fulfil himself and the promise of his abilities, and the individual and his faith are the only means by which anything on earth is ever done.

With all its faults, the Western system has infinite possibilities. The fact that it recognizes that it has faults is one of its greatest distinctions. It does not foreclose change. Yet because democracies limit liberty, while proclaiming it, is no reason to embrace a faith which wholly proscribes it. Without freedom, there is no risk, no challenge and, in the long run, no progress.

The West can survive only to the extent that individuals accept their obligations as members of a free community. As such, our duty is clear. First, last and all the time we must stand together. In this task there can be no excuse for failure, no room for misunderstandings and no scope for sabotage of the efforts of one nation by the ignorant of another.

All over the globe the British peoples have obligations. We are striving to fulfil them. I do not claim that our efforts are without mistakes of planning, judgment or execution. But in the same way that the American people are entitled to have others think that they are doing their best in a difficult job, so, I believe, are the British.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE

By George F. Kennan

THE very virulence with which Americans reject the outlook and practice of those who now hold power in the Kremlin implies in the strongest possible way the belief in, and desire for, an alternative—for some other Russian outlook and some other set of practices in Russia to take the place of those we know today. Yet we may be permitted to ask whether there is any clear image in our minds of what that outlook and those practices might be, and of the ways by which Americans might promote progress toward them. At the present time, in particular, when the coexistence of the two systems on the same planet has led to such immense strains and anxieties everywhere, and to so much despair of its successful continuation, there is a tendency on the part of many people to permit the image of a different and more acceptable Russia to become eclipsed by, or even identified with, the question of victory or defeat in a future war. Some Americans are already reverting, merely in contemplation of a possible war, to the American bad habit of assuming that there is something final and positive about a military decision—that it is the ending of something, and the happy ending, rather than a beginning.

There could, of course, be no greater error than this, quite apart from any consideration of the blood and sacrifice which war involves. A war against Soviet power which could be said to be relatively successful militarily (and we would do well to remember that no such war could be more than relatively successful) would in itself assure little or nothing in the way of progress toward the achievement of the sort of alternative we might wish; at the most it would only make more immediate various aspects of a problem which already exists and which every American who objects to Soviet behavior must, in consistency, have in mind anyway, war or no war. That is the problem of the kind of Russia which we would prefer to see; the kind with which we ourselves could, let us say, live easily; the kind which would permit the existence of a much more stable world order; the kind to which it would be both realistic and suitable for us to aspire.

This problem of the possibility of a different and preferable Russia is not really a question of war or peace. War in itself will not bring about such a Russia. Indeed it would be most unlikely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to lead in that direction unless accompanied by many wise and strenuous efforts besides the military one. And a continued absence of major war will not preclude the coming of a different Russia. All of that depends upon a great many other things which would have to be done by a great many people, either in war or in peace. Not all of these things can be done by Americans. So far as direct action is concerned, the bulk of them cannot be. But our possibilities for influencing the outcome are significant; and we must remember that there may be times when our efforts may be capable of swinging the balance one way or the other. For that reason our own relationship to the Russian future is something worth our most strenuous thought and attention. And in our efforts to determine it, two things are of major importance: 1, that we should know what we want; and 2, that we should know how to conduct ourselves in order to facilitate, rather than to impede, the coming into being of what we want. The word "facilitate" is used advisedly; for we are dealing here with a foreign country, and our rôle can be at best a marginal one, supplementary to a far more important rôle which others must play.

II

What sort of Russia would we like to see before us, as our partner in the world community?

Perhaps the first thing to get straight here is the sort of Russia there is no use looking for. And such a Russia—the kind we may *not* look for—is easy to describe and envisage, for it would be a capitalistic and liberal-democratic one, with institutions closely resembling those of our own republic.

If we look first at the question of the economic system, we see at once that Russia has scarcely known private enterprise as we are familiar with it in this country. Even in pre-Revolutionary times the Russian Government always had a close hold on a number of economic activities, notably transportation and the armament industry, which in our country have traditionally, or at least normally, been private. There were, to be sure, in the earlier period of Russian history, distinguished families of private Russian entrepreneurs, famous for their bold commercial pioneering in the undeveloped areas of the realm. But by and large indigenous private capital remained more conspicuous in the exchange than in the production of commodities. The great domestic business was trade, rather than manufacture. And business

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

did not stand in so high repute as in the West. There was a traditional, and deeply Russian, merchant class; but it was not generally noted or respected for breadth of outlook or for any enlightened concept of its own responsibility to society. The portrayals of it in Russian literature are generally negative and depressing. The members of the landed gentry, whose tastes and prejudices were authoritative in the social field, often looked down on business, and themselves tended to avoid participation in it. The Russian language, in fact, never acquired a word comparable to our expression "businessman;" it had only the word for "merchant," and this term did not always have a pleasant connotation.

As Russia became industrialized, in a sudden rush of activity which took place around the turn of the century, there were clearly apparent the absence of an adequate tradition of responsibility and restraint on the part of the capital-owning class and a general lack of preparedness, on the part of the state and of society generally, to cope with the new strains. This industrial development, proceeding largely on a basis of individual enterprise rather than of widely distributed corporative ownership, was marked by sudden accumulations of fortunes in the hands of individuals and families not always well prepared for such affluence. Often the mode of expenditure of wealth appeared to other people as little creditable as the means by which it had been accumulated. Individual capitalists and workers lived in close proximity—indeed, many of the factory owners lived in the compounds of their factories. Such conditions often bore greater resemblance to the pattern of early Industrial-Revolution capitalism, as Marx had described it, than to conditions in advanced Western countries. This fact may well have had something to do with the success of Marxism in Russia. The Russian industrial capitalist was generally visible in the flesh, and as often as not he had the rotundity, and sometimes (not always) the vulgarity and callousness, of the capitalist of the early-Communist caricature.

All these things go to show that whatever private enterprise may have been in Tsarist Russia, it had not yet come to hold anything resembling the respect and significance in the eyes of the people that it had acquired in the older mercantile countries by the beginning of this century. Perhaps with time it would have. The prospects were steadily improving. Examples of efficient and progressive industrial management existed in Russia before the Revolution, and were increasing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But all this, it must be remembered, was a long time ago. Thirty-three years have elapsed since the Revolution. Those years, in the strenuous conditions of Soviet life, have witnessed the passing of a full generation. Of the people capable of influencing the course of events in Russia today only an insignificant minority recall the pre-Revolutionary days at all. The younger generation has no comprehension or concept of anything but the state capitalism that the Soviet régime has enforced. And what we are talking about here is something not even in the present but in the indefinite future.

Bearing all this in mind, we see that there is no Russian national understanding which would permit the early establishment in Russia of anything resembling the private enterprise system as we know it. This is not to say that some such understanding will not some day develop. It may, if circumstances are favorable. But it will never be a system identical to our own. And no one will usefully be able to force the pace, particularly no one from outside.

It is true that the term "Socialism" has been used for so many years in close intimacy with the term "Soviet" that it is now hateful to many people, both within and without the borders of the Soviet Union. But it is easy to draw wrong conclusions from this phenomenon. It is conceivable that retail trade and the performance of the small individual services which have so much to do with the pleasantness of daily life may some day return in large measure to private hands in Russia. In agriculture, as we shall see presently, there will certainly be an extensive return to private ownership and initiative. There is a further possibility that the system of mutual production-coöperation by groups of artisans (*artels*)—a system peculiarly rooted in Russian tradition and understanding—may some day point the way to economic institutions which could represent a highly important and promising innovation in the approach to modern problems of labor and capital. But large sections of economic life known to us as the normal provinces of private enterprise will almost certainly remain in national hands for a long time to come in Russia, regardless of the identity of the political authority. This should surprise no American, nor should it offend any. There is no reason why the form of Russian economic life, beyond certain major exceptions that will be mentioned below, should be considered a matter of vital concern to the outside world.

Agriculture deserves a special place in our thinking on this sub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ject. Agricultural enterprise is the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. Left in private hands, it constitutes a concession to human freedom and individual initiative—a concession which the true Bolshevik finds abhorrent. Forcibly collectivized, it requires an elaborate apparatus of restraint if the farmer is to be made to stay on his land and to produce. The forced collectivization of the farming population is probably today the greatest single cause of discontent in the Soviet Union, except possibly the excessive cruelty of the police, with which it is intimately connected. It may be taken for granted that one of the first acts of any future progressive authority in Russia would be to abolish this hated system of agricultural serfdom and to restore to the farmers the pride and incentives of private land ownership and free disposal of agricultural commodities. Collective farms may continue to exist; and they probably will, for the most abhorrent feature of the present system is not the concept of producer-coöperation itself but the element of restraint that underlies its application. The collectives of the future will be voluntary coöperatives, however, not shotgun marriages.

Turning to the political side, it was said above that we could not expect to see the emergence of a liberal-democratic Russia along American patterns. This cannot be too strongly emphasized. It does not mean that future Russian régimes will necessarily be unliberal. There is no liberal tradition finer than the strain which has existed in the Russia of the past. Many Russian individuals and groups of this day are deeply imbued with that tradition, and will do all in their power to make it the dominant element in the Russian future. In that effort, we may wish them well without reservation. But we will be doing them no favor if we permit ourselves to expect too much to happen too fast, or look to them to produce anything resembling our own institutions. These Russian liberals will have no easy road to walk. They will find in their county a young generation that has known nothing but Soviet power and has been trained to think subconsciously in the terms of that power even when it has resented and hated it. Many features of the Soviet system will stick, if only for the reason that everything has been destroyed which might seem to have constituted an alternative to them. And some features will deserve to stick, for no system that lasts over decades is entirely without merits. Any program of government for a future Russia will have to adjust itself to the fact that there has been this Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interlude, and that it has left its positive marks as well as its negative ones. And no members of future Russian governments will be aided by doctrinaire and impatient well-wishers in the West who look to them, just because they are seeking a decent alternative to what we know today as Bolshevism, to produce in short order a replica of the Western democratic dream.

Above all, it behooves us Americans, in this connection, to repress, and if possible to extinguish once and for all, our inveterate tendency to judge others by the extent to which they contrive to be like ourselves. In our relations with the people of Russia it is important, as it has never been important before, for us to recognize that our institutions may not have relevance for people living in other climes and conditions and that there can be social structures and forms of government in no way resembling our own and yet not deserving of censure. There is no reason why this realization should shock us. In 1831 de Tocqueville, writing from the United States, correctly observed: "The more I see of this country the more I admit myself penetrated with this truth: that there is nothing absolute in the theoretical value of political institutions, and that their efficiency depends almost always on the original circumstances and the social conditions of the people to whom they are applied."

Forms of government are forged mainly in the fire of practice, not in the vacuum of theory. They respond to national character and to national realities. There is great good in the Russian national character, and the realities of that country scream out today for a form of administration more considerate of that good. Let us hope that it will come. But when Soviet power has run its course, or when its personalities and spirit begin to change (for the ultimate outcome could be one or the other), let us not hover nervously over the people who come after, applying litmus papers daily to their political complexions to find out whether they answer to our concept of "democratic." Give them time; let them be Russians; let them work out their internal problems in their own manner. The ways by which peoples advance toward dignity and enlightenment in government are things that constitute the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign interference can do less good. There are, as we shall see presently, certain features of the future Russian state that *are* of genuine concern to the outside world. But these do not include

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the form of government itself, provided only that it keep within certain well-defined limits, beyond which lies totalitarianism.

III

What, then, do they include? To what kind of a Russia may we reasonably and justly look forward? What attributes are we, as responsible members of the world community, entitled to look for in the personality of a foreign state, and of Russia in particular?

We may look, in the first place, for a Russian government which, in contrast to the one we know today, would be tolerant, communicative and forthright in its relations with other states and peoples. It would not take the ideological position that its own purposes cannot finally prosper unless all systems of government not under its control are subverted and eventually destroyed. It would dispense with this paranoiac suspiciousness we know so well, and consent to view the outside world, ourselves included, as it really is and always has been: neither entirely good nor entirely bad, neither entirely to be trusted nor entirely to be mistrusted (if only for the simple reason that "trust" has only a relative significance in foreign affairs). It would consent to recognize that this outside world is not really preoccupied with diabolical plots to invade Russia and inflict injuries on the Russian people. Viewing the outside world in this way, the statesmen of a future Russia could approach it with tolerance and forbearance and practical good humor, defending their national interests as statesmen must, but not assuming that these can be furthered only at the expense of the interests of others, and vice versa.

No one asks for a naïve and childlike confidence; no one asks for a fatuous enthusiasm for all that is foreign; no one asks that the genuine and legitimate differences of interest which have always marked, and will always continue to mark, the relations between peoples be ignored. We must expect Russian national interests not only to continue to exist but to be vigorously and confidently asserted. But in a régime that we could recognize as an improvement over what we know today we would expect that this would be done in an atmosphere of emotional sanity and moderation: that the foreign representative would not continue to be viewed and treated as one possessed of the devil; that it would be conceded that there might be such a thing as innocent and legitimate curiosity about a foreign county, which could be permitted to be gratified without fatal detriment to that country's national life;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it would be recognized that there might be individual foreign business aspirations which did not aim at the destruction of the Russian state; that it would be admitted, finally, that persons desirous of travelling across international borders might have, and are even apt to have, motives other than "espionage, sabotage and diversion"—such trivial motives, in fact, as the enjoyment of travel or the peculiar impulses that move people to wish to visit relatives from time to time. In short, we may ask that the grotesque system of anachronisms known as the Iron Curtain be lifted from the world, and that the Russian people, who have so much to give and so much to receive as mature members of the world community, cease to be insulted by a policy that treats them as children, too immature to have normal contact with the adult world, too undependable to be let out alone.

Secondly, while recognizing that the internal system of government is in all essential respects Russia's own business and may well depart drastically from our own, we are entitled to expect that the exercise of governmental authority will stop short of that fairly plain line beyond which lies totalitarianism. Specifically, we may expect that any régime which claims to contrast favorably with that which we have before us today will refrain from enslaving its own labor—industrial and agricultural. There is a reason for this: a reason even more solid than the shock we experience at witnessing the sickening details of this type of oppression. When a régime sets out to enslave its own working population in this way, it requires for the maintenance of the arrangement so vast an apparatus of coercion that the imposition of the Iron Curtain follows almost automatically. No ruling group likes to admit that it can govern its people only by regarding and treating them as criminals. For this reason there is always a tendency to justify internal oppression by pointing to the menacing iniquity of the outside world. And the outside world must be portrayed, in these circumstances, as very iniquitous indeed—iniquitous to the point of caricature. Nothing short of this will do. Carefully hiding the realities behind the Iron Curtain, the régime depicts "abroad" to its own people in every lurid hue of hideousness, as anxious mothers attempt to intimidate their children and fortify their own authority by embroidering the image of that sinister "something" which "will get you if you don't watch out."

In this way, excess of internal authority leads inevitably to unsocial and aggressive conduct as a government among govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments, and is a matter of concern to the international community. The world is not only heartily sick of this comedy by reason of the endless and wearisome falsehoods it involves, but it has learned to recognize it as something so irresponsible and dangerous that, maintained for any length of time, it easily becomes a major hazard for world peace and stability. It is for this reason that we, while recognizing that all distinctions as between freedom and authority are relative and admitting that 90 percent of them are no business of ours when they affect a foreign country, still insist that there is an area here in which no government of a great country can move without creating the most grievous and weighty problems for its neighbors. That is precisely the area in which the régime of Hitler found itself at home, and in which the Soviet Government has moved for at least these past 15 years. We may state bluntly that we can recognize no future Russian régime as one with which we could have a satisfactory relationship unless it keeps out of this danger area.

The third thing we may hope from a new Russia is that it will refrain from pinning an oppressive yoke on other peoples who have the instinct and the capacity for national self-assertion. In mentioning this matter, we are entering upon a delicate subject. There is no more difficult and treacherous one in the entire lexicon of political issues. In the relationships between the Great-Russian people and nearby peoples outside the confines of the old Tsarist Empire, as well as non-Russian national groups that were included within that empire, there is no conceivable pattern of borders or institutional arrangements which, measured against the concepts prevailing to date, would not arouse violent resentments and involve genuine injustices in many quarters. If people in that part of the world are going to go on thinking of national borders and minority problems in the way that they have thought of them in the past and continue to think of them today, Americans would do well to avoid incurring any responsibility for views or positions on these subjects; for any specific solutions they may advocate will some day become a source of great bitterness against them, and they will find themselves drawn into controversies that have little or nothing to do with the issue of human freedom.

What is plainly necessary, and the only solution worthy of American encouragement, is the rise of such a spirit among all the peoples concerned as would give to border and institutional arrangements in that troubled area an entirely new, and greatly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reduced, significance. Whether that spirit will actually arise, we cannot tell. And precisely because we cannot tell this, Americans should be extremely careful in committing their support or encouragement to any specific arrangements in this sphere; for we cannot know what they mean until there is clarity as to the spirit which will underlie them. How can we know whether a given national group will require an independent status, or a federal status, some special brand of local self-government, or no special status at all, until we know something about the psychological climate in which these arrangements would operate? There are peoples of non-Russian ethnological character on the borders of the Great-Russian family whose economic existence is intimately bound up with that of the Great-Russians. The future should see a minimum of disruption of these economic ties, and that in itself would normally warrant a close political connection. But its nature would always have to depend on what sort of attitudes prevailed on both sides of the line: on the degree of tolerance and insight which the peoples involved (and not only the Russian people) might be able to bring to the establishment of these relationships.

We are all agreed, for example, that the Baltic countries should never again be forced against the innermost feelings of their peoples into any relationship whatsoever with a Russian state; but they would themselves be foolish to reject close and coöperative arrangements with a tolerant, nonimperialistic Russia, which genuinely wished to overcome the unhappy memories of the past and to place her relations to the Baltic peoples on a basis of real respect and disinterestedness. The Ukraine, again, deserves full recognition for the peculiar genius and abilities of its people and for the requirements and possibilities of its development as a linguistic and cultural entity; but the Ukraine is economically as much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is a part of the United States. Who can say what the final status of the Ukraine should be unless he knows the character of the Russia to which the adjustment will have to be made? As for the satellite states: they must, and will, recover their full independence; but they will not assure themselves of a stable and promising future if they make the mistake of proceeding from feelings of revenge and hatred toward the Russian people who have shared their tragedy, and if they try to base that future on the exploitation of the initial difficulties of a well-intentioned Russian régime struggling to overcome the legacy of Bolshevism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is no use underestimating the bitterness of these territorial problems, even assuming the utmost of goodwill and relaxed tolerance on the part of the peoples concerned. Some of the dispositions taken at the close of the Second World War (made even worse today by the deliberate policy on the part of certain governments to turn the provisional prematurely into the permanent) represent distinctly unhealthy situations, not conducive to a peaceful future. Some day these dispositions must be changed; and it will admittedly require tact on the part of all concerned, and forbearance bordering on the miraculous, if these changes are to be effected without a further compounding of violence and bitterness. For that unhappy situation the peoples of Europe have to thank the calculating cynicism of the Bolshevik leaders and the amiable indulgence of the Western Powers.

But one of the greatest of the German oppositionists in the time of Hitler, writing at the risk of his life to a friend in England during the recent war, said:

> For us Europe after the war is less a problem of frontiers and soldiers, of top-heavy organizations and grand plans than . . . a question of how the picture of man can be restored in the breasts of our fellow-citizens.[1]

Would that the Nazi gallows had spared this man for the present and the future; he was both right and courageous, and such people will be desperately needed if the future of the region from the Elbe to Bering Strait is ever to be happier than it has been in the past. An American who wishes his influence to be beneficial in that part of the world would do well to impress on any friends he may have from the Iron-Curtain countries the folly of a continuation, by them or anyone else, of these dreary and profitless manipulations with so-called national boundaries and with the naïve loyalties of bewildered linguistic groups which have passed for statemanship in that area in the past. There are more important things than where the border runs, and the first of these is that on both sides of it there should be tolerance and maturity, humility in the face of the sufferings of the past and the problems of the future, and a realization that none of the important problems of the future for any of the peoples of Europe is going to be solved entirely, or even primarily, within the country's national boundaries.

These, then, are the things for which an American well-wisher

[1] "A German of the Resistance. The Last Letters of Count Helmuth James von Moltke." London: Oxford University Press, 1948.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may hope from the Russia of the future: that she lift forever the Iron Curtain, that she recognize certain limitations to the internal authority of government, and that she abandon, as ruinous and unworthy, the ancient game of imperialist expansion and oppression. If she is not prepared to do these things, she will hardly be distinguishable from what we have before us today, and to hasten the arrival of such a Russia would not be worth the care or thought of a single American. If she is prepared to do these things, then Americans will not need to concern themselves more deeply with her nature and purposes; the basic demands of a more stable world order will then have been met, and the area in which a foreign people can usefully have thoughts and suggestions will have been filled.

IV

So much, then, for the kind of Russia we would like to see. How should we, as Americans, conduct ourselves in order to promote the realization of, or at least an advance toward, such a Russia?

In our thinking on this subject we must be careful to distinguish between direct action, *i.e.* action on our part directly affecting persons and events behind what is now the Iron Curtain, and indirect action, by which we mean action taken with respect to other things—with respect, let us say, to ourselves or to our relations with other people—and affecting the Soviet world only obliquely and incidentally.

Most regrettably, as the world is today, the possibility for direct action by Americans toward the ends discussed above must be examined both in terms of a possible war and in terms of the continuation of the present state of "no major war." The first of these contingencies must unfortunately be discussed first, for it has become the dominant prospect in the minds of many people.

If war comes, what we can do directly to promote the emergence of a more desirable Russia? We can hold steadily and clearly in mind the image of the kind of Russia we would like to see and assure that military operations are shaped in such a way as to permit it to come into existence.

The first part of this task is a negative one: not to let ourselves be diverted by irrelevant or confusing concepts of war aims. We can avoid, this time, the tyranny of slogans. We can avoid confusing ourselves with grandiose and unrealistic, or even meaningless, phrases designed simply to make us feel better about the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bloody and terrible business in which we are engaged. We can remember that war—a matter of destruction, brutalization and sacrifice, of separations, domestic disintegration, and the weakening of the deeper fabrics of society—is a process which of itself can achieve no positive aims: that even military victory is only the prerequisite for some further and more positive achievement which it makes possible but by no means assures. We can have the moral courage, this time, to remind ourselves that major international violence is, in terms of the values of our civilization, a form of bankruptcy for us all—even for those who are confident that they are right; that all of us, victors and vanquished alike, must emerge from it poorer than we began it and farther from the goals we had in mind; and that, since victory or defeat can signify only relative degrees of misfortune, even the most glorious military victory would give us no right to face the future in any spirit other than one of sorrow and humbleness for what has happened and of realization that the road ahead, toward a better world, is long and hard—longer and harder, in fact, than it would have been had it been possible to avoid a military cataclysm altogether.

Remembering these things, we will be less inclined to view military operations as ends in themselves, and should find it easier to conduct them in a manner harmonious with our political purposes. If it should fall to us to take up arms against those who today dispose over the Russian people, we can try not to give that people the impression that we are their enemies, or consider them ours. We can try to make them understand the necessity of such hardships as we cannot avoid inflicting on them. We can endeavor to hold constantly before them the evidences of a sympathetic understanding for their past and interest in their future. We can give them the feeling that we are on their side, and that our victory, if it comes, will be used to provide them with a chance to shape their own destiny in the future to a pattern happier than that which they have known in the past. For all of this it is important that we bear in mind what Russia has been, and can be, and not permit political differences to becloud that picture.

National greatness is a difficult thing to define. Every nation is made up of individuals; and among individuals, as is known, there is no uniformity. Some are charming, others irritating; some are honest, others not exactly so; some are strong, others weak; some command admiration, others, by general agreement, are anything but admirable. This is true in our own country; it is true

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Russia. Just what, in these circumstances, national greatness consists of, is hard to say. Certainly it rarely consists of those qualities in which a people thinks itself great; for in nations, as in individuals, the outstanding virtues are generally not the ones for which we fancy ourselves distinguished.

Yet that there *is* such a thing as national greatness is clear; and that the Russian people possess it in high degree is beyond question. They are a people whose progress out of darkness and squalor has been a painful one, marked by enormous sufferings and punctuated by heart-rending setbacks. Nowhere on the face of the globe has the tiny flame of faith in the dignity and charity of man flickered more precariously under the winds that tore at it. Yet it has never gone out; it is not extinguished today even in the heart of the Russian land; and whoever studies the struggle of the Russian spirit through the ages can only bare his head in admiration before those Russian people who kept it alight through their sacrifices and sufferings.

The record of Russian culture to date has proven that this struggle has a significance far wider than the confines of the traditional Russian territory; it is a part, and an extremely important part, of the general cultural progress of mankind. We have only to look at the people of Russian birth or origin living and working in our midst—the engineers, the scientists, the writers, the artists —to know that this is true. It would be tragic if our indignation over Soviet outlooks and policies led us to make ourselves the accomplices of Russian despotism by forgetting the greatness of the Russian people, losing our confidence in their genius and their potential for good, and placing ourselves in opposition to their national feelings. The vital importance of this becomes even clearer when we reflect that we in the outside world who believe in the cause of freedom will never prevail in any struggle against the destructive workings of Soviet power unless the Russian people are our willing allies. That goes for peace, and it goes for war. The Germans, though not fighting at that time in the cause of freedom, learned to their sorrow the impossibility of combatting simultaneously both the Russian people and the Soviet Government.

The greatest difficulty here, of course, lies in the mute and helpless position in which the Russian people find themselves as subjects of a totalitarian régime. Our experiences with Germany have demonstrated that we have not succeeded very well, as a nation, in understanding the position of the man who lives under

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the yoke of modern despotism. Totalitarianism is not a national phenomenon; it is a disease to which all humanity is in some degree vulnerable. To live under such a régime is a misfortune that can befall a nation by virtue of reasons purely historic and not really traceable to any particular guilt on the part of the nation as a whole. Where circumstances weaken the powers of resistance, to a certain crucial degree, the virus triumphs. If individual life is to go on at all within the totalitarian framework it must go on by arrangement with the régime, and to some extent in connivance with its purposes. Furthermore, there will always be areas in which the totalitarian government will succeed in identifying itself with popular feelings and aspirations. The relationship between citizen and political authority under totalitarianism is therefore inevitably complicated: it is never pat and simple. Who does not understand these things cannot understand what is at stake in our relations with the peoples of such countries. These realities leave no room for our favored conviction that the people of a totalitarian state can be neatly divided into collaborators and martyrs and that there will be none left over. People do not emerge from this relationship unscathed: when they do emerge they need help, guidance and understanding, not scoldings and sermons.

We will get nowhere with an attitude of emotional indignation directed toward an entire people. Let us rise above these easy and childish reactions and consent to view the tragedy of Russia as partly our own tragedy, and the people of Russia as our comrades in the long hard battle for a happier system of man's coexistence with himself and with nature on this troubled planet.

V

So much for what we do if, contrary to our hopes and our wishes, a war so much talked about should prove impossible to avoid. But supposing we are faced with a continuation of the present state of absence of major warfare? What should our course of action be then?

First of all, have we any grounds to hope, in these circumstances, that there might be changes in Russia of the kind that we are here envisaging? There are no objective criteria for the answer to this question. There is no "proof" one way or another. The answer rests on something which is partly a matter of opinion and judgment, but partly, admittedly, an act of faith. The writer believes the answer to be a positive one: that we are indeed justified

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in hoping, and holding it possible, that there may be such changes. But in substantiation of this view it is possible to say only the following.

There can be no genuine stability in any system which is based on the evil and weakness in man's nature—which attempts to live by man's degradation, feeding like a vulture on his anxieties, his capacity for hatred, his susceptibility to error, and his vulnerability to psychological manipulation. Such a system can represent no more than the particular frustrations and bitterness of the generation of men who created it, and the cold terror of those who have been weak or unwise enough to become its agents.

I am not speaking here of the Russian Revolution as such. That was a more complicated phenomenon, with deeper roots in the logic of history. I am speaking of the process by which something claiming to be a hopeful turn in human events, claiming to lead toward a decrease rather than an increase in the sum total of human injustice and oppression, evolved into the shabby purgatory of the police state. Only men with a profound sense of personal failure could find satisfaction in doing to others those things which are always involved in such a system; and whoever has had occasion to look deeply into the eyes of a Communist police officer will have found there, in that dark well of disciplined hatred and suspicion, the tiny gleam of despairing fright which is the proof of this statement. Those who begin by clothing a personal lust for power and revenge with the staggering deceits and oversimplifications of totalitarianism end up by fighting themselves—in a dreary, hopeless encounter which projects itself onto the subject peoples and makes of their happiness and their faith its battlefield.

Men of this sort can bequeath something of the passion of the struggle to those of their close associates who inherit their power. But the process of inheritance cannot be carried much further. People can move along, themselves, as by some force of habit, on the strength of an emotional drive acquired at second hand; but it is no longer theirs to transmit to others. The impulses that thrust men of one generation into so despairing an attitude toward themselves and toward the popular masses in whom they like to see themselves reflected become progressively uninteresting to succeeding generations. The cruelties, the untruths, the endless deriding of man's nature practised in the concentration camps: all these institutions of the police state, though they may first

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have something of the lurid fascination that manifestations of danger and anarchy always exert in a well-regulated and composed society, sooner or later end up—like some stale and repetitious pornography—by boring everybody, including those who practise them.

Many of the servants of totalitarian power, it is true, having debased themselves more than their victims and knowing that they have barred themselves from any better future, may cling despairingly to their unhappy offices. But despotism can never live just by the fears of the jailers and hangmen alone; it must have behind it a driving political will. In the days when despotic power could be closely associated with a dynasty or an inherited oligarchy, such a political will could be more enduring. But then, by the same token, it had to take a more benevolent and constructive interest in the people over whom it ruled and from whose labors it fed. It could not afford to live by their total intimidation and degradation. Dynastic continuity compelled it to recognize an obligation to the future, as well as to the present and the past.

The modern police state does not have these qualities. It represents only a fearful convulsion of society, springing from the stimulus of a given historical moment. Society may be grievously, agonizingly ill from it. But society—being something organic, marked by change and renewal and adjustment—will not remain this way indefinitely. The violent maladjustments which caused the convulsion will eventually begin to lose their actuality, and the instinct for a healthier, less morbid, more interesting life will begin to assert itself.

These, then, are the reflections which give the writer, for one, faith that if the necessary alternatives are kept before the Russian people, in the form of the existence elsewhere on this planet of a civilization which is decent, hopeful and purposeful, the day must come—soon or late, and whether by gradual process or otherwise—when that terrible system of power which has set a great people's progress back for decades and has lain like a shadow over the aspirations of all civilization will be distinguishable no longer as a living reality, but only as something surviving partly in recorded history and partly in the sediment of constructive, organic change which every great human upheaval, however unhappy its other manifestations, manages to deposit on the shelf of time.

But how those changes are to come about is something which cannot be foreseen. If there are, indeed, such things as laws of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political development, they will surely play a part here; but then they would be the laws of development peculiar to the phenomenon of modern totalitarianism, and these have not yet been adequately studied and understood. Whether such laws exist or not, developments will be modified both by national character and by the tremendous part which the fortuitous unquestionably plays in the shaping of human events.

These things being so, we must admit with respect to the future of government in Russia, we see "as through a glass, darkly." Superficial evidences would not seem to leave much room for hope that the changes we would wish to see in the attitudes and practices of government in Moscow could come about without violent breaks in the continuity of power, that is, without the overthrow of the system. But we cannot be sure of this. Stranger things have happened—though not much stranger. And, in any case, it is not our business to prejudge the question. It is not necessary for us, merely in order to shape our own conduct in a way conducive to our own interests, to decide what we admittedly cannot really know. We should allow, here, for all possibilities, and should exclude none. The main thing is that we keep clearly in mind the image of what we would like to see in the personality of Russia as an actor on the world stage, and let that be our guide in all our dealings with Russian political factions, including both that which is in power and those which are in opposition to it. And if it should turn out to be the will of fate that freedom should come to Russia by erosion from despotism rather than by the violent upthrust of liberty, let us be able to say that our policy was such as to favor it, and that we did not hamper it by preconception or impatience or despair.

Of one thing we may be sure: no great and enduring change in the spirit and practice of government in Russia will ever come about primarily through foreign inspiration or advice. To be genuine, to be enduring and to be worth the hopeful welcome of other peoples such a change would have to flow from the initiatives and efforts of the Russians themselves. It is a shallow view of the workings of history which looks to such things as foreign propaganda and agitation to bring about fundamental changes in the lives of a great nation. Those who talk of overthrowing the Soviet system by propaganda point, by way of justification of their thesis, to the intensive workings of the Soviet propaganda machine and to the various facets of subversive activity con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ducted, inspired or encouraged by the Kremlin throughout the world. They forget that the outstanding fact about such activities, on the record of the 33 years over which they have been assiduously conducted, has been their general failure. In the end, military intimidation or invasion has been generally necessary for the actual spread of the Soviet system. It may be argued that China is an exception to this statement; but to what extent China can really be said to be part of the Soviet system we do not know, and to attribute the revolution which has taken place in China in these recent years primarily to Soviet propaganda or instigation is to underestimate grievously, to say the least, a number of other highly important factors.

Any attempt at direct talking by one nation to another about the latter's political affairs is a questionable procedure, replete with possibilities for misunderstanding and resentment. That is particularly true where spirit and tradition differ and the political terminology is not really translatable. This appreciation in no way weakens the importance of the "Voice of America," the function of which, with respect to Russia, is to reflect as faithfully as possible the atmosphere and attitudes of this country, in order that the Soviet citizen may form a fair judgment of them. But this is an entirely different thing from urgings toward this or that political action. We may have our own hopes or ideas as to the implications for the Soviet citizen of the view of American realities which is apparent in the broadcasts of the "Voice" and in such other evidences of American life as reach his consciousness; we may think we know what we would do in the light of this evidence; but it would be a mistake for us to be too explicit and to make these things the basis of suggestions and promptings to him about what he should do in the internal political life of his own country. We are too apt to talk in our terms rather than his, and from an imperfect understanding of his problems and possibilities. And our words, accordingly, are apt to convey meanings entirely different from those which we meant them to convey.

For these reasons, the most important influence that the United States can bring to bear upon internal developments in Russia will continue to be the influence of example: the influence of what it is, and not only what it is to others but what it is to itself. This is not to say that many of those things which are now preoccupying the public mind are not of unquestioned importance: such things as physical strength, armaments, determination and soli-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

darity with other free nations. It is not to deny the urgent and overriding necessity for a wise and adroit foreign policy, designed to release and make effective all those forces in the world which, together with our own, can serve to convince the masters of the Kremlin that their grand design is a futile and unachievable one, persistence in which promises no solution of their own predicaments and dilemmas. In fact, there can be no question but that these must remain major preoccupations if war is to be avoided and time is to be gained for the working of more hopeful forces. But they can only remain sterile and negative if they are not given meaning and substance by something which goes deeper and looks further ahead than the mere prevention of war or the frustration of imperialistic expansion. To this, there is general agreement; but what is this "something"? Many people think it only a question of what we urge upon others, in other words, a question of external propaganda. I would submit that it is primarily a question of what we urge upon ourselves. It is a question of the spirit and purpose of American national life itself. Any message we may try to bring to others will be effective only if it is in accord with what we are to ourselves, and if this is something sufficiently impressive to compel the respect and confidence of a world which, despite all its material difficulties, is still more ready to recognize and respect spiritual distinction than material opulence.

Our first and main concern must still be to achieve this state of national character. We need worry less about convincing others that we have done so. In the lives of nations the really worthwhile things cannot and will not be hidden. Thoreau wrote:

> There is no ill which may not be dissipated, like the dark, if you let in a stronger light upon it. . . . If the light we use is but a paltry and narrow taper, most objects will cast a shadow wider than themselves.

Conversely, if our taper is a strong one we may be sure that its rays will penetrate to the Russian room and eventually play their part in dissipating the gloom which prevails there. No iron curtain could suppress, even in the innermost depths of Siberia, the news that America had shed the shackles of disunity, confusion and doubt, had taken a new lease of hope and determination, and was setting about her tasks with enthusiasm and clarity of purpose.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SEA POWER: ABSTRACTION OR ASSET?

By Walter Millis

THE Korean war, the intensified effort of rearmament to which it has led and the attendant "great debate" over policy and strategy have alike compelled a reappraisal of the significance of "sea power" in American defense planning. Mr. Hoover's proposal that the United States should retire behind its oceans and Senator Taft's more moderate variant—suggesting that the United States should confine its contribution for the common defense mainly to its "sea power" and "air power," leaving the "land power" to the Europeans or the Chinese Nationalists—both reveal a new awareness of sea power in the total political-military equation. And both seem to suffer from the many misconceptions which have grown up in the course of years around the whole "sea power" concept.

It is at least a question whether the celebrated thesis of Alfred Thayer Mahan, however stimulating in its day, has not outlived its usefulness. According to a witticism of Philip Guedalla's, if Mahan "discovered nothing in particular he discovered it very well." Modern sailors might be tempted to think that he discovered it, if anything, rather too well. In calling attention to the fact that the operations of war vessels, unseen in their desolate element, had often had an influence on war and history quite disproportionate to that usually accorded them he was introducing a valuable corrective. It was true and important to remember that "power" could be exercised by armed ships—through commerce destruction, blockade, the denial of water routes of attack to an enemy and the opening of such routes to one's own forces—quite as well as by land armies utilizing their normal methods of invasion, physical conquest and occupation. In emphasizing this, however, the Mahan doctrine tended to give to "sea power" an appearance of *independent* reality and influence which it could in fact claim only rarely. The phrase "sea power," if not quite a misnomer, was at best misleading.

It clouded what should be obvious: that the ocean wastes were significant only in relation to land; that the only real prizes of war were land and its resources, and the control it gives over human beings (who could permanently maintain themselves nowhere else), and that all wars were finally decided on land—even

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those in which the closing ceremonies might, as in the Pacific, take place on board a battleship. Even sea power's own unique weapon —blockade—was ordinarily of little military value in itself; its strangling effect derived largely from the excessive exertions imposed upon the enemy by simultaneous land attack. Mahan's correction tended to become an over-correction in the hands of his own followers. And at this point a curious fate overtook it with the appearance of the aviators.

The airmen seized enthusiastically upon the "sea power" doctrine, applied it by analogy to the new element of which they were the masters, and with the resultant concept of "air power" advanced to rule the world—over the obsolete bodies, incidentally, of seamen and soldiers alike. The air, it was reasoned, is a separate element, like the sea; itself uninhabitable, it is also unbounded and gives direct access, not simply to coastal frontiers, as does the sea, but to every land frontier and to the heart of every inhabited community. With sufficient numbers of armed aircraft one might establish a "command of the air" on the pattern of Mahan's "command of the sea;" once that had been achieved, one could then attack not simply an enemy's commerce, not simply his armed forces, but the heart and center of his national resistance—his industrial complex, his civil population, his governmental structure—with directly delivered high explosive. Just as soldiers had in the past failed to grasp the strategic significance and tactical uses of men-of-war, so neither soldiers nor sailors could be trusted to employ wisely a new weapon of such remarkable potentialities. The only answer, the aviators argued, was the recognition of "air power" as a third, independent element in warfare and of the air service as a third and independent military dicipline.

Unfortunately, the analogy, while close, was inexact, and the extension tended to exaggerate all the flaws or weaknesses of the original model. It was inexact, to begin with, in one very important respect. At the very core of the Mahan concept there lay the physical fact that war vessels could not (beyond the very limited range of bombardment artillery) participate in land warfare nor armies fight at sea. Without this physical separation there could have been no "sea power" theory. The military airplane, on the other hand, is of course indissolubly linked with every form of military action. Not only is it indispensable in all kinds of surface operations; the Second World War repeatedly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demonstrated that surface operations were indispensable to the advance and success of "independent" air power. The sailors could with reason claim complete and independent control over the operations of armed ships. The aviators have been constantly bewildered by the fact that they could not establish a similar claim over the military airplane without reducing surface armies and navies to impotence, or at most to the status of mere auxiliaries for completing and securing the victories of "air power."

What militated against the latter course was the uncomfortable yet undeniable fact that in the actual experience of World War II "air power" had largely failed to produce such victories. "Sea power" theory had its weaknesses. "Command of the sea" exercised through a predominant battle fleet could never be as complete or as easy of even partial attainment as the Mahan concept suggested; while new tactics or inventions—such as the submarine in World War I—might qualify it in unexpected ways. "Command of the air" was to prove even more elusive, and even more subject to dispute by new methods and weapons. And even after the establishment of a reasonable degree of "command," the air weapon lacked the decisive effects which had been expected of it. Just as sea blockade took longer than theory always recognized, and was more dependent on the simultaneous application of other forces, so there were definite limits upon what could be done by the air delivery of high explosive. Accurate delivery proved to be very difficult. Enemy military and naval forces rapidly developed effective protective measures; while both civilian morale and the industrial complex proved capable of withstanding an unbelievable amount of punishment. In the end, those real successes which independent or "strategic" air power could claim turned out (as in the case of sea blockades) to be largely a function of the terrific pressures simultaneously applied by surface forces.

Yet "air power" theory, superposed on "sea power" theory, had in the meanwhile embedded the concept of three separate "powers"—diverse in method but roughly equivalent in utility and effect in governing the relations of states—in the popular mind. Curiously enough, this concept was finally written into the organizational structure of the American military system at the close of a war which would seem to have demonstrated above all that military power is unitary; that aircraft, ships and ground

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troops are alike ineffective except when utilized in closest mutual support, and that, since the political decisions which are the ultimate objectives of all military action are attainable only upon land, all power is really "land power" and should be so conceived.

All this was, or should have been, plain enough by the end of 1945; and after some years in which American military policy wandered weirdly in the jungles of inter-service rivalry and amid illusory hopes of "push-button" or gadget warfare, it was suddenly and vividly demonstrated anew with the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. The first confident notion that "air power" would meet the crisis was shattered by a stubborn peasant infantry which had never read the works of "Billy" Mitchell and was pecularily well adapted, by its primitive training and supply system, to defy the costliest weapons of air war. "Sea power" saved the day by its command of ocean routes for prompt reinforcement; but it would obviously have been helpless if the United States, with aid from other members of the United Nations, had not been able to scrape together in time enough ground troops with which the reinforcement could be effected. Once some real "land power" was available, moreover, "air power" acquired a renewed value; for there is no doubt that the United Nations' command of the air, and the very powerful air weapons it was able to deploy, made it possible to retrieve both the first and the later Korean débâcle with many fewer ground troops than would otherwise have been required. The dominant factor in every subsequent stage of the conflict has been the closest possible teaming of all arms and services—the use of amphibious Marines at the Inchon landing, of carrier-borne naval air as tactical support in ground operations far from the coast, of "sea power" to evacuate the 10th Corps from the north and regroup it with the 8th Army, of all forms of air weapons to slow the Chinese advance and open the way for a "limited offensive" which at this writing has shattered another heavy Communist attack and worked its way back nearly to Seoul. Korea is one long lesson in the double fact that all military power is "land power;" and that it can be effectively exercised, under the conditions created by modern technology, only by the most skillful combination and concentration of all available weapons, whether airborne, seaborne or earthborne, to achieve the desired political ends under the particular circumstances which may arise.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What has been re-demonstrated in Korea must surely hold true upon the greater stage of world strategy as a whole. It is idle to think of the United States supplying the "sea" and "air" power while the Europeans and the Chinese provide the "land" component. What is necessary is to look at the total problem, to consider all the various means available for meeting it, to reassess both the military assets and the military liabilities involved and try to make the best possible use of the former while guarding so far as may be against the latter. From such a point of view, the ability of the United States and of the Western nations in general to command and use the sea routes will at once appear as a great asset, but, like most assets, of value only as it can be soundly invested, in conjunction with all other assets and in accordance with some clearly-conceived purpose. In themselves, both "sea power" and "air power" are nothing; all that counts is power—no matter what its shape or in what element it operates—to accomplish some definite political end.

The end, in the present world context, may be simply stated. It is the "containment" of Soviet-controlled Communist dictatorship, while at the same time providing so far as possible for the protection of our people and territories against whatever attacks or reprisals this policy may invite. It is true that the policy of containment has been subject, since it was first clearly defined in an article attributed to Mr. George Kennan in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*, to severe criticism; but its severest critics have failed to supply any very practical or acceptable alternative. Despite all arguments over tactics, timing or methods, it is the policy which has actually governed American foreign relations since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947; and it seems likely to continue to govern in the future.

To succeed, "containment" clearly calls for many other instruments besides those of military power, such as economic and technical aid to threatened societies, political leadership, psychological and propagandist efforts; but events have proved that these, however necessary, are not enough. In face of the large Soviet and satellite armies, military strength is also indispensable; and it is the deployment and application of this military factor which is here alone under consideration. In general, it would seem that military means, as such, can operate toward containment in but two ways. One is by interposing direct physical obstacles—men and firepower—to the advance of Communist

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conspiracy, Communist armies, the whole "apparatus" of the Communist minority police state. The other is by influencing through threats of one kind or another, the decisions of those few powerful individuals who control the "apparatus."[1]

Down until June 1950, the United States, so far as its military policy was concerned, put virtually its whole confidence in the second method. The threat of strategic air war was about its only military instrument through which to control events; and at least since the end of 1947 "strategic air war" has meant in fact the delivery of the atomic bomb on Soviet industrial and population centers. One of the many things we still do not know about war—curiously enough, considering our 6,000 years or so of experience with the subject—is the true efficacy of mass demolition, whether by fire and sword or by atomic energy, in producing the kind of political decision here desired. The lessons of 1939–45 were not, it would seem, particularly encouraging; but they were hardly final, and few Americans would willingly resign the threat value, whatever it may be, of the atomic bomb and its carriers. As a threat, the bomb probably has had a real value in containing the Soviet ground armies; not because it would necessarily bring the armies themselves to a halt with any promptness but because it holds Soviet cities and industrial complexes in hostage, so to speak, for the ground army's actions.

The bomb is still, presumably, a potent political instrument. But its value is depreciating. Its effectiveness as a threat has been severely limited in two ways; one, of course, being the Russians' development of a bomb of their own, which by introducing a counter-threat of reprisals puts a rather drastic restraint upon our own resort to the weapon. The other is the skill with which the Russians have worked out techniques of aggression and expansion against which the threat is more or less inoperative. When it came down to cases in Korea the atomic bomb was not used, primarily because there was nothing we could have done with it which gave any promise of altering the specific situation with which we were trying to deal. The bomb could not blow the Communist infantry out of Korea; even vast devastations of Chinese and Siberian cities would not for a long time paralyze their primitive supply system, while such attacks were scarcely likely to produce in the minds of the Chinese or the Russian leaders the

[1] Influence may be exerted by bribe as well as by threat; by the "carrot" as well as by the "stick." But the carrot does not lie within the competence of the military arm.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kind of decisions which we desired. The bomb has afforded us no means of taking the pressure off Indo-China or Tibet. If, as seems not impossible, Moscow is organizing a military attack on Jugoslavia to be delivered by the satellite armies surrounding that country, the bomb will afford only a very dangerous and unhandy answer, if it affords an answer at all. As long as Soviet Communist aggression follows the methods of piecemeal advance, it will be almost immune to an atomic strategy.

But if threats fail or are inapplicable, the military arm has only one other way in which to effect containment—by putting men and firepower on the ground to interpose a physical obstacle to the Communist advance. Where the advance has already reached a sea barrier, as at the Formosa Straits, commanding naval forces are the necessary instrument, and should be sufficient; elsewhere, the one indispensable requisite is still ground troups, available where they can stop the physical progress of the aggressor army and its supporting police, where they can arrest infiltrators, hold the communications and propaganda and press networks against seizure, and in general maintain the citadels and levers of "power" against that form of sudden capture by an organized minority which represents the basic strategy of Communist aggression.

This was the simple and somewhat brutal fact which Korea suddenly drove home—suddenly, but with such instant, unanswerable conviction that the United States acted upon it in the space of two or three days (when American ground troops were ordered into action) and then in the space of a few weeks rebuilt from the ground up (the phrase may be taken literally) a military policy with which we had been dallying and tinkering since 1945. The wave of armed and organized force which washed down over the 38th Parallel swept away tons of theorizing—military theorizing about "air power" and "sea power" and "land power;" diplomatic theorizing about the susceptibilities of the Soviet Empire; political theorizings about the attitudes and aspirations of the Asian peoples. Abruptly, all this made no difference. It certainly made no difference what the Korean people thought about it; in a matter of days they would either be swallowed by a dictatorship which would give them no further opportunity to think, or force would have to be found to prevent it. It equally made no difference what the jealously-guarded "missions" of the three services might prescribe. It was a case of get out at once—leaving another disastrous breach in the policy of containment

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and another springboard for further Communist advance—or else of putting men and firepower on the ground to retain physical control of the situation. The decision was almost automatic. It was a decision to stay; and the rest has followed.

It was immaterial whether the men were from the Army or the Marines, except that each had special skills which it was important to fit into a pattern of maximum utilization. It was immaterial, except again in the same sense, whether their air support was provided by the Air Force or the Navy carrier planes. Sea control was vital in bringing the men to Korea and maintaining them there; it was subsequently most useful in manœuvring them about the peninsula; and it was able to lend powerful support even to battles far inland—not only by air but also by long-range battleship bombardment—which neither the Air Force nor the Army could have provided. But sea control was validated only by the men on the ground, without whom the carrier planes would have been even more helpless than were the Air Force's Japan-based planes in the first days of the war.

Korea wrote the lesson plain. The policy of containment requires, for success, a military arm; that arm must be based on ground troops, available to control the actual (rather than the future hypothetical) situations which Communist expansion is constantly creating. In a context which is global, these ground troops must have the mobility which can be conferred only by control of the sea routes; they must also have the fullest possible support of tactical aviation, as well as whatever assistance may be lent, under the specific conditions, by longer-range "strategic" air war. The whole must be operated as a team, making optimum use of each available element in accordance with the circumstances presented. The concept of cut-and-dried "missions," which was written into American military policy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferences at Key West and Newport in 1948, seems somewhat questionable. There will be conditions under which tactical air support can best be provided by the land-based planes of the Air Force; but equally there will be conditions, and Korea has afforded examples, under which the Navy's carriers will provide a more prompt and efficient means to the end. The Navy has on occasion performed inland "strategic" missions as effectively as the Air Force; while even in the case of the atomic bomb, which the Air Force has claimed as peculiarly its own, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which it would be desirable to be able to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

launch the weapon from one of the Navy's highly mobile floating "airfields" rather than from the fixed bases of the Air Force. In actual warfare, missions are dictated, not by service politics but by combat conditions.

Korea, at all events, has torn up the military policy which ruled in this country from 1945 to 1950. It is not only that the nation has at last accepted a drastic expansion in the total scale of the military effort—to a point where for the first time since the end of the war it is absorbing a really punishing proportion of the national production—but that the emphasis has been abruptly changed. The new policy is no longer formed around the atomic bomb; it is formed around ground troops. We are trying to get them everywhere, from Western Europe, from Greece and Turkey. We are taking a new interest in Chiang's Nationalists on Formosa and in Tito's ground army. But in trying to get them from others we are also (and it is, as Mr. Hoover apparently fails to realize, an indispensable condition to the success of such efforts) raising them from our own manpower. One of the first responses to Korea was not to order more air groups but to draft four National Guard divisions into Federal service; and we are now trying rapidly to double our total manpower under arms. From relying on machines to serve as substitutes for men, we turned almost instinctively to obtain the men, for whom there is no substitute, leaving it to the machines to support and protect the men and enhance their effectiveness.

This puts the "machine," which includes everything from a B-36 to a bulldozer, from a jet fighter to a cargo ship, in sounder perspective. The West as a whole cannot quickly match the Soviet and the satellite battalions. But given a reasonably firm core of manpower on the ground, it can use its machines to expand greatly the power of the men it does have—provided always that the machines are used with skill, with a firm strategic purpose in mind, and with complete and flexible coördination of the capabilities of the machines. "Air power" is one such machine which would be far more effective in the actual contexts of today if its exponents had given more thought to them. An organization which could quickly make available anywhere in the world the combined tactical resources of the Royal Air Force, the United States Air Force, the United States Navy and Marine aviation, drawing on each component for the particular types of aircraft or training best suited to the particular conditions, would be a powerful

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organization indeed. No such organization now exists. "Sea power" is another machine of the same kind. An organization which could similarly use the combined power of the United States and Royal Navies and their respective merchant fleets to put troops ashore at any desired spot, to supply them and to support them to the full capabilities of modern naval artillery and aviation—or for that matter to supply and support troops already on the ground, as they are in Formosa, in Greece, in Turkey and in Jugoslavia—could again be a very powerful instrument of policy.

Admittedly, it will be some years before the structure of Western defense can be rebuilt to a point at which it will be capable of containing an all-out assault upon Western Europe by the Red Army in full strength. Until that time the atomic threat, for whatever it is worth, must continue to be the main reliance against such an eventuality. But it does not follow that the West in the meanwhile must remain militarily impotent. The West is seriously deficient in ground troops. If, however, it is fallacious to imagine that "air power" or "sea power" can be substitutes or alternates for "land power," there is no fallacy in observing that the West's dominance at sea and its relative strength in military aircraft (of all types and services) can immensely increase the effectiveness of the ground troops it does have. Command of the sea confers upon them the priceless advantage of mobility, and strength in the air gives them a tremendous additional firepower wherever they may be deployed. Properly combined and used, these advantages already confer upon the West very considerable powers for military containment.

We do not yet know the outcome in Korea. As this is written, however, there seems much reason for hope that in the end it will stand as a successful case of military containment—at a point where success was absolutely vital to the entire containment policy—achieved at a cost which, heavy and tragic as it now is, will still be negligible in comparison with the total resources of the Western world. And even this cost would obviously have been far less had the situation been foreseen, had policy been firmly determined in advance and had the then available Western resources been marshalled to meet the crisis.

It is possible, of course, that the hope will be defeated; that the Russians and Chinese will mass another and still greater effort, that the commitment will become too great for the possible gains, and that evacuation will have to be accepted. Even so, the sea

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will make evacuation possible at a time which the West can choose; it will be a battle lost, rather than a war, and lost under circumstances which will make containment along the new line much easier than it would have been had Korea simply been surrendered to the first push of Communist armed force. This is the worst possibility. So far, all one can say is that the original line has substantially been held; and while the holding consumed almost all the military strength which was formed and available in the United States and elsewhere in June 1950, it has put only a minor drain upon our total mobilizable power. Of all our tremendous rearmament effort, very little as yet is actually earmarked for Korea.

One hopes that our enforced resort to military containment in Korea will prove as successful an investment in the end as was our resort to political-economic containment in Greece and Turkey in 1947. Meanwhile, there are other areas where military containment may have to be envisaged, along with political and economic counter force. There is Formosa. There is Indo-China, gateway to Burma, Malaya and Indonesia. There is Jugoslavia, gateway to Greece, Turkey and Italy. There is, though less immediately under pressure, the Scandinavian Peninsula. In respect to all of these a definite plan of action, utilizing all available services and resources, based on the mobility conferred by the sea, the immediate air support which carrier-borne aviation can bring to each of these areas, the possibility of committing land-based air and ground troops without forfeiting the ability to take them off again if need be, would probably have powerful political effect.

Such reasoning obviously lays one open to the charge of advocating a series of small, indecisive peripheral wars, which would "suck in" and waste our whole military strength, leaving us helpless against the hypothetical big encounter, or would alternatively bring on a huge continental conflict before the combined strength of the West was equal to sustaining it. On such grounds the Korean war has already been bitterly criticized. One may perhaps venture certain answering observations. In Korea it is not only Western strength which has been expended; the Soviet imperial system as a whole has certainly felt the strain, and may have felt it even more acutely than the West. It has seen one of its satellite armies—the original North Korean Army, formed, equipped and trained for this particular job of expansion—destroyed as a military force. It has seen the Chinese 4th Army,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which is not only the best-trained and best-equipped but also the most pro-Russian command in Red China, heavily mauled. Some observers believe that the 4th Army has in effect been withdrawn from the campaign, not because it was defeated but because it was too valuable a political-military instrument to be further risked. If so, this would in itself represent a considerable victory for Western arms. There have at the same time been heavy losses in tanks, artillery and similar matériel; no doubt a small matter for the Red Army itself, but making it so much the harder to supply other satellite forces for other adventures. The situation is obscure. But what appears to be current U.N. strategy, summed up in the remark recently attributed to a British officer in Korea to the effect that "Ridgway's interests are homicidal, not geographical," reflects a belief that in Korea the West can do more damage to the basic military potential of the Communist empire than the Communists can do to that of the West.

As for the continental war in Asia, the sea leaves the West with the choice. It has always been difficult to understand the panic lest the United States get drawn into a vast war in China. For a century and a half Western Powers have waged wars with and within China without ever being dragged into such an imagined morass—the reason being that the Western Powers always operated from the sea base and were always able to apply or withdraw pressure as the political ends seemed to dictate. It was only the Japanese, who set out to conquer the country, who got bogged down in a Chinese continental war—and as we discovered in 1941, even they were not bogged down as badly as we had assumed.

Finally, Korea is undoubtedly a "peripheral" action, and an application of its lessons elsewhere might well produce more of them. But in any policy of containment it is the periphery which is vital. Total wars cannot be won or lost on the periphery; but we have not yet reached total war, and it is the whole aim of the containment policy to insure that we never shall. If we do not use the great forces we now have, with skill and resolution and unity of plan, to hold the periphery, then all we can look forward to is the total war, for which our forces are as yet admittedly inadequate.

The plain consequence of all this is not to rebuild "sea power" into a new fetish, but to put a much greater emphasis on sea communications, sea-borne weapons (in which one may well include the amphibious Marines) and sea-based combined operations than has hitherto been accorded them. It would be better, of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

course, to have the power on the ground, where ultimately it will be needed. To some extent, the argument has run parallel here with arguments of certain British critics in the inter-war period, who held that with the mobility and striking power conferred by her ships, aircraft and tanks, Britain could sufficiently control events on the Continent without an undue commitment of men. As a general theory of war it had its flaws. But as an interim policy, under conditions such that the men cannot quickly be provided, it is not to be despised. And even in considering another general war, the sea—always assuming that it is used in proper combination with all other services operating in all other elements —has its uses.

Probably the best way to prevent another general war is to establish a ground power in Western Europe strong enough to insure that any Soviet attempt to overrun it would prove unprofitable. If the attempt, nevertheless, should be made, there would be other ways in which to paralyze the thrust besides either reinforcing on the Rhine or dropping atomic bombs on Moscow. John A. Lukacs[2] has pointed to the comparatively narrow throat between Koenigsberg and Odessa through which all Soviet effort toward the West has to be channelled. This space between the Black Sea and the Baltic is only 750 miles wide (no more than about twice the length of the Northern Korean border) and is further narrowed by the Pripet marshes. It is accessible by sea at both ends, with easy landing beaches for any Power equipped with the ships and air cover to bring men to them and with the amphibious forces to make good the foothold. Mr. Lukacs also observes the rather remarkable sensitivity which Russia has always manifested toward any threat in either the Baltic or the Black Seas. No doubt one should not draw exaggerated conclusions from this. But here at least is a possible opportunity for a properly coördinated ground-sea-air team that might offer decisive results if the Third World War should be joined. It might even—provided the naval as well as ground and land-based air components necessary to take advantage of it were available—have a more important effect than the atomic bomb in averting such a catrastrophe.

"Sea power" as a concept may have outlived its usefulness. The sea, as a great highway of both aggression and of defense, as a platform and base for weapons which can now range far beyond

[2] *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, Washington, D.C., November 1950.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its limiting coastlines, as an element over which complete corps and even armies can now be manœuvred, deployed or withdrawn (as was once, of course, impossible) remains a tremendous military asset, and an asset largely in the hands of the West. But as has been said, it is an asset of value only as it is properly invested in conjunction with all the other assets at hand. Much nonsense was once talked about contests between the "mastodon and the whale" (Russia and Britain), to which some in later years have added the "eagle" as a third member of the cast. A mastodon obviously never could have fought a whale, nor could an eagle do much about either. Modern warfare is beyond such absurdities. All the arms and services today are caught in the same matrix; all are to some extent "triphibious;" their common problem is how to use the capacities of each to the best effect in a total combination. It must, for the Western Powers, be a combination in which the sea takes important place, not as "sea power" but as a vehicle for that national power which can best employ the advantages which the ocean offers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE IMPACT OF REARMAMENT ON THE FREE WORLD ECONOMY

By Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

BOTH the state of the world and the state of the Union are forcing us to reëxamine and redefine our foreign economic policy, especially for Western Europe. Economic recovery for Western Europe within four years' time was both the premise and the promise of the Marshall Plan when it was launched in 1948. Only two years after the plan got under way that recovery was running ahead of schedule in many industries and many countries. But three months thereafter, starting from the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, the pressure of new world events began to alter the political and economic landscape in which the E.R.P. had flourished.

The United States is now engaged in a massive preparedness program. Most of the E.R.P. countries are also rearming and they, too, already feel the effects of the effort. Its burden on our own economy is heavy; and, comparatively, the burden is almost as heavy upon the economies of our principal North Atlantic allies. We shall be spending during the fiscal year starting in 1951 an estimated 48.5 billion dollars for military purposes, or 15.7 percent of our gross national product. The United Kingdom is spending 3.6 billion dollars, or 9 percent, and France plans to spend $2,450,000,000, or 9.7 percent. At the moment, the United States is furnishing its partners in Western Europe with armament aid in the form of ships, tanks, planes, guns, machine tools, spare parts and raw materials at the rate of some $214,000,000 a month; this compares with the $283,000,000 rate at which help for reconstruction in the form of credits, grains and machinery was being furnished during the corresponding months of E.R.P.

All these changing conditions raise basic questions about the economy of Western Europe and the future of our own economic policy. Will the need to rearm extinguish the E.R.P. or merely cause it to redirect certain of its activities into new channels? Will rearming, paradoxically, bring full recovery more rapidly? What is the connection between continued economic aid under the Marshall Plan, and plant expansion and tooling up for military

Note: The author is deeply indebted to Mr. Herbert Harris for his invaluable collaboration in the preparation of this article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might? Can Western Europe increase its over-all productivity to such an extent that it will be able to divert its material and human resources to rearmament without again facing the grim prospect of guns without butter and even very little bread? Do the Western Europeans still require economic assistance beyond the military supplies which we are sending them or helping them to produce? In short, what henceforth should be the goals and nature of American economic relations with Western Europe?

II

For an understanding of economic conditions in Western Europe it is necessary to assess the reciprocal character of the three underlying economic problems with which Western Europe has been grappling since the end of World War II. The first, both in logical priority and in time, was the insufficiency of current production. In 1946 and 1947 Europe was simply not producing enough to live on. To be sure, the crisis took the form of a shortage of dollars. But everyone realized that dollars were short in part because exports to North America and other areas were so small; and that these exports in turn were limited by production rather than by financial dislocation or by the difficulty of selling European goods in American markets.

The second major problem might be called the "exchangeability of resources." By the middle of 1949 it occupied the center of the stage. Western Europe had become prosperous enough to export sufficient goods and services to pay its way. The question was no longer that of insufficient output but rather of the extreme difficulty of selling the things that Europe was making. One reason for the sales problem was that as world production began to catch up with demand, and excess productive capacity was starting to emerge, Europe's currencies were overvalued and its goods overpriced.

The devaluations in the fall of 1949 substantially corrected this impediment. But price was by no means the only obstacle; the European countries could not expand their exports to the United States virtually at will merely by the process of devaluation. This was soon recognized; and by the summer of 1950 the other aspects of selling, namely, product design, packaging, credit terms and advertising, were receiving major attention in Manchester, Brussels, Turin, Lyons and elsewhere. Although it cannot be said that the sales problem was "solved" in the sense in which the produc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion problem was, the devaluations, plus the growing adoption of modern merchandising techniques, plus the boom in the United States in early 1950 indicated that this knot too would be unraveled far ahead of schedule.

The distinction between the ability to produce and the ability to sell must be emphasized because the two things are frequently lumped together under the single heading of "the dollar problem." The underdeveloped areas of the world, like the nations of Western Europe in 1947, have a perpetual "dollar problem" because they have to import capital from the United States. Their economic conditions are such that per capita income and output are too low to sustain a standard of living that can prevent the rise of dangerous social tensions, or support a rate of saving and investment that can insure an ever-increasing amount of productive capacity. The result is that they look to the United States as the likely source of capital to meet their needs. Many countries in the sterling area in 1949 had ample resources available for export but could not earn convertible exchange with their produce. This kind of dollar problem reflects the difficulty of exchanging the output of one economy for the output of others.

The confusion between the problem of the ability to produce and the problem of the ability to sell has sometimes also obscured the real nature of the economic assistance rendered by the United States during the last few years. It is obvious that economic assistance from abroad may both supplement and increase the current output and thus alleviate the first of the two economic difficulties. It is also clear that a grant in aid can relieve the dollar stringency of a country beset by acute troubles in acquiring markets for a sufficient volume of exports to the dollar area. What is confusing is that even where economic aid has been needed to improve a country's ability to sell, that aid has in fact enlarged the recipient's income. This holds true regardless of whether or not aid could be justified on grounds of sheer poverty. Hence the paradox that the United Kingdom, which has received the largest amount of American aid since the war, has been the country with the highest per capita real income in Europe; and hence the paradox of continued aid for countries after both the standard of living and the rate of investment in new productive facilities had risen above prewar levels.

The third problem facing the E.R.P. is particularly complex. It is the question of the distribution of income within the Euro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pean countries. The very use of this term is an oversimplification. The whole issue is hard to define neatly, since it is as much or more a problem of social structure and stratification than of economics. Its importance and form vary widely from country to country. However, three of its most significant aspects can perhaps be identified.

First, in the early phases of postwar recovery, there was powerful inflationary pressure in every European country which gave rise to familiar distortions in the distribution of the national wealth. Where direct controls were weak, or were removed, farmers and various entrepreneurs were greatly benefited at the expense of white collar employees, industrial labor and those living on fixed incomes. In the northern countries, where rigid and effective controls were maintained, the distortions took other forms. Current money income became less important than the amount and kind of food and apparel that the ration card could command. Work incentives were thus seriously impaired. As inflation was brought under control, this particular range of troubles tended to disappear.

Second, there is the persistent question of wider diffusion of immediate recovery gains. In a number of the continental countries industrial profits have been large and growing as recovery progressed; and agricultural revenues have gone up well above prewar levels. By contrast the industrial worker has done badly. Civil servants and the recipients of contractual income also continue to be in a relatively unfavorable position. It is no accident that in France and Italy, which historically have been characterized by great inequality of wealth and income, labor became predominantly Communist and that the pivotal union organizations are still Communist led.

In its third facet, the problem is also one of social structure. It is created by the enormous increase in social security payments, pension allowances and other so-called "transfer" disbursements. In most European countries today (and in the United States) a quite unprecedented proportion of the national income is routed through the fiscal machinery of the government, and paid out in various benefits to individuals. This process redistributes income as between the rich and the poor very imperfectly. The redistribution in fact is between the well and the sick, those of working age and those who are retired, the employed and the unemployed. Universally, the process converts income of the taxpayer into the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

income of the beneficiary. Even if the taxpayer and the beneficiary are the same person, this whole practice has real and perhaps profoundly important consequences. Just what it does to individual incentives is not clear. But clearly it places an extraordinarily heavy burden on the fiscal machinery. It renders even more onerous the task of the finance minister who has to raise additional revenue in order to be able to divert economic resources into, say, rearmament. In Western Europe today, from 20 to 35 percent of the national income is already being committed to "social security" programs. With such a high percentage of national income politically pledged, it becomes immensely more difficult to take another 10 percent for some new purpose, such as rearmament.

III

So much, then, for the attempt to explain the way in which grants of dollars have been used temporarily to compensate for the sheer lack of goods and services, or to make up for a country's inability to exchange its own products in sufficient volume for those of the rest of the world. The ultimate aim of the E.R.P. has been, of course, vastly more ambitious than that of merely trying to keep Europe going while the flow of aid continued. Both as between countries and within countries the recovery funds accomplished far more than merely to make up the deficiency in Europe's resources. They often achieved what would otherwise have been a political impossibility: they provided the more progressive and effective groups within each country with bargaining power they could use in an effort to carry through the often unpalatable measures of self-help that were so necessary.

The process of extending economic aid made it possible to influence ideas and actions by imparting strength to such notable international institutions as, for example, the Organization for European Economic Coöperation. It is doubtful whether this institution would have come into being without the Marshall Plan. Surely it would have had little force without the backing of the United States. But with this support, it has become a part of the machinery by which many key government decisions are made in Western Europe today. Its importance and effectiveness have nothing to do with constitutional powers, but lie rather in the fact that it provides a new kind of clearing house for plans and programs throughout Western Europe. It is a forum where any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

view on a matter of common concern, held by a considerable number of European governments, can be brought to bear persuasively on the others. In this respect it constantly promotes the democratic process.

The acid test of the E.R.P.'s effectiveness, both in approach and in method, is to be found in its record. That record can be best evaluated by looking at the five primary accomplishments to date of the Western European countries with the help of the Marshall Plan. First has been the enormous increase in production—27 percent above prewar levels for industry and 9 percent for agriculture. Second has been the great progress in licking inflation. Indeed, by the first half of 1950, prices and living costs were stable or gently declining throughout most of Western Europe. With some few exceptions, rationing, together with price and other controls, had been abandoned. Third, internal trade was restored. Within each country confidence in the buying power of the national currency rose with the rising output in factory and field. As a result, that most vital trade of all, the exchange of the produce of the countryside for the wares of city and town, was completely restored. Fourth, trade among E.R.P. countries was lifted out of stagnation, and by the middle of 1950 was already 17 percent higher than in 1938. A substantial portion of this trade was freed from the crippling restraints of high tariffs and rigid import quotas. By means of the European Payments Union, and its precursor, currencies were rendered more freely convertible into one another than they had been in 20 years. Fifth was the improvement of Western Europe's external account. In the summer of 1948, Western Europe was importing goods and services from the rest of the world at the rate of 6 billion dollars a year in excess of her current earnings of foreign exchange. Yet by June 1950 this gap between receipts and payments had been reduced to less than 2 billion dollars a year.

These, then, were the five great achievements of the first two years of economic recovery under the Marshall Plan. But recovery can also be defined in terms of what these made possible, as well as in terms of the achievements themselves. By June 1950, for example, there were only a few countries where the volume of resources flowing into consumption was not surpassing prewar standards. Everywhere the most important element in consumption, the diet of the population, was at least quite adequate and, in general, fully up to prewar value nutritionally, if not in variety.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1949 Europe's production had made possible a higher rate of investment—ranging from 13 percent in France to 18 percent in the United Kingdom to 31 percent in Norway—than had ever been attained before. And these results were possible in spite of (or, it may be argued, because of) a heavy absorption of resources by swollen government budgets. Europe was still, to be sure, well short of paying its own way. It was running a deficit in its current accounts with the rest of the world of nearly 2 billion dollars a year. Nevertheless the record remained impressive. The rate at which the United States was contributing resources to the European economy had been reduced by two-thirds along with an increase of 6 percent in total consumption and some 10 percent in the rate of investment.

High on the agenda of the Marshall Plan's unfinished business remains the more equitable distribution of income. The size of labor's pay envelope has grown to greater or less degree throughout Western Europe. Generally speaking, in the northern countries it is well above prewar and the discontents and discords of too-low wage scales hardly exist. But in France, labor's relative position is less favorable than before the war. And in both Italy and Germany wages hardly above subsistence standards prevail alongside of severe unemployment. For this and other reasons there is urgent need for increases in productivity, coupled with a wage and price policy that will improve the relative as well as the absolute position of labor and other groups that have suffered most through both postwar inflation and the persistence of archaic social attitudes. The importance of further progress on this front must be kept in mind in making plans for the future.

IV

The entirely new direction of economic events in the past eight months reflects, of course, the turn in political events. It has influenced prices, production and incomes by way of two economic developments which may be taken as first causes in analyzing the impact of rearmament on the European economy. The first of these developments is the rearmament program of the United States Government. This has generated a powerful inflationary impulse. The second development is the rearmament of Europe, which is beginning to generate an inflationary impulse of its own. The inflationary trend in the United States seems likely to be the larger and occurred nine months to a year ahead of the European.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Up to date the inflationary pressure has not been released through the fiscal operations of the United States Goverment. On a cash basis, there was a surplus in the first three months of 1951 and the deficit will be only moderate in the second. For the current fiscal year as a whole, the cash deficit will be smaller than in the preceding 12 months. The rearmament program in the United States has tremendously quickened private capital formation, and consumer purchases. Both were fed by a rapid expansion of credit, running at an annual rate of 14 billion dollars at the end of 1950. As 1951 wears on, it is hoped that we can slow down the pace of our credit expansion.

But, at the same time, the direct impact of military expenditures will be felt increasingly. It is true that, if the budget is kept close to balance on a cash basis, rising tax revenues will curb the rising demand for goods. But a dollar taken out of the spending stream by taxes rarely cuts the demand for goods as much as a dollar put into the spending stream to buy military hardware cuts the supply of goods. Thus, the mere act of channeling 70 odd billions of dollars through the Federal Treasury is in itself inflationary. Moreover, the pressure to maintain or expand the rate of private investment will become explosive under conditions of full employment, plus. It is a safe forecast that we can expect a strong inflationary movement within the American economy for some time to come.

In assessing the impact of this first cause on the rest of the world, two familiar facts must be kept in mind. The first is that, within the United States, a rearmament boom is being superimposed on the roaring civilian boom that began in mid-1950. With only 5 percent of the civilian labor force unemployed, as compared to 17 percent in 1939, there was very little slack in the American economy when this new and massive preparedness burden was assumed. This carries obvious implications for us and the rest of the world. The demand for imports into the United States has risen along with the demand for everything else. But the United States will have difficulty in enlarging and perhaps maintaining any corresponding flow of exports.

The other fact, less generally appreciated, is that in recent years as the world's output of basic commodities, mainly raw materials but also foodstuffs, has expanded along with industrial production, it has become increasingly costly to develop new sources of food and raw materials. Consequently, it was apparent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

even a year ago that the non-Soviet world was threatened with substantial shortages in such commodities. Even as of last June, industrial production in the United States was 76 percent above the peak rate achieved in 1937, and 81 percent above 1929, the highest previous peacetime record. Meanwhile, in Western Europe as a whole, industrial production was about 27 percent above prewar. In Canada, Australia, Brazil and the Argentine, the percentage increases over prewar were likewise impressive. Japan was the only great industrial nation whose production lagged. Broadly, then, raw materials were being chewed up in the free world at a rate half again as great as ever before. By contrast, agricultural output was little higher than prewar anywhere except in the United States. Although the current output of most of the important metals had increased more or less proportionately with the industrial production indexes, there was reason for grave concern about the future. Attempts to raise current production could be thwarted by lack of raw materials. Our own great reserves of low-cost iron ore had been virtually depleted. Entirely new sources are being developed in Labrador and Venezuela. The pinch of limited supplies of iron ore was being felt in Europe and Japan as well. For many other materials, notably minerals, production will respond only with time, and after the prospect of high returns over a long term has provided sufficient inducement. The free world is similarly faced with at least temporary shortages in a long list of agricultural commodities.

The effect on prices and on the pattern of world trade of the other first cause—the process of rearmament in Europe itself—is yet to be felt. In most of Europe, the new orders for military equipment are just beginning to be placed. Their effect on government expenditures and individual production is scarcely visible. As in the United States, however, the actual expansion of military production has been preceded by an anticipatory spurt in private buying and in civilian production, and this has reinforced, but only in small degree, the world-wide effects of the boom in the United States.

As rearmament in Europe gathers momentum, its impact will be sharpened by circumstances very much like those prevailing in the United States. In France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and Britain employment has steadily risen during the past three years especially, when very little unused industrial capacity remained. In broad terms, rearmament throughout Western Europe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is being imposed on economies often as tightly strained as our own. To be sure, Italy and Germany still have a large amount of unemployment. In the middle of 1950 both countries had scope for considerable industrial expansion. But substantial as this latitude may still be, it is nowhere near so great as might be suggested by the unemployment figures. A good deal of that unemployment derives from a growth in the labor force that has never been matched by a corresponding growth in productive capacity. In Italy this has been the result of a rapid natural rise in population; in Germany of the enormous influx of refugees from the East. Both countries contain many more workers than can be employed very productively. It is also a pretty safe forecast, then, that Western Europe will be producing under forced draft by the middle of 1951. There, as here, the rearmament program will require both the diversion of resources from civilian to military production and a substantial increase in total output.

Only when the parallelism between the situation of Western Europe and that of the United States is recognized can one grasp the way in which rearmament in the Western World is likely to affect Europe's economy. Europe and North America (and, it may be added, Japan) are in the same boat, whether they like it or not, in more than a political sense. For these are the great industrial centers of the free world. And with the exception of the three ex-enemy countries, their economies have been sprinting and have kept their populations fully employed during more recent years. Even in Italy, Germany and Japan, near-capacity operation is being reached. The alignment of free nations must now begin to spend collectively at the rate of something like 70 billion dollars a year for rearmament. It is scarcely surprising that inflation is again the great internal problem. Nor is it surprising that the great external problem is how to maintain a sufficient supply of foods and raw materials on not too exorbitant terms.

What effect will United States and European rearmament have upon Europe's ability to trade, and to keep herself supplied with the goods and services which she must have from the rest of the world? It should be noted in passing that the control of internal inflation may be more important as well as more difficult for Europe than the question of her foreign trade. Indeed, internal inflation can be a serious threat to the military strength of the North Atlantic community. If inflation is not controlled, it can undo everything that has been accomplished in the last three years. It

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can again distort the pattern of income distribution and undermine the loyalty even of those now faithful to the idea of a free society. If carried far enough, inflation would begin to interfere with both production and trade. But this is largely an internal problem for the Europeans, as it is for us. It will probably be handled in a fashion far from perfect. But it will be handled well enough to avoid a serious hampering of production and trade and a renewed distortion of income. If we assume that this is what is going to happen, the actual and prospective changes in Europe's trading position can be set forth with considerable confidence.

The first change has already occurred. Since the inflationary boom in the United States appeared earlier than it did in Europe, the first economic consequence of the Korean crisis was a sharp improvement in Europe's balance of payments with the dollar area. As recently as June 1950, it seemed likely that the dollar deficit would be at least 2 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1950–51. When the year is over it may well turn out to have been less than 1.5 billion dollars. Even before the current crisis, the United States market was booming, and the exports of the European countries to the United States expanded far more rapidly than had been expected. From a low of $82,000,000 per month in the first half of 1950 they rose to $151,000,000 per month in the fourth quarter for December. In less than a year, there was a larger increase in dollar earnings than had been hoped for by the very end of the Marshall Plan. At the same time, active demand and high prices in the United States helped to reduce the volume of exports to Europe. Moreover, this improvement in the ability to earn dollars will almost certainly last for the duration of the vast rearmament program in the United States. Temporarily at least, the exchangeability of European resources for those of the dollar area has been largely solved.

The second major change has also taken place. Inflationary pressure in the United States set off an explosive rise in commodity prices. From June 1950 to December 1950, the price per pound of crude rubber increased from 23.5 cents to 71.4 cents; the price of wool rose from 67.8 cents per pound to more than $1.13; tin mounted from 77.8 cents per pound to $1.46. The prices of many other raw materials went up in similar fashion. Though industrial prices have also been rising fast, the sharp shift in the terms of trade has favored the producers of raw materials. Such a shift in terms of trade means, of course, that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe must export more industrial products than before to obtain the same imports.

These changes delineate Europe's economic problem for the next several years. The problem is not that of exchanging resources, but of turning out enough manufactured goods to produce a sufficient supply of food and raw materials. As in the early phase of postwar recovery, the question posed by rearmament is how Europe can double or triple its expenditures, maintain a tolerable standard of living, continue enough capital investment for the European economy to expand, and still pay its way in the world in the face of adverse terms of trade. Thus formulated, Europe's problem is identical with our own.

In one very important respect the problem today differs from that of the first two and a half years of the Marshall Plan. There were still a few scarce commodities in 1948. But dollars would buy most of the things Europe needed, and could therefore make possible the ultimate solution of Europe's difficulties. The situation faced by Europe today is different. The world-wide shortage of raw materials does not result merely in adverse terms of trade. If, in other words, it were possible to buy any amount of copper, aluminum, steel, wool, or sulphur merely by paying a high enough price, then Europe's problem (and ours) would be a financial problem, serious, but relatively easy to remedy. The sheer unavailability of needed commodities offers a problem of a quite different kind. Today an allocation ticket or an export license is becoming a more important kind of currency than a dollar bill. Even if the Europeans had dollars enough to buy, at current prices, all the raw materials they need, they would not now be able to do so, because raw material supplies cannot readily be expanded. Rationing to producers is already widespread. And there is no way in which a country (any more than an individual) can increase its supply of tickets by devaluation or any of the techniques of "earning" dollars. Whatever the United States is going to do about Europe must take this basic fact into account.

Before coming to grips with the question of an American policy to meet this circumstance, the importance of specific shortages must be emphasized. If these shortages appeared merely in particular consumer goods, it would be possible somehow to determine the appropriate shares of all the countries of the free world. If consumers have to substitute black sidewall tires for white, their disappointment will not bring the economy of Europe to a halt.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An extreme shortage of meat is much more serious. And shortages of key components and of vital raw materials are apt to be lethal. A shortage of 20,000 tons of sulphur in the United Kingdom can cut output and result in idle plants and men in a whole range of industries. The shortage of a few spare parts or of certain essential pieces of equipment can paralyze many productive facilities and many skillful workmen. Second only to the danger of inflation, such shortages are the worst peril to Europe on the economic front. They can affect everything from ingots to shoes; they can thwart effective rearmament. For a year or so it might be possible to sustain rearmament out of a static or shrinking national income. But unless the European economy is dynamic and expanding, the time will never come when Europe can support itself at a decent level and still bear the cost of military strength. Yet this paralysis is a real possibility unless vigorous measures are taken to deal with specific shortages.

V

If this is the shape of Europe's economic problem for the next two or three years, what should the United States do about it? Any answer reflects an individual judgment, and the correctness of the answer cannot be conclusively demonstrated by objective evidence. Similarly the execution of any policy is subject to human fallibility. What follows, therefore, is a brief summary of the particular procedures which would seem to be indicated, offered in no oracular spirit and in recognition of the precept that the first law of life is change.

First: Europe will need further economic aid. But we must carefully weigh its amount, administration, purposes and methods. Its purpose must be to enable the Europeans to rearm without such setbacks in internal economic conditions as would weaken the existing fabric of European society or weaken its potentialities for acquiring greater strength. We must constantly remember that the fundamental difficulty at present is not that of selling goods and services for dollars, but the insufficiency of Europe's current output to meet her minimum needs, first for rearmament, second for export, and third to sustain the domestic economy. Here we must note a serious difference of approach between the American and European views.

In the view of the Finance Ministers of Europe, the great purpose of American aid is to resolve the problem of balancing their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

respective budgets. This is not a standard the United States Government can afford to accept. When dollars are provided to a country as economic aid they go into the bank or stabilization fund, and an equivalent sum of local currency is available (in the form of counterpart or simply as government revenue) to cover the government expenditures. If the amount thus received is greater than the country's balance of payments deficit, then the central bank takes in more dollars than it has to pay out. It accumulates gold or dollar balances. What really happens, therefore, under these circumstances, is that the supply of local currency is increased, but the increase has the backing of larger gold or dollar holdings. To put the matter in less kindly terms, the government's expenditures are covered, in part, by printing more of its own currency, and the increase in gold or dollar balances serves to maintain confidence in the currency and to lend a cloak of financial respectability to the transaction. Gratifying though this may be, it hardly seems an appropriate use of funds supplied by the United States taxpayer. The burden on us will be heavy enough in the years immediately ahead if we rearm as we must, and, at the same time, finance the import surplus that our European allies will have to incur. There is no valid reason why we should, in addition, allow our allies to accumulate claims against us as backing for the expanded circulation of their own currency.

Second: The amount of economic aid may have to be fully as large as that actually furnished in the current fiscal year. The winter of 1950–51 has been a period in which the European countries already felt the beneficent effect of American inflation on their dollar supply. But they had only begun to feel the adverse effects of unfavorable terms of trade and of their own rearmament. To put this point concretely, Western Europe's exports to the United States began climbing in midsummer and reached a very high level by December, as already recorded. The imports from the United States have been falling continuously since 1948 and were lower during the summer than for many years; and they have stayed down. At the same time, exports to the rest of the world from the metropolitan countries of Europe held their own or went up during the last six months of 1950, and the value of Europe's imports had risen little by December. But this favorable turn of events may prove temporary. One reason that Europe's actual disbursements for imports remained as low as they did was because goods that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were flowing in across Europe's frontiers in December were those for which contracts had been let months before. It is predictable, therefore, that the value of imports, especially from the primary producing areas, will rise as 1951 wears on and recent price increases have their effect.

Even more important in interpreting recent events is the fact that the expansion of military production in Europe had barely begun by the date of the latest available trade statistics. The diversion of raw materials, labor and industrial facilities to armaments is bound to cut into European supply. This is true not only as a matter of general economic logic but for particular reasons. As Europe recovered, the engineering and metal fabricating industries have, by and large, made the best export record. Automobiles, ships and all manner of capital goods have sold well. But these are the very lines that will be hardest hit by the conversion to military production. The central fact about Europe's trading position, therefore, is that the favorable developments of the last half of 1950 were temporary. The European economy cannot sustain the pace of recent trade, increase the pace, keep step with rising import prices, and, at the same time, rearm. Just as the unmanageable surplus in the United States balance of payments was converted in a comparatively few months into a $2,000,000 deficit, so it appears highly probable as of the date of writing that the balance of payments of the metropolitan countries of Europe will deteriorate sharply when the burden of rearmament begins to bite.

In general terms, this is the reason why continued aid to most of Europe cannot be ruled out. But this explanation leaves the ultimate query unanswered. Although Europe's current output may not be large enough to meet Europe's urgent needs, can the United States spare more aid from its own strained economy to make up the balance? Are we to become a new Atlas bearing the economic burdens of the whole world?

The answer to this question cannot be more than an expression of opinion. But one opinion at least rests on the following basis. There is no significant Communist movement in the United States. There is no large political group on the extreme right with the kind of feudal mentality which questions the fundamental principles of a democratic society. The labor and liberal movements have cleansed themselves, on the whole, of Communist influences. While the labor movement is vigorous and aggressive, it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

does not, despite some fears of "Socialism," seek fundamental change in the character and contours of American society. Indeed, the fabric of that society is far stronger and more closely knit today than virtually anywhere else in the free world. There is not only a spirit of underlying unity within American society, but the United States is by an enormous margin the wealthiest nation in the free world. Finally, the threat of Soviet invasion is less immediate and frightening in North America than in Europe.

Taking these considerations together, it is at least plausible to reason that since Europe cannot carry out the task of rearmament by drawing on its own resources alone, the cost to the United States of furnishing the needed aid would be less than the cost of failing to do so. The aid required would cost the United States less than 1 percent of our gross national product. The cost of refusing to lighten the burden on the Europeans by this amount would probably be either their failure to rearm, or a deterioration of their will to survive in freedom.

Of course, no generalization applies to all European countries. The present degree of recovery differs widely from country to country. Britain can probably stand the drain of devoting nearly as large a proportion of her resources to rearmament as we can, with no worse effects. But the major continental countries—France, Italy and Germany—have not regained full health. There is widespread disaffection on the left in two of these countries. In all three the extreme right displays a notable lack of loyalty to the aims of freedom and an equal lack of ability to accommodate itself to imperative social change. It may well be within our power to compel the governments of these countries to impose excessive strains upon themselves. But until necessary adjustments in European society have been made which restore health, stability and the confidence of the people in the future, it would be the greatest folly to attempt to exert such pressure.

Third: The United States must join the Europeans in an effort to increase the supply of scarce foods and raw materials, to utilize them with maximum efficiency, and to hold down their prices. In this endeavor, we obviously have a common interest. The Europeans certainly cannot accomplish these purposes alone and it is doubtful if we could safeguard ourselves without their help. Nevertheless, to be successful we shall have to bargain with the Europeans and with the primary producers in a tough-minded fashion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To be effective any such policy must include at least three elements. To begin with, Europeans and American must find ways to prevent the terms of trade from continuing to shift against them. There are many devices they can jointly invoke. The most gentlemanly, if it will work, is the control of supplies and prices by agreement among exporting and importing countries. If this will not work, or if agreements require enforcement, import controls may be used and the industrial countries can resort to exclusive buying in particular markets as in World War II. The success of such a buying club will depend on the discipline of members in not breaking away for the sake of individual gain. The problem of securing discipline among ten important industrial countries when the occasion is rearmament is quite different from the problem facing an Anglo-American alliance during a shooting war.

Even if such a policy could successfully be enforced, however, it would be not only unfair to the primary producers but too austere for the industrial nations as well. Britain's stalemate with the Argentine over meat is a perfect example of the way in which the effort to drive too hard a bargain can dry up supply. The fact is that, rearmament aside, the world is facing a relative shortage of primary commodities. The purpose of international arrangements to control price should not be to milk the primary producers, or even to reduce the terms of trade to some traditional ratio, but rather to prevent a destructive rise in commodity prices. For this would provoke a damaging inflation in the primary producing areas as well as in the industrialized sectors of the free world.

If the first element in an effective policy is price control, the second must be a skillful and ordered use of consumer goods, capital goods and industrial products to elicit food and raw material supplies. The primary producing nations, at least, remember that trade is, ultimately, barter. In World War II they accumulated, in the aggregate, 30 or 40 billion dollars of dollar and sterling balances; that is, they sold goods to this prodigious value in exchange for I.O.U.'s. While the war continued, they found themselves in the grip of tight controls, enforced, ultimately, by the allied control over shipping. These controls made them unable to obtain what they regarded as the absolute necessities of life. Then the postwar inflation cut the value of their holding by one-third. It is altogether understandable that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they will do everything in their power to avoid playing this particular game again.

Moreover, their power is considerable at this moment for two reasons. First, precisely because of the relative scarcity of the primary commodities. And second, because this time they have a wide market in which to trade. So long as the North Atlantic nations are in a state of only partial mobilization, so long as vessels carrying the Panamanian flag can still trade freely, controlled by no Ministry of War Transport or War Shipping Administration, the bargaining power of the primary producers is probably greater than that of the industrial nations. Under these circumstances, the refusal of one industrial country to supply its normal volume of coal, petroleum, steel, textiles and even a small flow of capital equipment is bound to cut in return the supply of meat, grains, coffee, non-ferrous metals, rubber and all the other primary commodities that are the sinews of rearmament.

This is not an argument for treating the primary producers with rash generosity. It is clearly to the interest of the North Atlantic allies collectively to drive a hard bargain in terms of quantities as well as in terms of prices. But it would be disastrous to fail to make any bargain or to fail to include Europe's industrial output as an element in that bargain. To view the problems as simply a series of bilateral trades for the United States or the United Kingdom or France would be to lose sight of their essential nature. What is needed is machinery to enable the North Atlantic countries to act in concert in making the best possible use of their exportable surplus of industrial goods to obtain the primary commodities they require. To help blueprint such machinery and put it to work is an inescapable part of our task today.

Fourth: The final element of an effective policy in this field must be a control over the use of scarce materials which will direct them to essential purposes in Europe as well as in North America. The United States must see to it that materials are not more freely available for relatively low priority uses in Europe than here. Yet we must avoid, if at all possible, a major dislocation of European industry. To pursue this latter course in a flexible, common-sense manner is one way in which the United States should extend aid to Europe in the years immediately ahead.

An inadequate supply of raw materials to Europe will not only impede rearmament directly, but will also cut back European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

production in general and reduce productivity in particular. This development could, therefore, both impair Europe's strength and widen the fissures in European society, thus gravely weakening our allies. Some dislocation of European industry is, no doubt, inevitable. But it should be the policy of the United States to prefer to curtail luxurious use of scarce materials here rather than to force a cutback in production abroad. In the long run, this procedure would reduce the real burdens on the American people and would contribute both to a spirit of coöperation and to larger output for the Western alliance.

It is not easy to see how the whole series of complex and interrelated bargains about commodities will be made by the United States Government. But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that skill in this activity can probably do more for the success of our cause than the furnishing and administering of financial aid. It is, of course, mandatory for us to continue to finance some transfer of resources to Europe. Yet the major preoccupation of American foreign economic policy must henceforth be to make the best use of the things we export in order to obtain the goods, and to induce the behavior that the American interest requires.

Fifth: In the administration of aid, and in our other contacts with Europe on economic concerns, we must do everything in our power to help raise productivity and improve the distribution of income in continental Europe. This is, as previously remarked, the unfinished business of the Marshall Plan. It has become even more crucial now than before the beginning of rearmament. For the next two or three years, the resources of the free world will simply not be adequate to support a further rise in the standard of living. The rate at which economic conditions improve for the average European is bound to slacken, even on the most optimistic assumptions. In some countries, the rapid gains which marked the last few years will be followed by a setback. It is vital for the strength of the free world that this setback be as limited as possible. Moreover, since some setback is inevitable, it is doubly necessary that distribution of income be more equitable, and that we help to generate among all Europeans a sense of progress and a hope for large and lasting advances over the long haul.

These advances must be rooted in an increase in productivity. The phrase is appealing; it would seem that everyone must favor an increase in productivity and that everything that would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hasten this result must have the support of all parties and of all classes. But let there be no misunderstanding on this score. A great many people in Europe will have to face the hard cold facts if anything is to be accomplished. Higher productivity is unlikely if restrictionism continues to be the order of the day in finance, industry and commerce. To revive genuine competition in Europe means not only to eliminate most trade barriers at national frontiers but, in a very real sense, to revive the entrepreneur class. In plain terms, that means men willing to accept and to act on the central principle of modern capitalism, namely, that profits are the reward of risk, enterprise, efficiency, innovation and sound labor relations.

A vigorous and free labor movement is a prerequisite for that kind of industrial society. Today the Continent's labor movement is social democratic in Scandinavia and the lowlands, but Communist dominated in France and Italy. The minority of free unions in these countries cannot regain the leadership of the masses unless they are aggressive. And an aggressive labor union, at least over the short run, may seem to harm rather than help the interests of those against whom its aggressiveness is directed. There is no telling just what inroads a truly competitive industry in Europe would make against many institutions that are carry-overs from feudal days. Higher productivity is as necessary in agriculture as in industry. And to increase output, reforms in land tenure as well as in agricultural methods must be adopted. In short, if a vigorous society is again to flourish in Europe, changes in the structure of the European economy must be carried through. The pressure of external political events lends an urgency to the need for change that vastly magnifies the difficulty of bringing it about. It may be argued that this is the design for a New Deal in Europe. But any such argument will be far from the truth. What is necessary is a peaceful revolution which can incorporate into the European economic system certain established and attractive features of our own, ranging from high volume production to collective bargaining.

What social forces can be unleashed in Europe to achieve this result? What leverage can the United States exert to foster them? The detailed answer would require a volume. The broad answer is that the United States must exploit to the full the example of its own accomplishments and their powerful appeal to Europeans (and others) among all groups. Coca-Cola and Hollywood movies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may be regarded as two products of a shallow and crude civilization. But American machinery, American labor relations, and American management and engineering are everywhere respected. The hope is that a few European unions and entrepreneurs can be induced to try out the philosophy of higher productivity, higher wages and higher profits from the lower prices of lower unit cost. If they do, if restrictionism can be overcome at merely a few places, the pattern may spread. The forces making for such changes are so powerful that, with outside help and encouragement, they may become decisive. It will not require enormous sums of money (even of European capital) to achieve vaster increases in production. But it will require a profound shift in social attitudes, attuning them to the mid-twentieth century.

Finally, it cannot be said too often that an effective United States economic policy toward Europe cannot be passive; it must be affirmative and active. Consequently, the American interest demands constructive social and economic change in the free world. The United States Government cannot help being (as it has been for the last three years) concerned with such matters as the distribution of income in Germany, the wages of industrial labor in France, the ownership of land in southern Italy, and the commercial and financial policies of the British Government. A blundering interference in these matters would, of course, frustrate its own purpose. And it must remain a cardinal precept of our foreign policy that it is no business of ours to try to upset a deliberate and orderly democratic choice of the people of any country about the conduct of their own affairs. Affirmatively, however, the conduct of our foreign policy must consist in the use of all the elements of American strength to encourage, among other things, the progressive developments in the world that alone can make it peaceful and safe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PHILIPPINES: WHERE DID WE FAIL?

By Albert Ravenholt

AMERICANS who have assumed that in the Philippines we did a model job of starting a colonial people toward independence and prosperity are now experiencing a rude shock, and there are others to come. Less than five years after the establishment of the new Asian nation, our hopes —and those of the Filipino people—have been met with the emergence of something acceptable neither to us nor to them.

It is now evident that the Philippines do not have an adequate foundation for developing democracy under their own leadership and with their own resources. Mismanagement, corruption and failure to enforce needed reforms have destroyed public confidence in the Government and contributed to a breakdown in administration and economic life. Possibly more than anywhere else in the Far East, society in the Philippines is coming apart at the seams. Internal developments in the Islands make it unrealistic to think of the Philippines as a secure military base for the United States and its allies at this time. In view of the need for a viable American position in the Pacific and Asia we now are being forced to improvise answers to these fundamental problems.

The Communist-led Hukbalahaps are the most dramatic symptom of the social disease that affects all levels of life in the Philippines. These guerrillas have set aside government authority in some of the richest rice-growing areas on the main island of Luzon. Their strength now is expanding rapidly on the smaller southern islands. The major Huk attacks have been carefully timed and well coördinated. From their mountain bases they have struck simultaneously at widely separated Constabulary posts. Wherever they succeeded in killing or dispersing the defending garrison, they usually looted government offices for money and documents and seized all arms. They also made off with medical supplies commandeered from hospitals and stores. During such raids the guerrillas have killed a number of wealthy landowners and suspected police informers.

In retaliation the Philippine Constabulary has wiped out entire villages and sometimes learned later that the Huks actually were elsewhere. The majority of the combat units of the armed forces of the Philippines, numbering about 37,000 men, today are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tied down battling the Huks. But so far they have failed to "settle the dissident question." Instead, during the last three years the Huks have welded themselves into a force resembling the early Chinese Red Army. Their regular troops are believed to number between 10,000 and 15,000 men well-armed with light weapons. An equal number of partly trained men are reported to be in an organized reserve. In addition, the Huks have thousands of sympathizers in the rural and urban areas who assist the guerrillas in maintaining a superior intelligence network.

The small corps of senior Huk leaders—including their *Supremo,* Luis Taruc—are avowed Communists. However, many of the guerrilla soldiers are boys still in their teens who left the farm because of wretched rural conditions. Others are veterans of the war against Japan who resented the U. S. Army's failure to award them the back pay and recognition given many of the more politically respectable guerrilla units.

So far the Huks have avoided large-scale planned attacks upon Americans and American installations. The available evidence suggests that their leaders do not want to arouse American attention and action at this time. However, should they choose to do so, it would be possible for the guerrillas to isolate our major Air Force base at Clark Field. At present it is frequently necessary to ship supplies from the port of Manila to Clark Field in truck convoys to guard against bandits. Several of the other and now inactive military bases which we have leased in the Philippines would be equally vulnerable to guerrilla attack. Should United States troops garrisoning our bases be forced into combat with the Huks there is the danger that the Communists could exploit the struggle as evidence of "American imperialism" among their nationally sensitive countrymen. It is with this in mind that thoughtful Filipino army officers have discouraged suggestions of direct American military participation in the war with the Huks.

This Hukbalahap movement meanwhile is capitalizing upon several unhealthy developments in the postwar Philippine society. They are helped by the popular fear and hatred in the rural areas of the Philippine Constabulary—the 7,000-man national police force. In some districts Constabulary commanders are paid substantial sums by large landowners in return for collecting rents and guarding property. Some landlords complain that Constabulary officers in their areas have taken over and are collect-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing most of the crop for themselves. There is substantial evidence to indicate that the Constabulary usually has seized considerably more rice from the farmers than have the foraging Huks. On paper, the Constabulary last summer was incorporated into the armed forces of the Philippines and is slated for reorganization. But prosperous Constabulary commanders also acquired political power and regular Filipino army officers schooled in the American military tradition have been prevented from cleaning up the force.

It is estimated that after Japan's defeat perhaps half a million weapons were held by private individuals in the Philippines. Additional arms were left in poorly-guarded surplus dumps turned over to the new government. There thus was an unlimited supply of weapons for criminal elements and those at loose ends due to unemployment and postwar dislocations. The Huks have outfitted themselves from the same sources. To date no adequate effort has been made to gather in most of these weapons. Some of the surplus dumps now are owned by politically powerful individuals who have sold arms to Communist China and other buyers.

At the root of the Hukbalahap problem, however, is the dissatisfaction generated by the growing numbers and poverty of the Filipino farm families who constitute almost three-fourths of the population. Within the last 10 years the population of the Islands has increased by 25 percent, but agricultural production has not yet reached its prewar average. Meanwhile, the "sharkskin gentry class," which includes roughly 1 percent of all Filipinos but controls most of the wealth, has taken a larger slice of the returns for itself.

Land in the Philippines, as in many other Asian countries, long has been the safest investment. With the steadily rising price of land it has become almost impossible for an ordinary farmer ever to buy the land he farms. Meanwhile, the growing population has created more tenants competing for the same land; thus the large landowners who usually dominate the local courts have been able to dictate their own terms. As a consequence the laws reducing land rents passed by the Philippine Congress since the war have not been enforced. In large areas the tenants who by law should be paying not more than 30 percent of their crops as rent actually are delivering more than 70 percent to the owners. The latter frequently are the only source of credit. Interest rates on loans in some of the richest agricultural areas are between 100 and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

200 percent per year. Many tenants are so deeply in debt that they have no hope of ever getting out from under this burden; they are in effect the property of the person whose land they work. As a general rule, farm productivity per man is the lowest in provinces with the highest rates of tenancy, and the Hukbalahaps are most active in those provinces.

The Philippines have large areas of potentially rich, underdeveloped land, particularly on the southern island of Mindanao. According to law some of these areas are supposed to be open for homesteading. Land registration, however, is so confused and is so infected with corruption that many small farmers who "proved up" their homesteads in 1935 still have not received title. They are unable to sell their land or use it as security for a loan. Meanwhile, individuals with political and financial power have laid claim to large sections of the public domain that are permitted to lie idle. Consequently, even the few tenant farmers with the necessary capital to move onto and develop new land often encountered insuperable difficulties.

The abuses of this system of land ownership are made more destructive because of the primitive character of Filipino agriculture. Some of the larger sugar, pineapple and hemp plantations have applied modern methods to production. But the ordinary Filipino *tao* lives and farms almost the way his ancestors did 100 years ago. Average annual rice production per acre in the Philippines compares unfavorably with most other countries in the world despite the naturally rich soils. The ordinary farmer does not use commercial fertilizer or improved seed such as have enabled Japan and Formosa to produce bumper crops for many years. He is ignorant of modern methods of controlling pests and plant disease. His storage and marketing facilities are primitive and wasteful. Irrigation and drainage methods that have been common practice in China for centuries are used only on limited areas. The Filipino tenant farmer who is part of this system lacks both the knowledge and incentive to grow the additional food which he and his country require to maintain even the present low level of livelihood.

We Americans have a direct share of the responsibility for some of these conditions. When our administration was first established in the Philippines we recognized the Spanish land grants. Thereby title covering large sections of land and entire towns was awarded to families and religious orders originally

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

granted only tax collection rights over that area by the Spaniards. Many Filipino families working this land once had been farmer-owners. Our action legalized a process that had gone on for more than a century and gave the tenants no compensation for land they had once owned. During several American administrations a beginning was made toward buying up large estates and reselling them to tenants. But the program never was implemented on a broad scale. After the Commonwealth was established in 1935 Filipinos with property used their growing political power to block reforms.

The abuses of this system would have been less severe if we had made certain that Filipino agriculture was modernized and the productivity of the average farmer steadily raised. But our policy of emphasizing agricultural research and education while failing to insure extension of improved methods to ordinary farmers made the pressures of a rapidly growing population both politically and technically destructive.

The present government of the Philippines has done an even poorer job of building up agriculture. Although farming is the most important source of livelihood and accounts for more than one-half of the national income, only about one-fourth of one percent of the budget for the fiscal year 1951 was appropriated to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The agricultural scientists trained during the American administrations are growing old; and because of the lack of opportunity, few young Filipinos are coming up to take their places. The Government has attempted to increase food production by creating a number of corporations to grow and distribute agricultural commodities. These corporations have absorbed and sometimes wasted large appropriations. They have hampered healthy agricultural development and made only a limited contribution to increased production.

Low agricultural productivity and miserable living conditions are partly responsible for the unhealthy state of labor in the larger cities where the Communists are making a major bid for support. Lack of opportunity on the farm pushes a growing number of young people to the cities. But the industrial revolution has not yet reached the Philippines and there is no expanding demand for a large labor force. Many of the young people from the farms join the unemployed who now number about 1,000,000 out of a total population of roughly 21,000,000. The pressure of these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unemployed has kept wages for common labor in Manila at from one to three dollars a day—although the cost of living is almost three times as high as it is in Chicago. Hundreds of thousands of seasonal workers on the large plantations receive less than one dollar a day; the average wage for these workers is below their prewar real income level.

Labor unions in the Philippines still are at the mercy of government and management interference, racketeering of labor leaders and other abuses. Collective bargaining as developed in this country is almost unknown. A Court of Industrial Relations, largely dominated by the same interests which control the Government, has power to decide all questions that arise between employers and employees. The Court in effect dictates the amount a firm must pay in wages. This has encouraged the development of "labor lawyers" who collect a percentage of the pay raises workers gain as a result of hearings before the Court. The practice has hampered the development of responsible union leaders. The failure of Filipino laborers to earn a living wage and their inability to see hope for the future have convinced an important segment of them that the Communist promise of violent revolution offers them their real opportunity.

The potential young leaders who might cope successfully with these and other basic problems are being warped by one of Asia's most destructive educational systems. Unless an adequate remedy for this situation is devised in time all other attempts at helping the Philippines appear doomed to ultimate failure, despite the fact that a fervent desire for an education is part of the American heritage in the Islands.

The first shipload of American schoolteachers who arrived in the Philippines in 1901 opened public schools in the rural *barrios* where they taught the three R's—often after the stern fashion of the late nineteenth century. They and other teachers who followed established English as the common language of instruction, trade and government. In so doing they for the first time enabled ordinary Filipinos, whose native tongues include eight languages and more than 80 dialects, to communicate throughout the Islands. (The use of Spanish under the previous régime was limited to a small group of officials, clergy and landed gentry.) By 1940 the American efforts had raised the literacy rate in all languages, including English, to 48 percent.

In 1940, however, the Philippine Commonwealth enacted a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

law requiring the National Government to finance all primary education. It was essentially a political move aimed at winning popularity, and no additional funds were made available at the time to replace former local and provincial contributions. The budget problem was met by cutting class time for all students in half. Since then, and partly as a result of the war, there has been a rapid decline in the quality of education.

The ordinary child in the rural areas who attends school does so half time for four years. His instruction is in English—a foreign language usually not spoken in his home. The average primary school student does not learn enough English to use the language, and those who do not continue their studies usually forget all except a few phrases. Because instruction often is not related to the student's need in daily life it tends to become a ritual.

A few statistics suggest the kind of schooling children receive in the Islands. Most of the primary schools have only one book for every three students. Many high schools use one book for every seven students. Funds supplied by the United States through the War Damage Commission were used to rebuild most of the schoolhouses destroyed by the war but not to equip them adequately. Less than one-half of the elementary school teachers have professional training. A teacher whose salary is listed at $50 per month may be three and four months behind in receiving his pay. The available schools and teachers fall far short of meeting the needs of the growing population. The low quality of elementary education is reflected in the work done by older students. The average student in one of the better colleges in the Philippines has the equivalent of a fourth grade knowledge of English From his textbooks and lectures he absorbs only a smattering of each course.

The effects of this development have been made more serious by the postwar commercialization of education in the Philippines. Private colleges and universities have become one of the most profitable businesses in Manila. Last year one of the larger universities earned a profit of nearly $5,000,000 for its stockholders. Shares in these schools can be purchased on the market. A number of successful college presidents ride in luxurious automobiles. These profits in education are earned only at the expense of the students, many of whom work long hours to pay the fees. Classes are overcrowded, most of the professors are poorly paid, and students usually are graduated regardless of scholarship, provided

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they have paid the necessary tuition. Among the 296 colleges and universities registered in the Philippines only about six meet American standards. Filipino educators who have tried to establish and enforce educational standards that would prevent racketeering by private schools were blocked by political pressure.

With the development of these profit-making schools has come a distorted emphasis on education. Only one out of ten secondary-school students is enrolled in agriculture and vocational courses. The thousands who are receiving degrees in law and other professions promise to add to the present white-collar unemployment and provide none of the technical personnel necessary for Philippine development.

These ills of the society are reflected in the character and performance of the Philippine Government and the Philippine economy. Within the last six months Filipinos have discovered that their government is nearly insolvent. The National Treasury was forced to hold up payment on government checks until revenues accumulated. Public construction projects were discontinued for lack of funds. The Government, which had accumulated a deficit of $260,000,000 since the end of the war, had almost exhausted its available resources and borrowed beyond the legal limit from its own banks.

Lack of realistic planning and some very fancy corruption contributed to this financial crisis. But the major cause was the failure of the Government to collect an estimated 60 percent of the revenue due. The tax collection system has disintegrated to the extent that Government revenue agents are employed by private firms to fill out their tax returns. Some of the biggest tax evaders are defended in court by the law firms of powerful senators. A junior Treasury attorney who is too energetic in prosecuting a tax case may lose his job, or find the senator has brought other forms of pressure against him and his family. These practices now are so widespread that the enactment of additional tax measures by the Philippine Congress provides no assurance in itself of a substantial increase in revenue.

Within the past year the Philippine Government has been forced to impose severe import and exchange controls to protect its fast-dwindling foreign exchange reserves and minimize the flight of capital. During the last six years the United States Government has paid out more than $1,700,000,000 in the Philippines. These funds included disbursements by the War Damage

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commission, military agencies, the Veterans' Administration and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. These dollars financed an import boom that flooded the cities with new automobiles and other expensive American consumer goods. Only a small percentage of these funds were used to finance basic development. With the present tapering off of United States governmental disbursements the Philippines face an increasingly difficult foreign exchange position. No likely early expansion of exports can bridge the gap and only a drastic imposition of more severe controls will be adequate. Such action requires a measure of government efficiency and honesty not now in sight.

These developments prompted the dispatch to the Philippines last summer of the United States Economic Survey Mission headed by Daniel W. Bell. Members of the 29-man mission avoided most of the dinners and cocktail parties that so often sap the energies of American investigators abroad. With the help of some very able and public spirited Filipinos they made a comprehensive survey of economic and financial problems in the Islands. The report which was submitted to President Truman last October summarized their findings in part with the statement: "The basic economic problem in the Philippines is inefficient production and very low income." Specific recommendations stated what action would be needed to stimulate the development of a healthy economy. The Mission proposed that the United States extend technical assistance and provide $250,000,000 to help finance a program of development extending over a period of years.

An agreement signed in Baguio on November 14, 1950, by Philippine President Elpidio Quirino and E.C.A. Administrator William C. Foster committed the Philippine and American Governments to a joint effort aimed at implementing the recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission. The Agreement stipulated that as an initial step the Philippine Government should promptly enact a new and adequate tax program, adopt a minimum wage law and through a joint resolution by the Philippine Congress indicate approval of the recommended social reforms and economic development measures. The United States promised to provide technical assistance, particularly in the fields of taxation, revenue collection, social legislation and economic development. Both Governments agreed to review the present trade agreement, including the often criticized Philippine Trade Act of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1946, better known as the Bell Act. A bilateral pact to be negotiated later is to amplify the terms of the new program. Meanwhile, the E.C.A. has established an office in Manila and dispatched several specialists to assist in drafting the necessary legislation.

The Mission Report and the Agreement provide a realistic foundation for initiating an attack upon the Philippine social and economic problems. But they leave unanswered the key question of how it will be possible to generate the required Filipino coöperation. There is an enormous popular demand among Filipinos for the kind of American assistance that will really enable them to improve their livelihood. The available evidence indicates that if American actions are of demonstrated value in giving the ordinary citizen a better break the charges that the Americans are infringing on Philippine sovereignty will fall flat.

Any adequate program of reform and development, however, will conflict with the privileges, interests, and sometimes rackets of several of the more powerful political and financial groups in the Philippines. In the past these groups have successfully blocked efforts at breaking their hold. They are also a vocal segment of society and can be expected to try to make use of Filipino nationalism as a shield to protect their selfish positions. Firm and sustained action by the United States in coöperation with constructive-minded Filipinos will be necessary to overcome this initial hurdle.

It is doubtful, moreover, whether the program now projected will be adequate to enable the Philippines to develop into an independent and economically and politically healthy democracy. No substantial provision has been made to help solve the fundamental problem created by the breakdown of the educational system. The Filipinos have borrowed extensively from the United States, but too often in the form of the gadgets and other superficial appurtenances of our culture. They seem to have missed some of the essential American spirit. This is particularly needed in the Islands because they lack a highly developed indigenous culture such as is found in many other Asian countries. The Philippines are predominantly a Roman Catholic country and the Church plays a cultural rôle; but only recently has it taken a progressive interest in promoting social improvement. If the Philippines are to be helped to a genuinely better future it will be necessary for American private leadership to participate in a broad way along with our Government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The success or failure of our new Philippine venture will increasingly affect our position elsewhere in the Far East. If Japan is to remain independent of China and Russia she will need to develop sources of raw materials, particularly food, outside the Asian mainland. The Philippines have a great potential production, and in return will need Japanese capital goods if they are to progress industrially at the same time that they develop their agriculture. The Filipinos, however, have bitter memories of the war. They will insist upon guarantees to protect them from becoming an economic satellite of Japan.

No country in the Far East today is militarily defensible unless it is in good health socially, economically and politically. We can expect the Filipinos to become worthwhile allies to approximately the same extent that they achieve something which they think worth living and fighting for. In this they need our help. Most Asians have not yet had it demonstrated to their own satisfaction that a foreign nation can help them add substantially to their welfare. In the mounting struggle for the friendship and coöperation of the Asian peoples the skill and effectiveness with which Americans contribute to a better life for the ordinary Filipino will be of immense consequence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRIKANER HANDS

By G. H. Calpin

LAST year the Government of the Union of South Africa dispatched an air squadron to Japan for operations in Korea with the United Nations armies under General MacArthur. Unremarked at the time, the dramatic quality of the occasion has since been lost in the tumbling events of the days. Very nearly the only comment that appeared upon it was a complaint by British South Africans that the contingent was too small to be anything more than a token of interest in the outcome of the struggle.

The significance of the event lies in the fact that for the first time in the history of South Africa a Nationalist Government has committed the nation to war, and that without reference to Parliament and without compulsions of any kind other than its obligations as a member of the United Nations. The interest of the matter does not end there. The Nationalist Government is itself unique in being the first one in South Africa to be exclusively Afrikaner in personnel. Generals Botha, Smuts and Hertzog each presided over cabinets of Afrikaner and British Ministers, not always equal in numbers but always equal so as far as possible, thereby accommodating the susceptibilities of the two white races which hold the destiny of the country in their hands. Dr. Malan, the fourth Prime Minister of the Union, differs from his predecessors in being a Doctor of Divinity and not a military leader. Botha and Smuts were essentially pro-British, attached to the British idiom, and prepared at all times to ally South Africa's cause to Britain's. Hertzog was an avowed republican who resisted the war decisions of 1914 and 1939.

South Africa does not go to war easily. Of all the Dominions, she is the tardiest to respond to the call: "We fight for world freedom." She does not know the unforced allegiance and spontaneous loyalty to Britain's crises which Australia and New Zealand and Canada feel. Two world wars found the Union seriously divided. The first threw a large and influential section of Afrikaners into armed rebellion; in the second, open and armed revolt stopped short only before the memory of the bloodshed and disaster of the earlier civil war. It is a chastening thought that on these two occasions South Africa was saved for the British cause at the risk

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of national disruption, and that for such salvation the British, inside and outside South Africa, had to rely on Afrikaner leaders, Botha and Smuts, and on their Afrikaner supporters. What is pertinent, however, is that the opponents of South Africa's participation in two world wars are now in command of the country. Some of them openly sympathized with Hitler's cause; one or two of them denounced Britain and all her works; while the more responsible of them withdrew to their farms in silent disapproval. Such, however, is the circumstance of history that those are the men who are responsible for the new commitment in Asia. The story reveals much about South Africa that is usually incomprehensible to the foreigner, and it loses nothing in drama from the fact that the crisis in Korea is a United Nations affair.

Nationalist Afrikaners did not take easily to the League of Nations, and in Afrikaner opinion the United Nations has shown itself a doubtful counsellor in the domestic policies of the Union. Indeed it was at the very top of the crisis in Korea that Dr. T. E. Donges, the Union's Minister of the Interior and leader of South Africa's delegation to the United Nations, uttered a warning regarding his country's continued membership in the organization, which had called for a postponement of an Act of the Union Parliament regarding the treatment of Indians in South Africa.

As a result of these and other issues, South Africa is not in good repute abroad. One might have expected that the decision to send aid to General MacArthur would have helped persuade foreign critics to examine Nationalist Afrikaner ideology more closely. The picture which emerges from such a study suggests that the Afrikaners, instead of being isolationists, reactionaries, Nazis and Fascists—the stock epithets of their traducers—are earnestly disposed, first, to order the heterogeneous communities of South Africa on sound and progressive lines; secondly, to bring South Africa to play her proper rôle in the world at large; and thirdly, to resolve the fundamental issues which still remain unsolved in the dual loyalties of Afrikaners and British.

Curiously enough, the fundamental differences between the Nationalist Afrikaners and the British in South Africa are identical with those which caused the first Americans to depart from England. Moreover, the Afrikaner *volk* and the Americans have another feature in common which decided the course of their histories. From the earliest days, European immigrants to the New World rejected their European motherlands and gave them-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

selves to the task of becoming good Americans. Much of the subsequent isolationism which large sections of the American public expressed in the Kaiser's war, and to a less extent in Hitler's war, originates in this act of rejection. There is, here, a close parallel with the motives of the Afrikaner. The comparison is broken only by the fact that the Afrikaner nation lost its war of independence, the Anglo-Boer war, 50 years ago, whereas the Americans won theirs a century before that. The British remained in South Africa, and persisted in their attempts to "anglicize" the Afrikaners; they were driven out of America. The Americans could do what they liked with their new land; the Afrikaners were never allowed to do what they liked with theirs. For nearly 150 years they have sought—first by flight, in the Great Trek, second by war in the two Anglo-Boer wars (the first of which they won) and third by political and cultural measures—to resist the overlordship of the British and the pervasive influence of the British idiom.

With the defeat of General Smuts in the election of 1948, and his death in 1950, South Africa passed into hands that were exclusively Afrikaner. The departure of "the Boer enemy turned friend of Britain" served, in the words of a prominent Afrikaner, to indicate the depth of Nationalist Afrikaner feelings: "At last we have got our country back." The utterance is pregnant with meaning. It expresses the sufferings of the Boers on trek, the despoliations of the Basutu and Zulu tyrants, the intrigues of Rhodes, the tears of Paul Kruger, the slights in language and the invasions in religion. As for the trek boers when Piet Retief led them into the unknown just over a century ago, so for the Afrikaners of today: there is no way of escape if they fail in South Africa. There was and is no motherland to receive them. South Africa is the only Afrikaner-land. To lose South Africa, or to be submerged in its vast heterogeneity, is to lose all. The Afrikaner race must live or die in South Africa.

These are the considerations which explain and dictate the policy of Nationalist Afrikaners. They are the dominating themes in legislative action, in Afrikaner relations with the South African British, in the government and treatment of non-whites, and in foreign affairs. On the first of these, Nationalist policy seeks to attract the British to a conception of South African nationhood based on the republican idea. Chiefly as a result of the efforts of General Hertzog, South Africa is already a republic in all but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

name, an independent sovereign state within the British Commonwealth. Afrikaners, having no racial kinship with the British, are republicans at heart. It is generally believed among them that before South Africa can know the unity and the national maturity which other nations enjoy, the British in South Africa must bestow upon that country the feelings they now divert to Britain. The Afrikaners are persuaded that the only route to national unity is through a republic. Dr. Malan has promised that if possible the decision will be taken by the broad will of the electorate. But if necessary it will be done by a simple parliamentary majority such as the Nationalists now possess. Dr. Malan is quite frank on the subject. His party's aim is to establish in law what exists in fact—the essential republicanism of South Africa. It cannot pass unnoticed that Dr. E. G. Jansen, recently appointed Governor-General—the King's representative—is an avowed republican.

A revealing light was thrown on the same subject when Dr. Malan, on his first visit to London after his advent to power, helped in the construction of a new formula which made India's membership in the Commonwealth consonant with her republican constitution. Praised as an expression of political genius by the American press, it was frowned upon in South Africa only by the British section of public opinion and by General Smuts. He saw it as a precedent—which, of course, it is—whereby the Afrikaner Nationalists could turn South Africa into a republic and yet retain the Commonwealth association. This would neutralize one of the main objections of the British in the Union and leave them to face the accusation that, after all, their spiritual home is England.

Dr. Malan, it should be said, is not rushing his republican fences. He and his colleagues are watching the reactions of their English-speaking compatriots to less profound changes affecting British susceptibilities. And he is probably discovering that fundamentally the British, in their conservatism, hate change for its own sake but soon accommodate themselves to it. There have been many indications of this British characteristic in the past, particularly in the twenties and the early thirties, when, under General Hertzog's ministry, fierce battles raged over the substitution of a South African flag for the Union Jack, over the introduction of Afrikaans as an official language, and over the affirmation of the Statute of Westminster in parliamentary enact-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments. All of these changes impressed upon the British in South Africa the fact that they no longer live in a British colony, and all of them are now accepted by the vast majority as desirable features of a complex society.

Dr. Malan has introduced a citizenship act which disposes of the dual nationality of the British, and requires that British immigrants must wait five years before they can claim South African citizenship. The period is shortened by two years for those who are willing to learn Afrikaans. In addition, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, the Board of which consists of Afrikaners and British, has abolished the B.B.C. news service relays. British hostility to these departures soon subsided, and would have done so even more quickly but for the useful ammunition they furnished to the United Party, which includes among its supporters almost all British South Africans. As if to emphasize the Party interest in these things, the champion of the retention of the B.B.C. news service was an Afrikaner United Party M.P. who stumped the country in protest. His campaign left his British fellows unmoved. Not so, it is true, with the decision of the Minister of Defense to change the uniforms of the men of the South African navy, for any interference with naval traditions touches the British to the quick. There was a storm of protest at the Minister's slighting references to the bell-bottomed trouser, but even this fell into its proper place in the public mind.

It is a grievous error to imagine, as many do in South Africa, that these occurrences, great and small, are intended as irritants to the British South African. Afrikaners are no longer anti-British in the sense that they were haters of the British before and during the Anglo-Boer war. Afrikaners have a very real regard for the British people, especially for leaders like Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill appeals to them as a British nationalist, a devout patriot and believer in the destiny of his race. It is this national pride and sense of community which they would have every British South African feel for South Africa. They feel that their task therefore is to impress a separate identity on South Africa, to give the country a character and form which, in its present duality, it does not possess.

At the same time, such innovations stem from a feeling among the Afrikaners that they are on the defensive. Although Afrikaners now outnumber the British by something like three to two in a white population of 2,000,000, and have triumphed politically,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they are vulnerable economically. Their forebears of the landlocked republics of Paul Kruger and Steyn were propelled into nineteenth-century liberalism by the invasions of foreigners after the discovery of diamonds and gold. Only recently have they realized that political power is only half of a team of oxen, and that economic power is the other half. They have no accretions either in numbers through immigration, or in capital from outside funds, like those on which the British can rely. This accounts for the appearance in recent years of determined and successful efforts to establish Afrikaner capital enterprises in industry and commerce.

Deepest of all the defensive responses of the Afrikaners is the conception of the color bar. The trek-boers of the nineteenth century were intensely religious—strict Calvinists who placed a wide and deep gulf between themselves as white men and the natives of Africa as black men. Only a powerful concern for the purity of race could have kept a numerically smaller society from miscegenation in the midst of a vast majority of natives. This belief in the rightness of the color bar was untouched by the liberalism of the West. To attribute Apartheid legislation to a desire to crush and to oppress subject races is a distortion. The Afrikaner is certain that only in separation, justly ordered and faithfully undertaken, can the two conditions—the preservation of the white race and the welfare of the black—be assured in South Africa. The British South Africans now likewise believe this. Both hold that South African problems cannot be solved by applying the principles of homogeneous European countries. However selfish the Union's policy may appear to be to other Western peoples, it must be granted that South Africa does not ask military service of the Negroes whom it sets apart.

The foreign policy of the Union is much the same under Dr. Malan as it was before, and there is indeed more sense of Cabinet responsibility in his Government. There is no indication of any withdrawal from the responsibilities of the world's crisis, or from the obligations to the Commonwealth and to the grand alliance of the West. There are many Afrikaners who continue to maintain that had General Hertzog carried his neutrality motion in September 1939, and thus afforded the country a final act of independence, he would have taken the whole country spontaneously into the war a few months afterward. As it was, Afrikaner Nationalists, and General Hertzog himself, believed that Gen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eral Smuts outwitted them. Today South Africa is confronted with a vastly different danger. The threat of Communism will unite the whole electorate for the first time in the nation's history.

The presence of so vast a majority of African natives makes the threat of Communism a far greater issue than in the Western democracies. It not only endangers a particular economic and social order, but raises the question of race survival. The Afrikaner Nationalists are often accused of the heresies of the *Herrenvolk*. To them, however, this is a superficial view. They believe that nationalism is a healthy instinct, intended by God to give expression to human purpose. They frankly refuse to accept the principles of liberalism as the final basis for the ordering of society. Their objection to the application of liberal principles to the government of African natives, for example, rests not only on a determination to preserve their own culture and nationality, but on the belief that in the process African natives would lose their own heritage. They insist that Apartheid will preserve for the Negro the very things for which they themselves have struggled in the past. They believe that only by a recognition of separate cultures and nationalities, and their accommodation in one territory, can some semblance of equality be assured. Hence they differ with British colonial policy, which maintains that once colonial peoples are trained in self-government they should be given political power.

It is these considerations which dictate the Afrikaner response to the crisis in the Far East. The dispatch of a contingent to Korea last year was not a new departure in Afrikaner Nationalist policy. South Africa is now convinced that she is the master of her own destiny, that she need no longer look to Britain for her policy, and that she need not share every commitment to war made by Britain. But whereas Afrikaner Nationalists refuse to go to war because Britain is at war, they will unite solidly in support of a war which, in their own opinion, touches the interests of South Africa. They will bring to it the same jealous regard for their prestige and their independence they have shown in other matters.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISRAEL: THE EMERGENCE OF A DEMOCRACY

By Abba Eban

LESS than three years have elapsed since the state of Israel proclaimed its independence at the termination of the British Mandatory régime. Within the brief period of its national life, events have unfolded with a speed and intensity rarely equalled in the history of political institutions. Israel is still beset by all the preoccupations which attended its struggle for birth; but each of its three infant years has seen a marked shift in the primary center of its concern. The year 1948 was characterized by a struggle for sheer physical survival. Military experts had not placed a high estimate on the ability of Palestine Jewry to organize its defense against a combined and simultaneous onslaught by all the neighboring states; and these doubts were not resolved until the end of the year, when Israel's improvised forces passed from tactical defense to a victorious counter-offensive and swept the entire southern desert clear of hostile forces.

In 1949, with physical survival assured, the central theme became the struggle for international recognition. Surrounded on all its land frontiers by unreconciled Arab states, Israel was driven to compensate for its regional isolation by an attempt to establish strong links with more distant countries and to achieve a secure status in the organized world community. Membership in the United Nations was of particular importance to a state whose very right to exist was fiercely challenged by its neighbors and whose most vital interests were still to be the subject of international deliberation and judgment.

By the end of 1949, a tolerable stability had been won both in military defense and in political status. Between February and August of that year, Israel had concluded armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. These agreements established demarcation lines which not only separated the armed forces of the contending states, but also marked the clearly defined limits of their civil jurisdiction and thus assumed the character of political frontiers. According to their own provisions (ratified by the Security Council in August 1949) the armistice agreements could be superseded only by new accords based on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the mutual consent of the signatory governments. The armistice lines thus rested both on bilateral obligations and on international authority. Behind them, the people of Israel were free to organize their society and to reach out toward the ideals which had inspired their arduous struggle for independence. The absence of clear-cut solutions for basic political problems no longer impeded the progress of the state or affected the increasingly tranquil routines of its daily life.

II

The dominant feature of Israel's life today is a rapid increase of population. When independence was proclaimed in May 1948, Palestine Jewry numbered 650,000. Within the ensuing two and a half years more than 500,000 Jewish immigrants have entered the country; and it is estimated that a further 600,000 will come during the next three years. Thus by 1954 this small country, beset by powerful adversaries, will have tripled its population in five years of intensive growth. This increase of population, coming at a time when most other migration movements in the world have spent their force, is considerable enough in its absolute dimensions. It is even more spectacular relatively; for the volume of new immigration will shortly exceed the size of the established community into which it has flowed. At the height of open-door immigration into the United States the population of that country never increased by more than 3 percent in any single year. Israel, with smaller area and more limited resources, will have achieved a threefold increase by immigration within five years. If this process is successfully accomplished, new and instructive lessons will have to be deduced concerning the absorptive capacity of small areas and the resilience of a political system which can bear the strain and shock of such rapid expansion.

The immigration of Jews to Israel derives its momentum both from negative forces operating against Jewish life in certain countries and from a power of attraction latent within Israel itself. The external factors which determine the pace and volume of this movement are to be found in those countries of Europe and the Arabic-speaking world where Jews lack the opportunity to live in conditions of individual or collective freedom. The Jews of Central and Eastern Europe are but the straggling survivors of a ghastly holocaust; 6,000,000 of their kinsmen were slaughtered by Nazi fury and their communal institutions were reduced to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

irrevocable ruin. The urge to leave the scene of agony and martyrdom is irresistible. It is reinforced by an inborn Jewish preference for a life of democratic freedom in a society which upholds as a focus of national pride the very Jewish connections which in Europe were the target of such brutal persecution. Again, in many parts of the Arabic-speaking world Jewish minorities have lived for centuries in squalor and discrimination or, at best, in the shelter of an intermittent and variable tolerance. In recent generations the rise of a strong national consciousness in the Arab countries, centered inevitably upon the Arabic language and the Moslem religion, has given the Jewish minorities a sharpened sense of isolation, separateness and insecurity. At the same time, echoes of the Zionist achievement have awakened dormant impulses of Jewish national pride and made those Jewish minorities increasingly unwilling to sustain a lot borne stoically by their ancestors. The clash between Arab and Jewish interests in Palestine—itself the outcome of these two original factors—has also had its disturbing effects.

In ordinary times the Jews of Europe and of the Arab countries would have had either to bear their disabilities or be crushed by them. But these are not ordinary times in Jewish life. They are times of pride and exaltation—of "thunder and lightnings and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud." An alternative to passive resignation or submergence now presents itself. There exists today a sovereign state which has as a central purpose the absorption and integration of Jewish immigrants. The flood of immigration which in consequence pours into Israel is one of the spontaneous and irresistible mass movements which have revolutionized the history of peoples and changed the face of continents. In recent months the apparent imminence of war has added a new incentive. The quest for sanctuary in Israel now appears to many Jews living elsewhere in conditions of insecurity as a race against time. There is a desperate urge to find shelter while liberty of access still remains.

Of the 510,000 Jews who have so far entered Israel since the proclamation of its independence, 280,200 have come from Central and Eastern Europe, and 208,000 from North Africa, Yemen and Iraq. The Jewish community of Yemen, numbering 44,600, has been totally transferred to Israel in a memorable air-lift from Aden lasting over 18 months. More than 100,000 of the 120,000 Jews in Iraq have registered for emigration to Israel and 40,000

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have already arrived. Almost the entire remnants of Bulgarian and Jugoslav Jewry have come to Israel, where they furnish valuable reinforcement of the country's agricultural and industrial strength. The total immigration figures during the period of Israel's independence are: 1948, 119,000; 1949, 239,000; 1950, 169,000. Thus the immigration into Israel during 30 months of statehood exceeds that which took place into Palestine during the previous 30 years.

III

It is obvious that a country which increases its population by 85 percent in two and a half years cannot hope to increase its productivity in the same degree. Jewish communities abroad, which share with Israel a deep sense of responsibility and concern for Jewsh refugees from Europe, Asia and Africa, have contributed substantially to meeting immigration costs, both by gifts and investment. However, these external sources of capital have not been sufficient to bridge the gap between the limited resources of the country and the needs of a rapidly growing population. Thus the major sacrifice has come from the Israel community itself. Increased savings have been extracted from the Israel population by reduction of consumption, by heavy taxation, and by governmental control of imports, giving deliberate preference to capital goods as against consumer goods. These measures, designed to overcome the lag between the increase of population and the inevitably slower increase of production, have imposed a régime of austerity and self-denial such as no population would suffer except in voluntary pursuit of a cherished ideal.

In most other migration movements of history, prospective immigrants have had to prove their capacity to enhance or, at least, not to prejudice the standards of welfare achieved by the existing population. In Israel this principle is reversed. The welfare of the existing population is subordinated to the supreme and unrestricted right of immigration. These moral and humanitarian attributes of Israel's immigration policies have impressed liberal opinion everywhere and have elicited powerful movements of sympathy and support throughout the world; but they have also created a severe economic crisis. This can be most vividly illustrated by reference to the balance of payments.

During the first 11 months of 1950, the value of imports to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel was £I 88,000,000.[1] Exports, both visible and invisible, amounted to only £I 16,200,000. The balance had to be made up by receipts of funds from Jewish institutions abroad; the import of goods under credits extended by the Export-Import Bank; and the release by the United Kingdom of sterling assets accumulated by Palestine Jewry during World War II. Since many of these balancing factors are either variable or non-recurrent, the Government of Israel is obliged to seek more stable remedies and has conceived a Three Year Development Plan designed to bring about substantial reductions of imports by increasing local productivity both of food and of manufactured goods. Agricultural production has already increased considerably since the establishment of the state; and the new agricultural program will lead to an over-all equilibrium of costs between food imports on the one hand and domestic food production on the other. At the same time, the expansion of industrial output will supply the home market with an increased flow of consumer goods, thus reducing the volume of imports to be paid for in foreign currency. Domestic manufacturers and merchants will also help stabilize the balance of payments by earning foreign currency through exports. The main effort will lie in the increase of citrus exports, the exploitation of Dead Sea mineral products, the expansion of chemical and textile industries and the establishment of precision industries based on the relatively large reserves of technical skill available.

The success of these plans, however, depends upon large additional investments both in agricultural and industrial development. The total sum required for the absorption of 600,000 new immigrants and the economic consolidation of the state is estimated at 1.5 billion dollars, of which one-third will be raised by local taxation and investment and the remainder from Jewish funds, the sale of Israel bonds and such inter-governmental aid as Israel can secure on the basis of its contribution to the economic development of the Near East and the consolidation of democratic institutions there.

The riddle of Israel's future is whether its political and military victories can now be crowned by economic success. It would be idle to underestimate the difficulties. No political or social unit in history has ever carried such burdens as those which Israel has voluntarily assumed. However, the omens are propitious.

First, it is significant that Palestine Jewry, before the great

[1] The exchange rate is £I (Israel pound) equals $2.80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wave of unrestricted immigration began, had already achieved economic equilibrium while maintaining a European standard of life far above the regional levels. Second, while the increase of productivity in the last two years has inevitably fallen behind the population growth, it has nevertheless been extremely impressive by absolute standards. Agricultural production has increased more than 80 percent; the consumption of electrical power for industry by 51 percent; building (at a rate of over 1,000,000 square meters per annum) within one year by 100 percent. New agricultural settlements to the number of 255 have been established within two and a half years, as against 270 founded between 1880 and 1948; and promising industrial projects have been initiated. Third, the fact that 35 percent of current imports are accounted for by capital goods holds the promise for increased productivity in the future. The Export-Import Bank's grant of credits to Israel on a commercial basis to the extent of $135,000,000 in two years shows that the most exacting financial authorities have been convinced of its productive potential. Fourth, the investment of the equivalent of $280,000,000 in Israel in 1950 illustrates the country's power of attracting investments, even though their volume still does not correspond to the needs of an expanding population. Fifth, there is ample evidence that Israel's determination to fight its way toward economic equilibrium is ardently shared by Jewish communities throughout the world.

In this struggle, as in others in the past, Israel seeks to supplement its material resources by less definable qualities—a strong sense of national discipline and a capacity for self-sacrifice. It also relies on the special élan which comes from a consciousness that this is the creative hour in Israel's long and tormented history. These imponderable qualities may well convert immediate sacrifice into ultimate gain. Mass-immigration, which appears to orthodox economists as a short-term liability, will certainly prove an asset in the long run, for it will increase Israel's productive capacity as well as its military security. Currently, the blockade imposed by the neighboring states may have an adverse effect on Israel's economy, for it cuts off potential sources of supply and nearby markets for industrial production. On the other hand, it has forced Israel to attain agricultural self-sufficiency and to build a network of trade agreements and commercial connections outside the immediate region. In the final resort, then, the incentives

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and challenges of the regional boycott may well make Israel more self-reliant and economically autonomous than it would have been if it had become accustomed to dependence on its neighbors.

Even today there are many signs of successful productive activity to be seen against the background of temporary shortage and austerity. New villages and townships spring up almost overnight. The immigrant transit camps are being replaced by work camps (*ma'abaroth*) in which the newcomers are engaged in lucrative work even before they are permanently absorbed into the labor market. Irrigation pipes carry the zone of cultivation ever deeper into areas which had been arid and desolate from time immemorial. Modern Israel has even had the startling experience of seeing water gush forth in the most primeval wilderness of recorded history, extending south from ancient Sodom between the Dead Sea and Eylat (Aqaba). The hills and roadsides are becoming fringed with belts of saplings, foretelling dense and verdant forests in the future. In short, Israel is a country of versatile talents and restless energies. Future hopes count more there than present difficulties.

IV

The immigrants who have entered Israel in the past three years have brought with them a bewildering variety of languages, social backgrounds and spiritual outlooks. The task of welding these heterogeneous elements into a single national culture is an intricate educational and cultural task. The difficulty is increased by the fact that the established community in Israel had itself not fully accomplished its own cultural unity. However, the unifying effects of the Hebrew language, the Hebrew school system and a common attachment to Jewish ideals, whether religious or secular, have been surprisingly strong. The children of immigrants swiftly cast off the dividing influences of their previous backgrounds. It is doubtful whether this sense of cultural cohesion could have been achieved if Israel had really been a new nation, engaged in the creation of its basic cultural forms. The state is indeed new; but the people are the heir of a cultural tradition sufficiently potent to have nourished the kindred streams of Christianity and Islam while maintaining their own native sources perennially fresh. This sense of a lineal connection with Israel of old affects the national life of Israel today more than is commonly realized. It gives background and depth to a national sentiment which might otherwise

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been doomed to superficiality. The deep aspiration for a Hebrew renaissance, the profound interest in archeological discovery, continually remind the infant state of its venerable antecedents. Nor is the search for ancient roots and origins confined to the traditionalists alone. The coins and stamps which recall the ancient eras of Jewish independence, even the tendency to Hebraize European names, are superficial signs of the deep desire to achieve a cultural unity patterned after the old inheritance.

Israel's culture is not yet in stable equilibrium. The rival claims of religious tradition and of progressive modernism have not yet been reconciled. On the other hand, nothing could be more eccentric than the charge of "theocracy" which some critics have levelled against the Israel system. The state does not impose a single religious obligation of any kind. It treats observance, agnosticism and atheism with complete toleration. Not a single law or practice affecting religious observance has been newly enacted to mark any divergence from the previous Mandatory law. All that can be said is that there has been no initiative toward abolishing the rights of religious bodies in the spheres of personal status—rights which have been maintained in all Near Eastern countries for centuries past.

Israel is governed by an elected single-chamber legislature, the Knesset. The election of Dr. Chaim Weizmann as the first President of the state in 1949 symbolized Israel's concern for international prestige and its devotion to the principles of scientific humanism which have inspired the President's long career. The system of proportional representation was adopted in deference to a United Nations resolution, which hoped to ensure the protection of minority rights, and in continuation of the procedure whereby the Zionist Congresses were elected before the establishment of the state. Many students deprecate the adoption of an electoral system which encourages the proliferation of parties and imposes the vagaries of coalition government. Yet the system serves the interests of small parties, and thus can be changed only in the unlikely event of its beneficiaries combining to secure their own doom. Even so, the first Parliament, composed of many parties, none of which has a clear majority, showed a considerable talent for cohesion. There was usually a sufficient sense of crisis—military, political or economic—to produce an underlying unity. The current crisis, on the issue of religious education, will probably be resolved in a new election to be held in the sum-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mer. It is probable that a coalition wider than that composed of the Labor Party (Mapai) and the religious bloc will now emerge. Basing their opinions on the results of recent municipal elections, some observers predict that the middle-class party (the General Zionists) will soon achieve a position in which it will have to be associated with Mapai in the governing coalition. In any case, it is likely that there will be a tendency toward wider crystallizations, and that the electorate will continue to turn away from programs which draw most of their appeal from the rancors which marked the termination of Mandatory rule. A Communist party competes freely and legally —and with complete failure—for the allegiance of the electorate. Political thought is more abstract in Israel than in most countries; but in the final resort the pull of interest as well as of sentiment ensure a strong bias in favor of political democracy. Israel needs capital funds, goods and supplies, and can obtain them nowhere but in the Western World. Moreover, few other democracies contain so many citizens who have tasted the fruits of totalitarian régimes and found them bitter.

The fact that a coherent system of parliamentary democracy is already at work in Israel is of more than local significance. Unlike other democratic systems, it has not evolved in the course of generations by the patient processes of trial and error; it has sprung to full maturity within a period of three years. Nor can it find much encouragement in its regional environment. The Near East is still governed for the most part by monarchic or oligarchic systems. The capacity of the Israeli democracy to sustain itself in such difficult conditions of both time and space may have a substantial effect on political thought in the Near East and Asia.

Most of the national movements in the Asian continent have achieved constitutional freedom with little or no corresponding advance toward social and economic liberation. Behind the flags and the constitutions, the parliaments and cabinets, which serve as emblems of political freedom, the old social apathy lingers on with its accompanying heritage of poverty, illiteracy and disease. This disparity between political freedom and social backwardness is perhaps the basic cause of political and social unrest throughout Asia. Men have come to realize that they may be free in every political sense, and yet lose the essence of their freedom in the throes of want. Democracy can flourish only where political freedom is accompanied by expanding horizons of welfare and de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

velopment. The fact that Israel regards statehood merely as the external framework for the social and cultural content of its national life entitles it to be regarded as a pioneer in the political emancipation of the continent. The states of the Near East will not remain hermetically sealed off from contact with each other forever. New examples may in the course of time influence political development throughout the area. At any rate, Israel's political institutions are an original expression of its people's mind. There is something unusual in the degree to which free enterprises live side by side with the most advanced forms of cooperative and collective organization. The labor movement is itself a large owner of industry; while powerful private corporations operate close to agricultural villages which apply collective principles to every aspect of individual and social life.

VI

The economic and social difficulties of building the state of Israel are increased by the regional and international tension. Until recently the primary objective of Israel foreign policy was to protect the state from Arab hostility while striving by all means to achieve an Arab-Israel accord. Today the preoccupation is with plans for securing minimal conditions of prosperity and stability in a world overshadowed by the clouds of international crisis. The two anxieties impinge upon each other. If the Near East were at peace with itself, it could the more easily organize its security on a basis of regional coöperation. So long as it is rent by internal conflicts it can consolidate its defenses and its supply facilities only with the utmost difficulty.

The harmonious integration of Israel into the life of the Near East thus remains a crucial objective of international statesmanship. The hope that the armistice agreements would be swiftly succeeded by definitive peace settlements probably took insufficient account of the deep psychological impulses aroused through the region by the emergence of the new state. In Israel itself, the memory of the recent attempt to extinguish the state by armed force dominates all thinking on security and political problems. But while the core of Arab opposition remains unbroken, Israel has been at great pains to strengthen its links of mutual recognition and coöperation with other Asian states such as India, Indonesia, Turkey, Burma, Thailand and Iran. Israel does not despair of a peace settlement with the Arab states; but it is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

completely resigned to the prospect of living without such a settlement if that is the consequence of the Arab League's attitude. It is comforting to reflect that the mutual interest of Israel and its neighbors in reaching a peace settlement is already so strong that pressures have to be exerted by the Arab League to prevent that interest from asserting itself. For example, so long as the Kingdom of Jordan lacks normal relations with Israel it is denied commercial access to the Mediterranean and loses its only natural market for its surplus production of perishable foodstuffs. Both lacks could be made good by a peace settlement. Arab countries suffer greater financial loss than Israel does through their refusal to permit the movement of oil through the Iraq-Haifa pipeline, or by tanker through the Suez Canal. Regional development schemes which would increase the strength of all Near Eastern states —and of the Near East as a whole—must be renounced so long as the Arab policy of nonrecognition is maintained.

It must be hoped that the weight of mutual interest and the common fear of a world conflict—which threatens all the Near Eastern states far more than any one of them can threaten another—may bring this sterile conflict to an end. Israel occupies a territory only one one-hundredth the size of that in which the Arab states have achieved political sovereignty. Its independence is no real derogation of Arab freedom. In any case, its existence and progress are permanent Near Eastern facts. Israel's true mission is to be a bridge, not a wedge. It could well assist the Near East as a whole to benefit from the interflow of Eastern and Western influences which has quickened the mind of the area and awakened its spirit. The deep historic affinities between the Hebrew and Arab cultures are an appropriate background for the renewal of this natural collaboration in modern times. Apart from the supreme psychological barrier, the actual conflicts of interests to be resolved between Israel and the Arab states are of minor proportions. The United Nations has now fully accepted the view that a solution of the refugee problem created by the Palestine war must be sought by processes of integration within the entire area. The states concerned have lived for two years under armistice systems which have become crystallized to such a degree that any possible territorial changes would be minor.

But whether or not this vision of peace is fulfilled, Israel will pursue its own course as heretofore. It will strive to maintain its lifeline across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sources of sustenance and nourishment in the Western World. The active sympathy and material support which Israel enjoys abroad could, in better circumstances, become available for the wider benefit of the Near East. But it may well be that Israel will have to prove its strength economically, as it already has done militarily and politically, before its own region of the world will regard the fact of its emergence and existence as irrevocable. Here lies a further incentive for a swift economic consolidation.

While Israel gravitates naturally toward the policies which commend themselves to other liberal democracies, a desperate concern for the preservation of peace, without which a new organism cannot possibly become strong, has made Israel prominent from time to time in the field of international conciliation. Since it has no commitments or alliances except under the comprehensive roof of the United Nations, it has made the international organization the chief vehicle for its political activity and thought. There is a universal as well as a national theme in Israel's tradition, and both are reflected in modern Israel's international policies. With an eye to the international situation, public opinion in Israel hopes that more attention will be devoted to the need for strengthening the will and capacity of the Near Eastern region to defend itself. Israel has an available combatant manpower of 200,000—a figure constantly being increased by immigration—and a varied industrial plant. As such, it must be regarded as a central factor in any estimate of the area's capacity to maintain its freedom and integrity against any attack. Independence and the maintenance of democratic institutions are causes for which the mass of Israeli citizens are prepared to struggle to the end. This is not so universally true of all states in the world—or in the Near East—as to be without import in the calculations of the greater Powers. Concern for the defense of world democracy must surely include concern for the preservation of the new democracy growing to strength and vigor at the crossroads where three continents meet.

Israel has arisen suddenly out of the shadows of history in testimony to the positive faith which endows men with full capacity to shape their own ends.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

By Dirk U. Stikker

IN ITS unending endeavor to create order out of chaos the human mind tries to establish guiding principles, to circumscribe the desired goals and direct the course of events. But the interplay of the innumerable factors that change the world in which we live tends to frustrate the most ingenious theories of economists and scholars. The year 1950 reminded all of us once again what severe limitations hamper forceful and concerted action by even such a large group of nations as is engaged upon the most ambitious program of economic recovery ever known—the program of repairing the devastations of war in Europe and infusing strength into the West European nations. The nations concerned could not have hoped to accomplish this by their own resources. They were prostrate after the liberation and seemed an easy prey for aggression and Communist infiltration unless the United States made funds available for economic and financial recovery. This the United States did.

In the circumstances, any considerable military effort would only have impeded and frustrated the execution of the economic plan. For several years, therefore, Western Europe remained practically without military defenses of any sort, apart from the Allied forces of occupation stationed in Germany—and the first task of those troops was to control the beaten enemy and not to defend the frontiers of Western Europe. The general concern lest a military rearmament program upset the precarious balance of national economies was so great that even when the danger from the East induced the Benelux countries, France and England to conclude the Brussels Treaty in March 1948 they were careful to contemplate only such increases in military effectiveness as did not affect economic viability. Western Europe's hope was that there would be time to complete the work of economic recovery and initiate the related work of European integration, so that military strength might then be built on a sound economic basis.

Gigantic progress has indeed been made in the field of economic coöperation. Ambitious schemes of European unity have been conceived and in part worked out. Nevertheless, in recent months

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the emphasis has changed radically. What was first considered the major task may turn out to be only one element in the general situation, to be taken into account from now on only to the extent that military considerations permit.

The effort to integrate Europe has often been viewed as a slow and painstaking program, in which the elimination of economic and financial barriers would lead by stages to political and military coöperation. But the pressure of the political situation has decreed otherwise. The pyramid of our theoretical conceptions now stands on its military top instead of, as formerly, on a broad and well-constructed economic and financial foundation. Korea and its consequences have destroyed the pleasant idea that economic and military considerations should and could be given equal weight. We are in a period in which military requirements have absolute priority, in which the remaining work of economic and financial recovery will be relegated consciously to second place. We regret that the attack on South Korea prevented the timely completion of the Marshall Aid program. Nevertheless we may be confident that those responsible for the interruption can no longer hope to destroy the solid foundation for coöperation among the European countries and their overseas associates laid in the years since the armistice.

The military alliance now being forged can be infinitely more effective if it is based on the efforts of a unified Europe than if it rests only on haphazard and incidental coöperation among the industries and manpower of more than a dozen different nations. Continuation of the work of integration thus remains highly important, in spite of the fact that military requirements may change the lines of approach. The example of nations like Australia and Canada, which made gigantic strides toward industrialization during World War II, indicates that a joint military effort may act as a catalytic agent, bringing to rapid realization projects which in normal times would be weighed and considered for years. On several counts, then, it is difficult to estimate with certainty how far European integration will progress in the near future and what shape it will take.

II

In its rich and varied history the old Continent has shown amazingly advanced forms of unification. Thus the Roman Empire succeeded in creating a strong common civilization around

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Mediterranean and left vestiges which today still permeate the life of most European nations. The Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages never succeeded in unifying the whole Roman area, but even when Europe was badly split its claim of worldly domination had some validity. The crusades demonstrated the force of religious and spiritual unity at a time when the physical strength of the individual seemed to be the main yardstick for the rule of law.

To an American observer today, Europe seems a conglomeration of political entities of various shapes and sizes, the position and importance of which are in most cases the result of an apparently endless series of political and military conflicts. The baffling confusion of frontiers, races, religions and political parties appears to him to indicate total disunity. When he travels through Europe this impression is confirmed by the variety of frontier regulations. If he is there on business, he is irritated by the rules which complicate transactions with European countries.

Nevertheless many unifying tendencies have been at work in Europe since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Uniformity of weights and measures, of railroad gauge and so on may seem trivial. But the common use of identical technical facilities such as the motor car, the sewing machine, the radio, the refrigerator and innumerable industrial processes is a strong unifying influence. The movies are a constant force for unification; so are the newspapers, many of which print information from the same news agencies. And the best books and music circulate everywhere.

New phenomena in Europe are labelled by new words. "Integration" is one of them. The expression "functional approach" is another. Europe's plight does indeed call for an entirely new approach, and for the application of drastic remedies.

At the end of the war the European countries faced the task of providing the necessities of life for their citizens and at the same time of reconstructing their damaged industrial equipment. Moreover, there was a considerable deficiency in the balance of payments, especially with America. This was due not only to the war, but to a prolonged lag in industrial productivity and efficiency. At the same time, the change in economic relations between the European countries and the Asiatic territories dependent upon them helped undermine Europe's position in world trade, which was partly based on multilateral trade with these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asiatic territories and with North and South America. The shortage of goods on the home market made Europeans suddenly painfully aware that their backwardness in production methods was what slowed industrial output. New attention to the idea of a single free market for European manufactures which would integrate the various national industries and restore a certain equilibrium in international trade was a logical result.

Another powerful impulse toward unity came from a different quarter. It soon became evident that coöperation among the Big Four had not survived the war. A succession of threats from the East made Western Europe a vital frontier of freedom. The mounting danger of aggression brought the free nations together for defense, reawakening the sense of a common bond which had been created by resistance to a common enemy during the Second World War.

We must remember, however, that strong influences also run the other way. European industry has developed on a nationalistic basis since the early nineteenth century, and the "economy of scarcity" which prevailed in the liberated countries in 1945 rooted the various industries still more deeply in separate economic and social systems. In an effort to create some sort of equilibrium in foreign trade, the European nations turned to bilateral arrangements. In many cases the customary sources of supply had disappeared from the market, and every country had to make itself as self-sufficient as possible. Economic nationalism thus was intensified.

The political confusion of the postwar years likewise strengthened the forces of nationalism. Frustration, cynicism and fear nourished selfish opportunism. Diversities were further accentuated by conflicts of language and religion, and sometimes even by dynastic conflicts. Though it is a good omen that the forces making for unity have taken shape and are gaining ground, we must always remember that the opposing forces are real.

Unification must be carefully planned, and carried out step by step, for a premature move would actually encourage the disruptive tendencies. The program cannot be constructed by analogy from antiquity or the Middle Ages, nor even from the impressive example of the United States. It must fit the particular circumstances of the Continent. Eastern Europe has been integrated forcibly, at the expense of democracy and independence. Western Europe strives for the voluntary coöperation of free

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peoples, without the destruction of those qualities or of their healthy variety. The form of organization must help meet immediate needs, but must be one from which a European federation can develop.

There is no single center of European gravity around which the nations can group to speed up this process. That is the reason why the functional approach offers the most direct path to the goal. "Functional integration" is based on the existence of very real national interests, and at the same time recognizes the necessity of subordinating separate interests more and more to the common welfare. It is based on a mixture of realism and idealism. It seeks to restrict national sovereignty, but does not attempt the feat of abolishing it at a stroke; to await the ideal situation in which complete federation became possible would mean never starting at all. It proposes that the countries of Western Europe at once proceed to coöperate wherever they can. Whenever a nation enters a new field of coöperation national sovereignty is transferred to a certain extent by that very fact. These new organizations create what might be called a limited federation—limited not geographically but functionally. In short, this approach does not claim to provide the final answer to Europe's problems but simply a series of practical steps forward. It is not a theoretical answer but an outcome of the concrete developments of the last few years.

A European "opinion" has crystallized in the Council of Europe. At Strasbourg the representatives of various countries are not seated according to nationalities, but in the alphabetical order of their names. In the Council, views of speakers are European rather than national. But though the Council is a symbol of the desire for a greater European unity, as expressed particularly by its great champions, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Spaak, it has not been able to do much. The proponents of federation have met with opposition from the British and Scandinavian Governments. The suggestion for a geographically limited federation—a "little Europe" which would omit Britain and Scandinavia—has also failed to win strong backing. The functional approach to European integration has, however, met with general approval. There is a general understanding of Britain's view that her relations with the rest of the Commonwealth are too important to be risked in experiments in Europe, and that she must search for a form of organization which does justice both to her position in Europe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and that within the Commonwealth. And there is hope that organs set up to meet limited concrete needs will help solve this problem for her and for the Scandinavian countries. No one wants a "rump Europe."

III

Of particular projects which have been launched the Schuman Plan is the most daring and far-reaching. It involves the partial transfer of sovereignty in the crucial field of coal and steel to a supranational authority. The effort toward integration would extend to subsidiary industries. The political importance of the proposal is also great, since it offers a means of ameliorating Franco-German antagonisms and bringing Germany into partnership in the European community.

In the summer of 1950 several other proposals inspired by the desire for European unity were submitted to the O.E.E.C. The suggestion made by the writer—the so-called Stikker Plan—is thoroughly functional. It aims to promote integration in various lines of industry not only by abolishing quantitative import restrictions but also by reducing the high tariffs which, if left at their present levels, will make the removal of quantitative restrictions an empty gesture. Indeed, their present partial removal is harmful to the smaller countries with a tradition of free trade and low tariffs, notably the Benelux nations, for it permits imports from abroad to come in easily while high tariffs elsewhere prevent these countries from finding a market for their exports.

The plan is also intended to help solve the problem of marginal industries. A real integration which facilitates a more rational organization of industry will inevitably result in considerable difficulties for the least efficient industrial enterprises in certain countries. The writer believes this difficulty should be met by the establishment of a European integration fund, which would have as its object the creation of new opportunities of employment. The coördination of internal monetary and financial policies of the various countries, to avoid inflationary or deflationary tendencies which endanger full employment, would also be sought.

The so-called Mansholt Plan, submitted by the Netherlands Minister of Agriculture, broadens these ideas to cover the special difficulties of European agriculture. It starts with the realistic acknowledgement that the creation at short notice of a single

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European market for agriculture is impossible. Agricultural products are of vital strategic importance. No European country can permit even its least remunerative agricultural soil to be unused. Moreover, farmers perform essential social as well as economic functions; changes in the pattern of agriculture are difficult, and cannot be made overnight. Full integration will some day have to be achieved in European agriculture no less than in industry, but for the present the objective is a gradual adjustment of prices and costs in the various national markets. The plan proposes that a "European price" be fixed for various products for the participating countries. The quantity of national agricultural production will thus be determined by competition. In the course of time the price will be gradually lowered and adapted to the cost level of the most rational production method. A European integration fund will be established, in part from duties on imports from non-European countries which, as a result of "social dumping," are priced far below European costs. This fund will assist in enforcing gradual rationalization.

M. Petsche, former Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs of France, has suggested the creation of a European investment bank. This is not intended to meet the problems of the rationalization of particular lines of industry, but, generally speaking, to coördinate the investment activities in Europe along European lines. For that purpose it would if possible utilize European as well as American private capital. It might be called a first step toward an integration of investments.

The functional approach also has a part to play in the complicated field of culture. A European Christian civilization was a well-established reality in the Middle Ages. The development of nationalist states promoted a growing divergence among national civilizations, especially in linguistic areas which were geographically isolated. This variety of languages and civilizations was by no means harmful for Europe, and we should all have been poorer without it. But governmental restrictions which hamper cultural intercourse among nations might profitably be removed. Private initiative can help most effectively to promote this objective; freedom from too close ties with governmental authority is essential for a healthy development of a democratic civilization. The European Cultural Center and the College of Europe, both established by the International Cultural Section of the European Movement, are examples of what can be done in this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

field. Moreover, in promoting European cultural unity we should never lose sight of the strong ties between Anglo-Saxon civilization and the English-speaking world overseas, or the strong bonds among Spain and Portugal and South America. They are being strengthened by the events which unhappily are severing the cultural ties between the Eastern and Western halves of Europe.

Joint efforts for defense will strengthen these various bonds. Indeed, they already have called forth proposals for special forms of organization like the European army envisaged by M. Pleven. The first attempt at military coöperation by the five European countries which signed the Brussels Treaty was too limited to be effective. The North Atlantic Treaty made the defense of Europe a transatlantic undertaking, and brought Canada and the United States into the joint effort. European nations such as Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Greece, while coöperating in the economic field through the O.E.E.C., are not members of a European military alliance; indeed, some of them steadfastly keep aloof from it. Germany, however, has a vital rôle to play. No scheme of European defense can be fully effective unless Germany, the "Heartland" of the Continent, is brought in.

In military problems the functional approach is of paramount importance. The armed forces of the various nations are still "balanced" national units, designed to protect special national interests. At present the joint forces for European defense are simply the sum of these forces, with wide differences in training, equipment and organization. There must be a balanced international force, which can be operated as one unit under a single commander and in which the various national components will concentrate on those tasks for which each individual nation is best fitted. A modern army is a highly complicated affair, and only Great Powers can afford to produce and operate such expensive weapons as long-range bombers and heavy tanks. The functional approach would expedite recruiting and training on an international basis. For a considerable time the infantry and attached units will still be formed and trained on a national basis, though along closely coördinated lines; but international training programs could be initiated at once in special weapons such as tanks and aircraft. These would be the nucleus of a unified force.

The standardization of equipment appears to be more difficult than the standardization of recruiting and training. Equality of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sacrifice should be the underlying principle. Every simplification of the machinery, every increase of efficiency, will multiply the strength of the total force. In the face of the great danger with which we are confronted we cannot afford to waste time. We shall have to reëquip, regroup and retrain the units available, and at the same time start to form and train truly international units. This is a joint undertaking of all the Atlantic nations. Europe, however, has a special task, for the danger to her is the most imminent and her efforts at defense have so far been inadequate. If Europe does not make a conspicuous effort of her own to match the assistance she is receiving from outside, her allies overseas will inevitably be influenced to keep their strength at home rather than risk it on Europe's battlefields. The military integration of Europe should be undertaken as a long-term program, pursued through a series of functional integrations in land, naval and air forces. Perhaps the close coöperation between Europe and the American states with the NATO may step by step create a single Atlantic community, the mainstay of a homogeneous Western civilization in which the ancient traditions of Europe are happily blended with the dynamic vigor of the New World.

At the moment the efforts for integration in all these fields are not coördinated. Thus while the proposed High Authority for the coal and steel pool covers only some six continental countries, the power of the Atlantic Council reaches far beyond Europe. The Council of Europe might perhaps be a good center around which functional economic organs can group themselves. But it should be borne in mind that Europe is not a building which can be pulled down and rebuilt. It is a living organism which can be altered only gradually.

Let us proceed step by step, then, always with a practical end in view. Many plans are waiting to be carried out. My own country, the Netherlands, is a country of merchants, sailors and reclaimers of land who are used to weighing the advantages and disadvantages of practical solutions—as adept at making sensible compromises as at exploring new territories. I feel sure that it can make a helpful contribution in this critical period in European history. The sober-mindednes of the Dutch people, and the facts of their country's political and geographical location, lead them naturally to strive for a strong and united Europe. The principle of functional integration is an expression of the middle road to which the Dutchman has always felt naturally drawn.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CRISIS AND REFORM IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

By Charles-André Julien

THE French Union, the successor to the French Empire, is composed under the Constitution of 1946 of France and four categories of overseas dependencies. There are the *overseas departments* (Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Réunion) which are completely assimilated to the administrative units of metropolitan France. There are the former colonies, now *overseas territories*. There also are two types of communities with a separate existence recognized in international law: the *associated territories,* or trustee areas, under the control of the United Nations (Togo and Cameroun); and the *associated states,* possessing their own political governments. Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia have requested and obtained membership in the French Union as associated states. But the Protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco are voluntarily remaining apart.

These two protected states, the subject of this article, do have a place in the French Union, but they can acquire the status of associated states only by special acts of adherence to the Constitution. Now the French Parliament voted this Constitution without consulting the Bey of Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco, and certain of its democratic and lay principles are not compatible with the theocratic basis of power of these two Moslem sovereigns. As a result, the Tunisian and Moroccan nationalist parties which are now demanding independence contemplate a future alliance of their countries with France, but not integration into the French Union.

French relations with the two states in question are regulated by the treaties of El Bardo and La Marsa, signed with the Bey of Tunis in 1881 and 1883 respectively, and the treaty of Fez, signed in 1912 with the Sultan of Morocco. The treaties, imposed by force, kept the reigning dynasties on their thrones but deprived them of actual power. The French Residents-General, charged with counseling the sovereigns, in fact assumed the duties of the rulers, while functionaries set up direct administration. It thus can be said that the protectorate system has been perverted in spirit as well as practice, so much so, indeed, that although independence may be the supreme aim, local opinion in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact welcomes any reform correcting the wrongs that have grown up.

Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists today earnestly solicit the replacement of existing treaties with new texts, which would be the product of discussions between France and the local sovereigns and freely accepted by the latter. But the Quai d'Orsay rejects the idea of revision and will permit reforms only within the framework of the protectorate. This is a difficult position to support. The protectorate system flourished at a time when the West was talking in an authoritarian manner to Turkey and Egypt and the "Tunis question" was reviving Franco-Italian rivalry. How could provisions applicable in those days remain workable after a war which has liberated Pakistan, Syria and Egypt and stirred the nationalism of all the non-autonomous Moslem peoples? And tomorrow independence for Libya will accentuate the paradoxical contrast between the status of that area and the Barbary protectorates. Whether one likes it or not, the problem is there and cannot be by-passed.

The problems of the two protectorates are not identical in detail. In Tunisia a third of the population lives in cities and small market towns; there is no tribal structure, no native feudalism, but instead an important urban middle class which gives the lead to opinion in the countryside. Tunisians are not very combative and only rarely indulge in city riots, as happened in 1938. In Morocco, on the other hand, the rural Berbers remain the dominant body. The French administration, while supporting the Sultan's authority, has upheld the powerful feudal system of the lords of the Atlas mountains. The last and most powerful of the grand caids, El Glaoui, could, if the occasion were to arise, revive the old Berber secessionist spirit. According to his followers, he could raise some 300,000 rifles against the Sultan.

It is in Tunisia, where fresh Western influences are strong, that public opinion has demanded substantial reforms most forcefully. The principal nationalist party, the Neo-Destour (Constitutional), is campaigning effectively for its claims under the leadership of an able lawyer, Habib Bourguiba. His stay in Cairo not only put him in contact with the leaders of the Arab League, but has enabled him to judge France's rôle in proper perspective. The party man has given way to the statesman.

During the course of a visit to Paris in April 1950 Habib Bourguiba formulated a seven-point program. It included the revival

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Tunisian executive as the trustee of sovereignty; the formation of a homogeneous Tunisian government responsible for public order and headed by a Tunisian prime minister designated by the sovereign; the suppression of the general secretariat, which is directed by a French functionary with control over the prime minister and, in actual fact, full administrative authority; the suppression of the civil inspectors who have replaced the caids; the elimination of the French gendarmerie which is responsible to the Ministry of National Defense and supports the military occupation; the establishment of elected municipal bodies, with French interests represented, in all areas with French minorities; and finally, the creation of a national assembly elected by universal suffrage, to be charged with drawing up a democratic constitution defining future Franco-Tunisian relations based upon respect for the legitimate interests of France and for Tunisian sovereignty.

The realization of such a program would mean complete Tunisian independence. France would have no guarantee, but she would have the virtual certainty of coöperation based on geographic necessity. The Neo-Destour leader had no illusions as to the immediate acceptance of the program, though it makes his final objective plain. In fact, he declared his willingness to have the plan given effect gradually, on condition that the Resident General and the Bey agree upon the nature and duration of the stages.

The plan gained important support when the French Socialist Party approved a resolution voted by the Socialist Federation of Tunisia in December 1949. This resolution demanded negotiations between the French Government and qualified Tunisian representatives to set the date when the Protectorate will end and fix the successive steps toward sovereignty and independence. It also called for agreement upon needed social legislation, and for a treaty of association to coördinate national defense, foreign policy, and economic and cultural relations on a footing of equality. Thus for the first time a leading French Party, with members in the Government, publicly accepted the idea of Tunisian independence.

The result was that the Tunisian situation, which had more or less been ignored by French opinion, became a question of the day. The Government instructed the new Resident General, Louis Périllier, a man of much ability, to work out with the Bey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

how to increase the number and authority of the Tunisian members of his Cabinet and develop internal autonomy. The program announced by Périllier on June 13, 1950, was received with general favor in Tunisia. The local French population, however, reacted against it strongly. The French section of the representative assembly—the Grand Council—resigned, and the union of French civil servants voted a formal protest. As in the past, the attempt at reform ran up against the blind egoism not only of the rich colonials with preponderant influence but even of lesser people who in one way or another saw their prerogatives threatened.

This atmosphere was not favorable for the negotiations. Nevertheless, the Bey, in agreement with the Resident, agreed to replace the Cabinet of M. Mustapha Kaak, which had been imposed by the French administration, by a united Tunisian Cabinet presided over by an able businessman, Sidi M'Hamed Chenik. The new team had once worked with Bey Mohammed Moncef, who had been dethroned by order of General Giraud in May 1943 and who had died in exile five years later, in Tunisian eyes a martyr.

The new Cabinet for the first time was made up of as many Tunisian ministers as French directors. It was to negotiate, in the name of the Bey, "institutional changes which were to bring Tunisia by successive stages to internal autonomy." The terms of the understanding were defined in a communiqué of the Resident General of August 17, 1950. France agreed to the final objective, the Tunisians to the stages. The matter assumed added historical importance when the Neo-Destour party authorized its Secretary-General, M. Salah Ben Youssef, to take the portfolio of Justice. Though M. Habib Bourguiba did not participate he signified his concurrence.

On his arrival in Tunis in June 1950 M. Périllier had announced three structural reforms: priority for Tunisians in access to administrative offices; a democratic communal régime; and restoration of the personality of the government. Despite the importance of the first two provisions, which are indispensable for any evolution toward autonomy, Tunisian opinion set its heart most of all on the establishment of governmental status as a matter of prestige. French opposition to this, however, was intense. Foreign Minister Schuman saw the need for major reforms, and had the support in the Cabinet of the Socialists and of his friends of the M.R.P. But he clashed sharply with the Radicals and various con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

servatives. Thus encouraged, the opposition elements in Tunisia stiffened and sent their friends in France into action. A cry was raised for the defense of "French interests." Valuable support came from General Juin, who was hostile to any change in Tunisia which might encourage similar claims in Morocco and thereby compromise, in his view, the military security of North Africa. There ensued a debate concerning the Atlantic Pact and its bearing on the problems we have been considering.

This campaign in France affected M. Périllier in Tunisia. His zeal slackened, and his Secretary-General, whose powers were at stake, let the Tunisian ministers know in humiliating, bullying terms that he would not tolerate any question of his supremacy. Former Prime Minister Kaak, who was most obnoxious to the Destour, was appointed to the French delegation to the United Nations without consultation with the Prime Minister. A certain caid received the Legion of Honor just when his minister was preparing to reprimand him for breach of trust. The whole Tunisian administration was paralyzed.

Four months had passed and no effective solution had appeared when the Resident-General announced on October 7 that it seemed to him "time to give politics a pause," and to accord priority "to human problems of economic and social reconstruction." Each time the Administration wants to block political reforms it invokes the priority of economic and social matters. The Tunisians made their bitter disappointment clear by keeping at a distance from the Resident-General during the course of his trip through the country.

M. Bourguiba meanwhile multiplied his contacts with political groups and official personages in Paris, pointing out to them the inconsistencies and dangers of the policy being pursued. A serious incident that took place at Enfidaville supported his view. On November 20, contrary to the Administration's promises, the police force was called to bring some striking farmers back to work. When the strikers stoned them the police opened fire; seven were killed, about 50 wounded and about 100 arrested. Passers-by far from the scene of the conflict were machine-gunned. At the funeral services the Tunisian Minister of Labor denounced the action as an inadmissible attack in connection with "a legitimate strike."

The Destourians pointed out that whenever a policy of reform was begun outbreaks of violence would offer a convenient excuse

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to interrupt it. The Quai d'Orsay saw the need for concessions, and the pourparlers were resumed. They proceeded slowly, however, and it was feared that the Neo-Destour executive committee would force M. Salah Ben Youssef to resign. At this point the Secretary-General, M. Vimont, decided to resign his post, apparently disavowing his chief, the Resident-General. Fortunately, M. Périllier and M. Bourguiba kept their heads, and this unusual action of a career diplomat had only limited consequences. Just when the situation seemed most serious agreement was reached.

The agreement was ratified by the French Government on February 7, 1951, and received the seal of the Bey the next day. The Council of Ministers is not to have a greater number of Tunisian ministers than French representatives, in spite of the wishes of the Neo-Destour Party; but the Resident-General will henceforth give the Presidency to the Prime Minister. The Council's decisions will be submitted to the Bey for his seal as decrees. Thus the sovereignty of the Tunisian state has been affirmed, in accordance with the basic claims of the nationalists. In exceptional circumstances, however, such as war, the Resident-General will have the right to convene a High Committee which will consult with the government on the measures to be taken. Thus though the Resident-General will not preside over the Council of Ministers, even in times of crisis, his authority will have substantial safeguards. He will also preside over a budgetary committee charged with arbitrating the differences between French and Tunisian sections of the Grand Council regarding financial problems. The creation of these two bodies, to function beside the Council of Ministers, reconciles the assertion of permanent Tunisian sovereignty with the effective intervention of the Resident-General in critical situations.

In addition to presiding over the Council, the Prime Minister may propose laws and decrees for submission for the seal of the Bey; coördinate the activities of ministries, directorates and commissariats; and keep general administration "under his authority." The big question was the rôle of the Secretary-General. Would he continue to exercise independent control of personnel and expenditures or would he be under the Prime Minister's authority? A compromise was reached. The Secretary-General is placed "beside" the Prime Minister and will assist him in all his activities as head of general administration, keeping him informed of all his activities. He becomes the "highest functionary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Tunisian Government" and assistant to the Prime Minister; but the Prime Minister remains the head. The main axis of Tunisian sovereignty is thus clearly affirmed. The Secretary-General will no longer sign administrative decisions—a prerogative which the Tunisians much resented as placing them under his guardianship. The Resident-General will have the controlling hand.

The powers of the French civil servants will not be altered, but in the future "top" posts will be shared equally between Frenchmen and Tunisians, and the Bey's subjects will have a right to two-thirds of the "intermediate" positions and three-quarters of the "subordinate" positions. French candidates for employment in the two latter categories can be confirmed only after giving evidence of a knowledge of Arabic sufficient to enable them to carry on simple conversation on subjects of everyday life concerned with their work. Thus Tunisians will have wide access to positions in the administration and the Arab language will have the basic place it always should have had.

These reforms have great significance. As the Resident-General has declared, "by a substitution of guarantees Tunisian aims will receive satisfaction while at the same time French interests are fully safeguarded." Beyond doubt the agreement will please neither those who have held preponderant power in Algeria, to whom the news came as a disagreeable surprise, nor the intractable Pan-Arabs of the Old-Destour Party; nor will it please the Communists who are hostile to any Franco-Tunisian understanding. But M. Salah Ben Youssef has not hidden his satisfaction, and it is shared by enlightened Frenchmen who are convinced that if this arrangement is loyally accepted the evolution toward Algerian autonomy can proceed amicably.

II

In Morocco the situation is brutally clear. General Juin, who is being mentioned for a leading rôle in NATO, was still, as these lines were written, Resident-General there. Born in Algeria and trained in Africa, General Juin looks on the Moroccans as agitators and feels that France should maintain her prerogatives in North Africa unimpaired even if she must use force to do it. He has clashed with the Sultan, Mohammed Ben Youssef, an intelligent and able man about 40 years of age, who makes the best use he can of the limited powers left to him by the Protectorate by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

refusing to sign the *dahirs*—decrees having the force of law—or in delaying signing them. Without his signature they are valueless. Although the Sultan refrains from demonstrations, it is known that his sympathies and those of his son, Moulay Hassan, spokesman for the youth of the country, are with the nationalist group, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which demands the freedom and unity of Morocco as "a constitutional and democratic monarchy guaranteeing democratic and individual liberties, notably freedom of religious belief."

But though the Sultan has proclaimed that "the time of democracy has come," the kind of democracy he seems to have in mind would be founded on concessions granted to the people, in the name of Islam, by a theocratic monarchy. "Islam," the Sultan has declared, "will continue to be the guide of our conscience and will require us to discharge our duties toward humanity. Is that not true democracy?" The Istiqlal, which is recruited mainly from the upper bourgeoisie, has pointed out that the democratic régime which it demands will be "comparable to the governmental régimes adopted in Oriental Moslem countries." This is not very reassuring.

The Moroccan nationalists have neither sought contacts with the French nor admitted the possibility of gradual progress toward autonomy. They are intransigent and aloof, and confine themselves to ineffective opposition. Some have even condemned the conciliatory position of M. Habib Bourguiba in Tunis. But they have finally realized that the Tunisian leader's campaign in Paris widened popular interest in the problems of Morocco as well as Tunis and they admit that certain partial reforms would be welcome.

Morocco in fact lives under a truly dictatorial régime. Labor has no rights to organize in unions, as in Tunisia, and there is no freedom of assembly. The press is subject to strict censorship. General Juin recently forbade the publication of a declaration by M. Schuman and even suppressed his photograph. Newspapers of the metropolitan area are seized if they contain comments considered unorthodox, whereas the Residency can spread news of the most questionable nature in its own press without fear of contradiction. Direct administration, explicitly condemned by Lyautey, is widely practised. There is no truly representative assembly, and the State Council is peopled by creatures of the Residency. The power of the French element is much greater than

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Tunisia. If a Resident-General moves toward a democratic policy, as did General Juin's predecessor, Ambassador Eirik Labonne, the coalition of colonials, officers and civil servants provokes such a furor that his position becomes untenable.

General Juin's policy has put relations between the Palace and the Residency under a severe strain. The soldier, accustomed to give orders, has been irritated by the Sultan's tenacious resistance. There are signs that he looks on the overthrow of the Bey Moncef, which he helped bring about, as a salutary precedent. The occasion for such a step has not arisen, though the situation became tense after the Sultan's trip to France in October 1950. In conversations with the President of the Republic, the sovereign demanded the abrogation of the Protectorate; and on its own authority the Quai d'Orsay created a mixed commission to study the problem at Rabat. But an inquiry "at Rabat" would be under the control of the Residency and cloaked in silence—in other words, powerless. Nevertheless the question had been put; it could not be banished as long as the Istiqlal continued to exist and the Sultan continued to reign.

General Juin carried on the fight on two fronts. The Communist Party, profiting by the timidity of the Socialist Federation of Morocco, had taken up the nationalist claims to advance their own ends. The press said this showed collusion between them and the Istiqlal, even though the Istiqlal repudiated the Communist support. The legend that the Istiqlal is "Communist" has been carefully spread in France and other countries, especially the United States. At the same time, the Moroccan newspapers denounce the nationalists as bourgeois and feudal. At the opening of the Moroccan session of the State Council on December 6, 1950, General Juin replied sharply to M. Lyazidi, a former French army officer and President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce representing industry and the workers, who had spoken out strongly against the way the Protectorate was functioning, and requested him to desist from further criticism there. A week later he expelled from the Assembly a prominent merchant of Fez, M. Laghzaoui, without permitting him either to read his report on public works or to request an adjournment to settle the incident. The nine other members of the Istiqlal then also left the hall.

General Juin still had to deal with the Sultan, a more difficult task because of his great prestige and the religious character of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his office. The Residency decided to call upon the old guard—the grand caids. El Glaoui was brought into the dispute to prove to Mohammed Ben Youssef that, if need be, a Sultan from the south could be used to replace him. El Glaoui, the pasha of Marrakech, is under great obligations to the administration, which allows him a free hand in levying forced "presents" and collecting taxes. This feudal lord, much hated in Morocco, was called the champion of the Berber and Moslem traditions against the impious innovations of the Sultan. On December 21 he vehemently reproached the Sultan for connivance with the Istiqlal. Sidi Mohammed replied by forbidding El Glaoui access to the Palace, with the time-honored formula of disgrace. In the incident El Glaoui received support only from caids and pashas whose power would crumble if the Residency withdrew its favor—as would his own. The Oulémas, doctors of law who have the prerogative of electing the Sultan, resisted official pressure and remained loyal to Sidi Mohammed. A few days later, General Juin, in company with the Pasha of Marrakech but without any representatives of the Sultan, presided over a great assemblage of Zaiane Berber tribes, giving the appearance of official support for a caid in revolt against his sovereign.

The move did not produce the expected results. The conservative press of France suggested that the Sultan could avoid forced abdication only by condemning the Istiqlal. However, the Quai d'Orsay did not want another "Moncefist" incident and bloodshed. The newspaper of Foreign Minister Schuman's own party expressed its opposition to such a course in forthright terms —and was promptly banned in Morocco. To make the Government's position clear, the Foreign Minister declared on February 2 that the conversations between the French and a sovereign who had always rendered great services to France were continuing, that they must continue, and that there was no question of abdication. The disavowal of the Resident-General though circumspect seemed nonetheless formal. But the matter did not end there. General Juin persuaded President Auriol to address a letter to the Sultan advising him that the General had the full backing of the Government. On February 25 the Sultan capitulated, issued a declaration condemning the Istiqlal, and signed some 40 decrees. For the time being, at any rate, the attempt to liberalize the French rule in Morocco had been defeated.

These events have made plain that even a Resident-General

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who desired to do so could not chart a liberal policy for Morocco unless the political status of the country were radically altered. There is another consideration. Islam, as Marshal Lyautey said, is a "sounding board" from which news is amplified throughout all the area from Morocco to Java. The Moslems of the world feel a solidarity with the threatened Sultan. The Arab League and the congress of Karachi have proclaimed this sense of solidarity. France, the Christian Power whose territory contains the largest number of Moslems, has nothing to gain from such a state of affairs. Nor will the problem be solved, as some pretend, by merely considering it against the background of the Atlantic Pact.

The North African theater is certainly vital strategically. But it will not be made secure by repressive measures against nationalist agitation there. The United States must not be persuaded to overlook questions of principle and signify its support for the elimination of troublesome elements, conveniently baptized Communists. A people's loyalty cannot be imposed by sanctions but must be won by needed reforms. The example of the agreement reached in Tunis will have a better effect in Morocco than calling in El Glaoui as a counterweight to the sovereign. France's strength will depend upon the boldness with which she leads the former colonial peoples toward federalism. Their bonds with her are mainly cultural, but these are so strong that she has no reason to fear that if they are free they will desert her.

With the lessons of Syria and Indo-China before it, French opinion understands this better perhaps than do the politicians. On the day Tunisia and Morocco realize that a close relationship with France is completely compatible with their autonomy, the legal obstacles on which the nationalists now lay so much stress will have no further importance. This will mark the advent of a true French Union.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CANADA, FREE AND DEPENDENT

By John A. Stevenson

CANADA is today enjoying her full share of the abounding prosperity of the North American continent. At the end of 1950 her population, augmented by the inclusion of Newfoundland in 1949, showed its greatest increase for any decade—2,500,000 or roughly 22 percent—and reached 14,000,000. In that year the value of her national production and her national income attained the record levels of 17.5 billion dollars and 14 billion dollars respectively. There are odd patches of unemployment due to seasonal conditions, but elsewhere there is full employment at good wages for every worker and in some industries a serious shortage of labor. Discoveries of rich oil fields in Alberta and immensely valuable deposits of high grade iron ore in northwestern Ontario and in Labrador will fill serious gaps in the national economy and promise a large increment for the nation's wealth. The outlay of 4.5 billion dollars on capital investment planned for 1950 suggests a continuance of the present high level of prosperity for some years ahead.

The political situation remains very stable, as the Liberal Ministry of Mr. St. Laurent is firmly entrenched in power at Ottawa, with commanding majorities in both Houses of Parliament. The wide divergence in the views and policies of the three parties in opposition prevents any effective combination for the expulsion of the Liberals. But the optimism about Canada's future, which such a happy domestic situation would normally generate, is tempered by grave anxieties about the struggle in Korea and apprehensions that it may prove the seedbed of a third world war. As a result, the international situation and a program for adequate defense against Communist aggressions preoccupy the minds of the Canadian people and their government to a greater extent than ever before in their history.

The foreign policy and defense of Canada remained responsibilities of the British Government for half a century after confederation. It is true that during this period Canada sometimes negotiated commercial treaties through her own representatives, but a separate Department of External Affairs was not constituted at Ottawa until 1912. At the close of the First World War its staff numbered only six, and its only agents abroad were the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

High Commissioners in London and Paris. Britain's trusteeship for the foreign relations of Canada was in the main satisfactory to the Canadian people, but there were recurring complaints that British Governments were too ready to sacrifice vital Canadian interests for the purpose of keeping in the good graces of the United States. In 1903 there was a nationwide outburst of indignation when Lord Alverstone, the Chairman of the Alaska Boundary Commission, voted with his three American colleagues against the two delegates of Canada to sustain most of the American claims about the frontier. Defenders of Lord Alverstone contend that on the evidence submitted to the Commission his vote need not necessarily have been governed by political considerations, but undoubtedly his course of action stimulated the nationalist spirit in Canada and planted in many Canadian minds the conviction that Canada ought to assume as soon as possible the management of her foreign relations.

However, no serious move in this direction was made until the close of the First World War, when Sir Robert Borden, a Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, who had always been counted a strong imperialist, took the lead in asserting successfully against the opposition of British Tory imperialists like the Marquess Curzon, who was to become Foreign Secretary in October 1919, the right of the Dominions to sign the Treaty of Versailles and subscribe to the Covenant of the League of Nations as separate autonomous nations. Canada thus acquired control of her foreign relations. In the period 1900–14 there had been a very large inflow of immigrants from Britain. A substantial element of the native-born Canadians were the children or grandchildren of British immigrants who still had strong sentimental ties with the mother country. Accordingly, a considerable body of Canadian opinion was still so convinced of the superior wisdom of British statesmanship that it expected Canadian governments to acquiesce in the foreign policies devised by Downing Street. On the other hand a sense of physical detachment from the continent of Europe had inevitably nourished isolationist sentiment among elements like the French Canadians, who had no racial or sentimental ties with Britain, and after 1899 French Canadian dislike of British imperialism had been fanned by the treatment meted out to another racial minority under the British flag, the South African Dutch. But from Confederation onward the need for friendly relations with the United States was the most deep-rooted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instinct of the Canadian people about their foreign policy, and such relations were the constant objective of all Canadian Ministries regardless of their party label.

As far back as 1874 Sir Richard Cartwright, who was then Canada's Minister of Finance and who held office in every Liberal Ministry up till 1911, besought Lord Carnarvon, who was then the British Secretary for the Colonies, never to forget that Canada lived cheek by jowl with another great Anglo-Saxon nation; and he reminded him that by the end of the nineteenth century there would probably be at least 80,000,000 English-speaking people in North America. At a later date Mr. Henri Bourassa, who organized the Nationalist Party in Quebec and opposed the Taft-Fielding reciprocity treaty in the election of 1911, propounded the thesis that "there is not a single problem of either internal or external policy that we can settle in Canada without reference to the policy of the United States." The validity of his statement has never been seriously challenged by any political party.

II

The Canadian Conservative Party had always been the special champion of the connection with Britain, but it was Sir Robert Borden, one of its leaders, who, according to the memoirs of David Lloyd George, served notice upon his British colleagues in the Imperial War Cabinet in 1918 that "if the future policy of the British meant working with some European nation against the United States, that policy could not reckon upon the approval or support of Canada." It was left, however, to his successor, Mr. Arthur Meighen, to force a reluctant British Government to a realization that Borden's declaration did not apply merely to relations with European countries. When an Imperial Conference, convened in 1921, discussed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, it appeared that the great majority of Lloyd George's Coalition Ministry, and the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, strongly favored the continuance of the alliance. But Mr. Meighen was aware that Japan's occupation of Shantung, and her conduct in other matters, had very seriously strained her relations with the United States; and he insisted that Canada's fundamental need for good relations with the United States forbade the endorsement of an alliance which might involve hostilities with her neighbor. His powerful

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advocacy of his case achieved the abrogation of the alliance and, although his career in office was fated to be very brief, Mr. Meighen deserves gratitude for a courageous stand which averted a fissure of calamitous possibilities in the relations of the United States and the British Commonwealth.

Soon after Mr. Mackenzie King led the Liberal Party back to power, he made a similar assertion of Canada's right to take her own line in international affairs by refusing Lloyd George's summons to assist in the suppression of the Turks after they had defeated his protégés, the Greeks. After 1923, Canada, beginning with the pact with the United States known as the Halibut Treaty, signed all her treaties through her own agents. Then at the Imperial Conference of 1926 Mr. King was one of the chief architects of the document called the Balfour Report, which gave formal registry to the new order in relations of the British Commonwealth by defining the status of the Dominions in these words:

> They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, although united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Mr. King, however, resolutely opposed all proposals for the establishment of any permanent machinery like an Imperial Secretariat for coördinating the policies of the partners in the Commonwealth, and with the appointment of a Canadian Minister to Washington in 1926 he began the creation of a separate diplomatic service for Canada. But his fears that Canada's membership in the League of Nations might involve her in another European war made him consistently lukewarm toward that institution. The policy of "no commitments," which he sedulously pursued, was designed to secure for Canada some freedom of action in the event of the recurrence of such a calamity. Yet, as the international skies darkened in the thirties this policy became indistinguishable from a timorous colonial subservience and the outcome was that his complaisant acquiescence in the policies of appeasement followed by Earl Baldwin and Mr. Neville Chamberlain landed the Canadian people in a second blood-bath.

III

The idea expounded by Senator Dandurand, Mr. King's chief French-Canadian lieutenant, during a debate on the Protocol

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at Geneva in 1924 that "Canada was living in a fireproof house far from inflammable materials" was rudely shattered by the devastating impact of the Second World War. Accordingly, soon after its start Mr. King proclaimed his complete conversion to the view that isolationism was an impracticable policy for Canada and that, after the war against Fascism was won, she must do her part in helping to build some more effective instrument of collective security than the defunct League. So he and his Ministry gave wholehearted support to the establishment of the United Nations and were active promoters of the North Atlantic Pact. And the only opposition to this assumption of international responsibilities for the preservation of peace and security came from a small body of French-Canadian isolationists and the Communists, now disguised as the Labor-Progressive Party.

A system of reasonably close liaison between the Canadian and British Governments was maintained after the war. But, while a frank exchange of views usually resulted in a reconciliation of such differences as arose, complete conformity in their policies and ideas ceased to be regarded as essential. Canada's foreign policy came to be governed primarily by her own interests and she refused to contribute any contingents to the Allied armies of occupation in Germany and Japan. So, when the cleavage between Russia and her satellites and the Western democracies became acute, and the United States assumed the leadership of the latter in the "cold war," it was almost inevitable that Washington should gradually replace London in the minds of the Canadian people and their government as the chief mainspring of effective policies for the frustration of Communism.

But Canada's independence was still qualified by certain links with Britain, which implied a status of subordination to the mother country. The elimination of these ties has become an objective of the Canadian Liberal Party. In 1947 the abolition of the right of appeal to the Judicature Committee of the Privy Council was accomplished. An enlarged Supreme Court of Canada is now the final court for all Canadian litigants. This reform was followed by a move to secure for Canada full control of her own constitution, which has remained embalmed in the British North America Act, a statute passed by the British Parliament in 1866. This British control of the Canadian constitution has long been only nominal, as constitutional amendments endorsed by both Houses of the Canadian Parliament have al-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ways been incorporated in it without question at Westminster. But its survival is a patent anomaly, resented by Canadian nationalists as a badge of political inferiority which invalidates Canada's claim to the status of an independent nation. All British parties would gladly be rid of this archaic trusteeship, but the French Canadians always opposed its termination, unwilling to leave their special privileges about language, religion and education, explicitly guaranteed by the British North America Act, at the mercy of a Canadian Parliament in which English-speaking Protestants held a decisive majority. However, French-Canadian fears on this score have been modified by the increase of their political influence at Ottawa and by the assurances of Prime Minister St. Laurent, a member of their race.

Accordingly, early last year the Federal Government arranged a conference with all the Provincial Governments for the purpose of tackling the thorny problem of constitutional reform. The initial session of this Dominion-Provincial conference produced a unanimous agreement that it was desirable for Canada to secure complete control of her constitution, provided adequate safeguards for the basic rights of French Canada were preserved. A subcommittee, consisting of the Federal Minister of Justice and the Attorneys General of the ten Provinces, was instructed to explore in consultation with the Provincial Ministries all the varied facets of the constitutional problem and devise a solution acceptable to all parties. Optimistic communiqués suggesting that good headway is being made have been issued, but the general impression among informed observers is that there has been very little progress. The present Federal Ministry feels strongly that it must secure an enlargement of its authority, partly to obtain sufficient funds to finance its ambitious program of social security, partly to cope with such problems as the need for firm economic controls in the present crisis and the effective suppression of subversive activities; in particular it seeks a modification of Section 92 of the British North America Act, which vests the Provinces with exclusive jurisdiction over "property and civil rights."

Certain provinces, notably Quebec, remain adamant against any such concession on the ground that it would reduce the Provinces to complete vassalage to Ottawa. And at least four of the Provincial Premiers argue that a constitution framed in 1866 has now become hopelessly antiquated and wholly inadequate to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the present needs of Canada, and that the procedure suggested by the Federal Government would merely patch up in unsatisfactory fashion an outworn political garment. They urge that the British North America Act be scrapped and a new constitution adopted. The St. Laurent Ministry does not reject the idea of a new constitution, but it wants the Dominion-Provincial conference to complete its assigned task of making the Canadian constitution amendable in Canada, and holds that this change would facilitate the drafting of a new one.

These controversies have produced a temporary deadlock, but solution of the constitutional problem cannot be postponed indefinitely, and, when it is achieved, the only remaining political link with Britain will be the representative of the British Crown, the Governor-General. Today the selection of the Governor-General rests with the Canadian Government, which is offered a list of possible choices by the British Government. Heretofore the office has always been reserved for eminent personages from Britain, but there is now a large body of Canadian opinion, well represented in the present Cabinet, which favors the selection of a native-born Governor-General.

One difficulty about this change, however, is that the French Canadians would certainly claim an even share of the appointments to this office, and could not be denied it. Viscount Alexander, the distinguished Irish soldier who is Governor-General today, was due to retire next spring and it is an open secret that the St. Laurent Ministry gave careful consideration to the appointment of a native-born Canadian as his successor. But there were peculiar political risks for a French-Canadian Prime Minister in assuming responsibility for the severance of a traditional tie with Britain, which many English-speaking Canadians value, and the problem was shelved temporarily by the prolongation of Viscount Alexander's term for another year. But now that both Australia and South Africa have native-born Governors-General, it is only a question of time when their example will be followed at Ottawa. The stage therefore seems set for the abolition of all formal political ties between Canada and Britain.

At the same time the strong economic tie between Canada and Britain has been weakened, since Britain's shortage of dollar exchange forced a drastic curtailment of her imports from Britain. In 1939 the ratios of Canada's exports shipped to Britain and the United States were respectively 36 percent and 40 percent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The trade figures for 1950 show that Britain's share of these exports had shrunk to 15 percent and the share of the United States had risen to 69 percent. As a consequence Canada is today much more dependent upon the American than the British market. On the other hand there has been since 1946 a progressive increase in British exports to Canada, their value in 1950 being $404,200,000 as compared with $114,000,000 in 1939. The pressure of Canadian manufacturers, aggrieved by this intensified competition, recently induced the Canadian Government to revive its anti-dumping laws, which had been suspended for automobiles and other goods in order to enable Britain to earn more Canadian dollars. Other Canadian manufacturers and natural producers, like the apple growers of Nova Scotia, also resent the restrictions imposed upon their exports to Britain and her colonial possessions. And while this attrition of Canada's ancient links with Britain has been proceeding, a huge inflow of American capital for investment in mining, pulp and paper, and manufacturing enterprises in Canada, together with the plan for the coöperative development of the St. Lawrence Deep Waterway, have been intertwining the economic fortunes of the two countries more closely than ever.

IV

Accordingly, it is much more difficult than it was in 1921 for Canada to pursue a foreign policy unpalatable to the Government of the United States. When the Korean war broke out, the determining factor in Canada's international policy was a desire to march in step with the United States. When, under American leadership, the Assembly of the United Nations took action to resist Communist aggression in Korea, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, Canada's Secretary for External Affairs, gave his Government's unqualified endorsement to this move. But unfortunately, Canada's profession of zeal for the cause of collective security has not so far been matched by her practical actions. Her original meager contribution of three destroyers and a group of transport planes to the struggle in Korea aroused such severe criticism in Canada herself, and such caustic taunts from American papers like the *Chicago Tribune,* that the St. Laurent Ministry was impelled to raise a special force, about 12,000 strong. It was at first placed at the disposal of the U. N. for service in Korea, and later had its theater of operations enlarged to include Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The St. Laurent Ministry now proposes to spend 1.6 billion dollars upon its program of defense during the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1951, and an almost equal sum in each of the two following years. It also plans as far as is within its power to accelerate the production of raw materials, which will be a very important contribution to the common cause. Recent discoveries seem to assure that Canada can become a large producer of iron ore, uranium, titanium and oil to supplement her very substantial output of copper, nickel and other metals; and her production of food is also capable of considerable expansion.

The Canadian Government, however, has not been completely subservient to Washington in regard to the Asiatic policies of the Truman Administration. If it has not followed the example of the British Government in giving formal recognition to the Government of Mao Tse-tung, it has been frankly critical of Chiang Kai-shek's régime, and has dissociated itself explicitly from the pledge given by President Truman to defend Formosa. Its acquiescence in the decision to authorize General MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel was qualified on November 6, 1950, by a confidential expression of misgivings to Washington about the reported intention of MacArthur to carry his campaign to the Yalu River. The creation of a buffer zone in northern Korea was also proposed.

When the United States began to press for the condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor, the first pronouncement of Mr. Pearson upon this move was that it was "premature and unwise." After the United Nations "cease fire" committee, of which he was a member, failed to achieve a basis for peaceful negotiations with the Chinese Communists, and the United States agreed to modify the terms of its original resolution, he cast Canada's vote for the condemnation of the Peiping Government. But, when Mr. Pearson reviewed the international situation in the House of Commons on February 2, he emphasized that his Government had not abandoned hope of a peaceful settlement, and had made its view abundantly clear that "this resolution does not give anyone on one side any excuse for rash or adventurous courses or anyone on the other any shadow of excuse for refusing to discuss an ending of hostilities or a peaceful solution of the problem." Moreover, when Mr. Attlee visited Ottawa, he found the St. Laurent Ministry in complete sympathy with his efforts to persuade the Truman Administration that the commitment of the Western democracies to a full-scale war against Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist China would play into the hands of the Russians and might well have calamitous consequences in Europe. At the moment Canada therefore has a greater community of views about Korea and the international crisis with Britain than with the United States.

V

Little fault can be found with the policy of the St. Laurent Ministry about Korea, but the very slow pace at which it has moved for the fulfillment of Canada's obligations as a member of the United Nations is less satisfactory. The reasons for the hesitancy are not obscure. Prime Minister St. Laurent is a French Canadian, and some 90 of his supporters in the House of Commons are either French Canadians or owe their seats to a bloc of French-Canadian votes. In the later stages of the First World War the French Canadians banded together in a solid racial bloc to resist the imposition of military conscription by the Borden Ministry. They were subjected to persistent indoctrination by the leaders of the Canadian Liberal Party to the effect that conscription was a monstrous injustice perpetrated against the French-Canadian people by wicked Canadian Tory politicians acting as servile agents of aggressive British imperialists. There are few British imperialists of any kind left today, but a process of political miseducation, which was no credit to Canadian Liberalism, has planted in the minds of most French-Canadians the *idée fixe* that they should be privileged to enjoy immunity from participation in overseas war because such conflicts always brought the hated draft in their train.

There had been some expectation that the powerful influence of the Roman Catholic Church would be exerted in Quebec to persuade the French Canadians that in any war against Communists its fortunes were at stake, but the editorial comments of the French-Canadian papers upon the Government's decision to support the United Nations intervention in Korea ranged from outright condemnation to lukewarm approval. The recruiting returns for the special U.N. force showed a smaller proportion of volunteers from Quebec than from any other province. Under these circumstances the St. Laurent Ministry felt that it must keep its commitments for the common pool of defense within limits which would not arouse violent opposition in Quebec. It secured authority at the special session to spend $300,000,000 in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

providing equipment and munitions for the European partners in the North Atlantic union; spokesmen of the Ministry from Mr. St. Laurent downward have been arguing that such supplies would be a quicker and more effective contribution to the defense of Western Europe than a contingent of Canadian troops.

The Ministerial contention is that the cost of maintaining a Canadian force in Europe is much greater than the cost of an equivalent force of Europeans, and that Canada can give as good value for money spent on equipment and munitions as any other country in the world. But this specious plan of making armaments rather than manpower Canada's chief contribution to the defense of Western Europe does not seem to many Canadians an honorable fulfilment of Canada's obligations. Influential papers like the *Toronto Globe and Mail* support the demand made by the Canadian Legion and other organizations of veterans for some form of compulsory selective service and total mobilization of the nation's resources. The Government also has critics within its own party. On the eve of the opening of the Federal Parliament on January 29, Mr. Bruce Hutchison, the editor of the *Victoria Times,* who is the ablest Liberal journalist in Canada, was moved to write: "In times like these not only the Government, not only Parliament but the people who nourish them are on trial. And since we have fallen so far behind our partners in defense and since we are the most fortunate nation in the world and have suffered less than anybody, many outside foreign eyes are watching us with interest."

However, it was to the credit of Prime Minister St. Laurent that in the opening debate he faced the issue squarely with a declaration that his Government was not opposed in principle to conscription or selective service. "As far as I am concerned," he said, "this is not a matter which should be decided on sentimental grounds. It is one which should be decided strictly on its merits and with regard to what will make for the efficiency and effectiveness of our contribution to the joint efforts that have to be made by the 12 nations joined together." He also argued that Canada's contribution of manpower was a question for the collective decision of the members of the United Nations and cited the statement of General Eisenhower that the prime need of Western Europe was arms rather than troops.

But Mr. George Hees, a young veteran, who was elected last summer as a Progressive Conservative, proceeded to expose

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the degree to which Canada lagged behind both the United States and Britain in her contribution of manpower. According to his figures, Canada with a population of 14,000,000 is today 7,000 men short of the establishments of 69,000 authorized for her regular forces. But the United States with 11 times the population of Canada will have 3,500,000 men under arms by June 3, or 60 times as many as Canada; and Britain, with a population three and a half times as large as that of Canada, had 1,023,000 men under arms last October, or 16 times as many as Canada has. He maintained that such comparative data made nonsense of the claim that Canada was shouldering her fair share of the common burden.

In short, Canada remains the only member of the North Atlantic union which has not some form of military draft. Her Government is ready to enforce it, if the international situation deteriorates so much that her partners demand a larger contribution of manpower from her. But as long as the Canadian Government will spend upon defense only a much smaller proportion of the national income than do both the United States and Britain, and balks at the enforcement of conscription, Canada can expect continuous criticism both at home and abroad for the inadequacy of her contribution. However, if reports are true that the Roman Catholic clergy of Quebec have been preaching from their pulpits that the youth of French Canada must not be laggard in the struggle against Communism, the Government may find its prime difficulty about the enforcement of some kind of compulsory selective service greatly eased.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDO-CHINA ON THE RAZOR'S EDGE

By Seymour Topping

INDO-CHINA began to attract the attention of most Westerners only last year, after the nationalist revolution there against French rule had already been oriented toward the Soviet bloc. The area—two vast river delta plains linked by a mountainous spine with a total population of about 28,000,000—is strategically more important than Korea, for it is the bridge over which Communist China hopes to penetrate unstable and restless South Asia.

The struggle in Viet-Nam is between the French-sponsored Bao Dai Government, supported by an army of 150,000 troops, part French and part native, and the Ho Chi Minh Government, representing a Communist-led nationalist movement, known as Viet-Minh (League for the Independence of Viet-Nam), supported by Moscow and Peiping. When the victorious Chinese Communist forces reached the Indo-Chinese border in December 1949, the French garrison was ordered to seal off the frontier. The French hoped the Viet-Nam army would remain a guerrilla force that could be contained in the mountains. But by as early as March 1950, when the writer visited the frontier, French officers there acknowledged that large-scale infiltration over the long border could not be blocked. Several months later, French, American and Chinese Nationalist intelligence estimated that up to 30,000 Viet-Nam troops were being trained and equipped within Communist China.

Having failed to prevent Viet-Minh traffic with China, the French posts astride the main communications routes across the frontier lost their usefulness and, in fact, became dangerous liabilities. The striking power of the Viet-Minh forces was steadily augmented by Chinese aid. They intensified their raids from bases on both sides of the border and soon made the position of the posts precarious. After a delay that was to prove fatal, the French decided to evacuate the most exposed post, Caobang, 110 miles northeast of Hanoï. The results of the attempt were disastrous. Attacked by an overwhelming force of well trained and equipped Viet-Minh troops, seven French battalions were shattered in a series of ambushes along the withdrawal route.

The French defeat was the severest in the four-year war, and revealed that the Viet-Minh had an army that could pass to the offensive. For most Viet-Namese, the Chinese Communist commitment to aid Ho Chi Minh now seemed a guarantee of victory. Any immediate prospect of a political solution through a significant swing of popular support from Ho Chi Minh to Bao Dai disappeared. The Viet-Namese who had considered joining the Bao Dai camp now waited to see whether the French army could restore the military balance.

L'Affaire de Caobang also had strong political repercussions in France. In December, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was appointed French High Commissioner to replace Léon Pignon, who has been architect of the policy of fitting the "Associated States of Indo-China" into the French Union. Pignon acknowledged upon his departure that France had reached an impasse

Editor's Note: For a French view of the situation in Indo-China see "Indo-China and Korea: One Front," by Jacques Soustelle, *Foreign Affairs,* October 1950.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in her search for political means of resolving the Indo-Chinese conflict, and said that it was time for a soldier to take command. De Lattre, an able and distinguished soldier of great energy and flamboyant personality, proved to be the tonic needed to brace French forces to meet the Viet-Minh offensive. His spirit and initial defensive victories served to restore the confidence of the French and some of the respect and prestige that France had lost at Caobang.

When General de Lattre took command almost the entire north Indo-Chinese frontier was controlled by the Viet-Minh, and Ho Chi Minh's prin-



cipal army was entrenched in a mountainous region with good communication to supply and training centers in China. The French in north Indo-China (Tonkin) are now holding a 375-mile beachhead that has the Hanoï-Hai Phong area as its core. Hanoï, the northern military and administrative center, is linked by a vulnerable 60-mile communications corridor to the seaport of Hai Phong. The beachhead embraces the delta of the Red and Black Rivers, the rice-bowl of the north and the home of most of Tonkin's 9,000,000 inhabitants. Viet-Minh guerrillas operate within the perimeter and the French claim firm

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

control of only about one-third of its villages. A line of posts, or small forts, form the outer defenses of the perimeter and, like the interior posts, exercise local control. When a post comes under attack, its mission is to hold until a mobile task force is moved from a concentration point to the menaced sector. Some 80,000 French and Viet-Namese auxiliary troops, including the cream of the Indo-China garrison—Foreign Legionnaires, North Africans, French paratroopers—hold the northern line.

The garrison is confronted by a regular Viet-Minh army roughly estimated at 90,000 troops, backed by guerrillas. The Viet-Minh troops are thoroughly indoctrinated, fanatical fighters, as well equipped as the French in light infantry weapons. As this is being written, they are descending from their mountain base to the delta to engage French troops on the northern approaches to Hanoï in the initial phase of what may be a decisive campaign for north Indo-China. If forced to abandon Tonkin, the French will probably fall back to a new line in the narrow waist of central Viet-Nam (Annam) north of Hué, the provincial capital. Except for a 200-mile sliver of territory hinged on Hué, the greater part of the Annamese coastal plain is occupied by the Viet-Minh. The strategy of the French has always been to consolidate the hold on the northern delta, and on south Viet-Nam (Cochin China), before attempting to pacify Annam.

In Cochin China, which comprises the greater part of the Mekong River delta, an estimated 25,000 Viet-Minh regular troops operate from five major base areas in conjunction with strong guerrilla activity throughout the province. Viet-Minh strength in the south is steadily augmented by newly formed units, armed by weapons manufactured locally or smuggled in from Siam (Thailand). More than 50,000 French and Viet-Namese auxiliary troops police Cochin China, the wealthiest region in Indo-China. In normal times it produces Viet-Nam's only exportable surplus of rice, about 1,500,000 tons, as well as other commodities such as rubber, timber and copra.

The Viet-Minh strategy is apparently to wear down French forces through attrition, on the assumption that they can afford heavier losses because of their large manpower reserves. The Indo-Chinese war has already cost France more than 2 billion dollars and perhaps as many as 100,000 casualities, including 25,000 dead or captured. When the French have been sufficiently weakened, the Viet-Minh plan to launch a final general counteroffensive intended to sweep them from Indo-China. Since the victory at Caobang, and the arrival of substantial aid from Communist China, the date for the opening of this final stage seems to have been advanced. When the general offensive is ordered, the main effort will be made in north Indo-China, but secondary attacks elsewhere will attempt to prevent the transfer of French troops to meet the northern blow. Viet-Minh propaganda has left no doubt that invasion of Cambodia and Laos would follow victory in Viet-Nam. Guerrilla infiltration of both countries is already well advanced. The weak French-sponsored Governments of Cambodia and Laos are also harassed by native dissidents, some of whom are coöperating with the Viet-Minh. Conquest of Laos and Cambodia would bring the Communists to the border of Siam, the next objective of Communist penetration in Southeast Asia.

If the Western Powers commit large enough military resources to enable the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French to fight a successful holding action, the Viet-Minh may invite a "volunteer" Chinese Communist invasion, despite the strong nationalist sentiment against this. According to some estimates, 25,000 Chinese Communist troops could turn the tide decisively.

The French objective in coming months will be to hold on to their present positions, which dominate the main population and production centers of Viet-Nam. Since they are outnumbered, they are depending upon their superiority in artillery, and the effectiveness of their air force and armored units. American military aid in the form of planes, tanks and artillery and other matériel is now arriving in quantity; but the French air force in the north still possesses only about 125 fighters and bombers, and the inadequate road network limits the manœuvrability of armored units. Unless the Indo-Chinese garrison receives substantial troop reinforcements, the French northern line will probably collapse eventually before the growing weight of the adversary. France has few troops to spare from other parts of the French Union for duty in Indo-China, and before more French soldiers can be subtracted from the Western European defense pool some understanding about it will probably have to be reached by the Western Powers.

If the French are to move beyond the holding stage and reëstablish a military equilibrium that would open an avenue to a political compromise with Viet-Namese nationalism, and hence make possible the pacification of the guerrilla-infested countryside, they will have to build an effective Viet-Namese national army. The greatest obstacle is now a lack of trained officers. In part the delay in building a national army is a result of the political problem. The French have grave doubts of the reliability of such an army when confronted by a popularly supported native revolutionary movement. The recent American experience in China with Chiang Kai-shek's troops illustrates the danger for the French. They have had fair success with the Indo-Chinese colonials that make up perhaps one-third of their Indo-China garrison, and with the Indo-Chinese auxiliaries; but for the most part these are officered by the French. However, a national army under direct Viet-Namese command seems indispensable for a solution of the guerrilla problem.

II

Gauging public opinion in Western countries is difficult enough; the job is infinitely more baffling in Asia. As nearly as the writer can determine, a majority of the politically conscious Viet-Namese are in sympathy with the Ho Chi Minh régime. The political consciousness of the Viet-Namese population has steadily broadened during the last four years under the influence of Viet-Minh propaganda. Whatever the political character and intentions of the Communist leadership, the popular appeal of the Viet-Minh is purely nationalistic. Unlike the Chinese revolution, which was generated essentially by social and economic factors, the insurgent movement in Viet-Nam is almost solely an expression of nationalism. It has, of course, social and economic roots; but the present-day political temper of the Viet-Namese is a product of the experience of 90 years of French colonial domination, allowed to find expression in the past decade of world upheaval. The nationalist revolution in Viet-Nam is similar to the Chinese revolution in that the Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munists are exploiting it as a useful vehicle upon which they can ride to power.

The nationalist movement did not begin to attract mass support until after World War II. It had been accelerated by the Japanese conquest of Indo-China, and the consequent lowering of French prestige, and the wartime experience of native administrations. When France attempted to reimpose her colonial authority at the war's end, the balance sheet of the years of French rule was not an easy one for the Viet-Namese people to read. The French had begun their colonization of Cochin China in 1858, and after consolidating that rich region extended their hegemony to Annam, Tonkin, Laos and Cambodia. They built roads, railways and ports, and constructed towns and cities modeled on their own. They mined coal, opened rubber and coffee plantations and expanded the profitable rice culture. Prewar exports from Indo-China totalled annually about $100,000,000, and in return about $50,000,000 in almost exclusively French products entered the country. The French instituted a limited program of education and founded a university at Hanoï and a number of *lycées* and technical schools. Some Viet-Namese went to France to study. The written Viet-Namese language was romanized, and French became the second tongue, as had English in India. Missionaries made Catholics of about 2,000,000 Viet-Namese. And the French administration brought order to the country.

Frenchmen point to these things with pride in Indo-China; but there are other things which the Viet-Namese recall more vividly. The French permitted no self-government; Viet-Namese held only minor or honorary official posts. French colonial capital developed almost exclusively extractive enterprises to exploit Viet-Namese resources; except for mills to process agricultural products, few factories were built. The Indo-Chinese were shut off from the rest of the world by a French cultural and economic monopoly that was nearly complete. Probably 80 percent of the population was illiterate. Civil liberties were harshly restricted. In the light of this experience, and impelled by the aspiration for national freedom stirring all Asians, the Viet-Namese rose to fight for their independence.

In late September 1945, shortly after the Viet-Minh had proclaimed their "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam" with Ho Chi Minh as President, the French moved to retake possession of their colony. French troops released from Japanese internment by the British drove the Viet-Minh out of Saïgon, and the fighting continued until the following year, when peace talks were initiated. Ho Chi Minh was welcomed to France to carry on negotiations, but they broke down. The Viet-Minh explanation was that the French refused to meet demands for qualified independence. The French point out that an agreement had in fact been signed recognizing the "Republic of Viet-Nam" as a free state with its own government, parliament, army and finance within the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union; and that negotiations to give it effect failed for the same reason that other attempts by Westerners to negotiate with Communists failed after the war. In any event, as it turned out, the Viet-Minh troops attacked in Hanoï on December 19, 1946, and the war was on in full fury.

By 1948, the French began to search again for a political solution to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problem of Viet-Namese nationalism. Bao Dai, the 36-year-old French-educated heir to the "Dragon Throne" of Annam, was brought out of exile in Hong Kong. He had served as the nominal Emperor of Annam under the French, was continued on the throne under the Japanese and abdicated to serve as "High Councilor" to the Ho Chi Minh Government before escaping to an indolent existence in Hong Kong. On March 8, 1949, the French signed an agreement with Bao Dai which granted limited autonomy to Viet-Nam within the French Union. Bao Dai became the provisional Chief of State pending resoration of peace and the election of a constituent assembly to frame a constitution. The French retained direction of Viet-Nam's diplomacy and national defense. Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos were to be incorporated into an economic federation and their currency tied to the French franc. French business and cultural interests were assured special prerogatives. Frenchmen were to be tried before mixed courts according to French law and were to be given preference in the appointment of foreign advisors and technicians. The Viet-Namese were given no official promise that the agreement would lead to full independence and no provision was made for the withdrawal of French troops from the country after the attainment of peace.

The Agreement fell far short of the dramatic act of liberal statemanship that might have placed Bao Dai's government on a solid political foundation and enabled him to attract support away from Ho Chi Minh. By failing to meet Viet-Namese demands for a place in the French Union equivalent to that of a Dominion in the British Commonwealth, France lost, perhaps irrevocably, a chance to ally herself with strong Viet-Namese nationalist elements. In November 1950, at the International Conference at Pau, the French made further economic concessions under the pressure of military reverses. Although these concessions were within the framework of the March 8 Agreement, they were substantial and, made earlier, might have been applauded by the Viet-Namese. Coming as they did on the heels of *L'Affaire de Caobang,* their effect on Viet-Namese public opinion was negligible.

The Bao Dai Government is generally looked upon as a "puppet régime," although many of its members have shown considerable courage in criticizing French policy and in urging a more liberal revision of the March 8 Agreement. Bao Dai has won the nominal allegiance of several special groups, such as the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao—political-religious sects in Cochin China which number about 2,000,000 and 50,000 respectively. Both of these sects, and several other smaller groups in Cochin China backing Bao Dai, possess private armies and enjoy semi-autonomous status in the territories under their control. However, the bulk of Viet-Nam's 2,000,000 Catholics, chiefly those living in autonomous dioceses in Tonkin, have refused to rally to Bao Dai, though they oppose the Viet-Minh's Communist leadership. Bao Dai has been unable to recruit adequate senior personnel for his government from among the few influential leaders who are not actively in the opposition. Some have refused to join because they believe the government lacks the fundamental attributes of sovereignty, others are awaiting developments before taking sides.

A major weakness of the government is Bao Dai himself. By subordinating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

affairs of state to pleasure seeking, he has disappointed not only his French sponsors and American supporters, but also the Viet-Namese coterie surrounding him which is trying to place Viet-Nam under the Annamese imperial dynasty. To the rather impressionable Viet-Namese, Bao Dai's deficiencies appear particularly striking when he is compared to the ascetic professional Communist revolutionary, "Uncle Ho."

Ho Chi Minh ("The One Who Shines") was born 57 years ago in Annam, the son of a petty official. As a student in France in 1921 he was already an active Communist and a leading opponent of French colonial policies. He went to Moscow in 1923 as a delegate to the "Peasants International Congress" and remained to work at the School of Asiatic Peoples. He reappeared two years later in Canton, deep in Indo-Chinese revolutionary activity. In 1931 he organized the Indo-Chinese Communist Party and in the same year directed an unsuccessful rebellion against the French. French Sûreté files state that he became the chief Comintern agent for Southeast Asia. It was during this period that his underground work landed him in a Hong Kong prison for 18 months. In 1940 Ho Chi Minh organized the Viet-Minh, and with Allied support based himself in the north Indo-Chinese mountains to stage guerrilla raids against the Japanese. The Viet-Minh entered Hanoï triumphantly in August 1945 and proclaimed the "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam."

In October 1945, the Indo-Chinese Communist Party was transformed into the "Marxist Cultural Group," in line with Party tactics after the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. Now it is sometimes said that Ho Chi Minh is no more than titular head of the movement, and that the real power in the Viet-Minh resides with younger and more trustworthy Stalinists. The secrecy blanketing the activities of the Party makes it impossible to obtain answers to such questions. It seems probable that though Ho Chi Minh remains the respected leader of the Viet-Minh he is no longer indispensable to the movement.

We can at any rate be sure of the political line pursued by the Viet-Minh ruling clique. Propaganda is securely in the hands of the Communists and carefully parrots the Moscow line. To preserve the national character of the Viet-Minh front, the Communist leadership, employing orthodox Communist tactics, has avoided advocating any revolutionary social program that might alienate any of the different factions. Social reform has been mainly confined to some reduction in land rents and other improvements of agricultural conditions, readjustment of the tax scale, and an educational drive that serves the double purpose of indoctrinating the masses and wiping out illiteracy.

The Communists are a minority in the Viet-Minh, probably not exceeding 30 percent of those engaged in the movement. The non-Communist faction believes that the country would not fall under Communist control if the French were ousted, a confidence which seems rather naïve in light of the fact that the Communists already dominate the Viet-Minh army, police, political machinery and propaganda apparatus. In part this willingness to take a chance with the Communists is due to lack of experience of the ruthlessness of Communist revolutionary technique; but it is also a product of disillusionment with colonialism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECONOMIC BASES OF UNREST IN BURMA

By Peter Ady

THE first two years of independence in Burma were a period of the greatest difficulty for the new régime. The country, which was devastated by the two Japanese campaigns, has since been torn by internal strife, partly due to Communist groups in open revolt against the newly elected Government, and partly arising from racial conflicts.

The situation today in the third year of independence seems more promising for eventual stability. The main Communist groups have been dispersed by government troops and the countryside is quieter. Conditions are far from settled, however. The Communist influence is partly dependent on events in China and Korea, so that it cannot be considered disposed of by military victories. Further, the countryside is still disturbed by marauding bands, calling themselves Communists although often only brigands.

The resulting chaos cannot easily be attributed to Burma's choice of independence, even by Churchillian critics of the régime, in view of the greater strength of the Communist-Nationalist opposition in both Malaya and Indo-China. Neither in Burma nor Siam can Communism appear as the champion of nationalist aspirations. Significantly the Communist opposition is weaker than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In Burma it is also divided into two groups, kept apart by personal enmity between its leaders.

The reasons for other outbreaks of fighting can all be traced to separate tendencies of minority groups, distrustful of the Burmese majority. Yet, except for the Karens, the numbers have been small and the movements have had little support from responsible elements in the minorities themselves. With the semi-federal constitution of the Union, local autonomy already exists for most tribal minorities and its extension is always constitutionally possible. With the Karen rebels now defeated, the Government has the opportunity of developing constitutional reforms to provide Karen autonomy, and the principle of a new Karen state has been accepted.

Government troops seem to have turned the tide against all the various rebel groups in the last 12 months. Yet it is clearly going to take some time to disarm the countryside. Looted weapons were in the possession of every village after the Japanese campaigns, and the dispersion of arms and ammunition has been increased as a result of the present rebellions. Even in the nineteenth century it took British troops years to pacify the countryside; and after 40 years of the *pax Britannica,* Burma still had one of the highest rates of robbery with violence in the world. For dacoity, or brigandage, has always been a favorite means of livelihood.

This is one reason why some of those who support the Burmese desire for independence have thought that it was perhaps undertaken too soon after the war. The Burmese argue, however, that dacoity would be the same problem to any administration, while the state of civil war would have been far more serious had Burma not gained her independence. The British, they say, would have had to face a people united in rebellion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

Much the greater problem to the first elected Government, in the Burmese view, is the present economic condition of the country. The destruction caused by the two Japanese campaigns is described in the following extracts from the first Burmese Finance Minister's budget speech of September 1948:

> Burma before the war was a surplus country in many respects . . . she had surplus rice, timber, petroleum, kerosene, lead, tin, wolfram, silver, hides, rubber, etc. . . . If war had not come to Burma she, like India, would have emerged as a creditor country, with her material resources greatly developed. . . . The Anglo-Japanese wars twice fought over the length and breadth of Burma have wiped out all her sources of income.

The Minister's figures indicated a catastrophic fall in current output since the war. Oil and mineral output, which had formed 40 percent of the value of the prewar export total, are negligible, and will not be produced on any scale before 1951. Timber output in 1947 was assessed at 29 percent by volume of the 1939–40 figure. Rice cultivation is yielding only 50 percent of prewar averages, largely owing to a decline in the area cultivated in the fertile delta region, where much damage has been caused by the destruction of the sea-dykes, or bunds.

With Burma's national income at half its prewar level, the task of her reconstruction is indeed great. The courage or temerity of her leaders in taking on simultaneously the problems of the transition to independence and of the rehabilitation of the economy seems only too apparent. Yet any other choice would have been politically impossible, as was shown by the referendum of 1946 in favor of leaving the Commonwealth. This political atmosphere is due in part to the centuries-old tradition of independence, for there has been a kingdom in Central Burma since the twelfth century. Since 1919, moreover, the trend of opinion in the Far East has been increasingly critical of the colonizing Powers, and suspicious of the good intentions of their administrations. This has certainly been the case in Burma, despite the great increase in the wealth of the territory in the 60 years since its annexation.

Between the first Burmese War of 1852 and the last of 1886, the main interest of the British settlements at Moulmein and elsewhere was trade with the still independent Burmese kingdom further north. Railway development assisted the phenomenal expansion of the rice and timber trade which began only a decade after the opening of the Suez Canal. Modern oil and mineral extraction came only at the end of the century; and the development of adequate road communications came later still. The rapid growth of trade is reflected in Burma's exports, whose value rose from Rs 45,000,000 in 1872–73 to a peak of Rs 654,000,000 in the boom of 1926–27.

In spite of this progress it was widely felt in Burma that foreigners had benefited more than her own people. Her first Two-Year Plan said:

> During the period in which she formed part of the overseas dominions of Britain, Burma has been the scene of intense economic activity. . . . But this period was dominated by the ruling doctrines of laissez faire, and the nature and extent of the economic development were determined almost exclusively by the self-interest of foreign capitalists and entrepreneurs. Hence the paradox that while the national

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wealth of the country undoubtedly increased manifold, the lot of the villager remained unchanged, and he continued to live in squalor and extreme poverty.

Many who know Burma would deny the truth of this dark picture of Burmese village life, and others would contest the statement that it has seen no improvement in the last 50 years. But the evidence as to the net effect of the British occupation upon Burmese welfare has never been thoroughly examined. The expansion of rice exports indicates the rising productivity of the land, and supports the view that Burma shared in the wave of the nineteenth century world prosperity and progress. Yet, although total income rose fast, income per head appears to have risen in this period only by about 50 percent, partly because the population of British Burma also had doubled in the 50 years before 1926. Despite this increase in numbers, consumption of home-produced food is not thought by the Burmese themselves to have fallen in this period because of the increase in agricultural output; and the per capita value of imports, adjusted for price changes, rose also from Rs 10 in 1900 to Rs 16 in 1926. The story is very different after that date, however, and it is certain that the decade of depression which then followed witnessed a definite recession of living standards, as compared with the 1920's.

Whatever may have been the long-term trends in economic welfare before 1930, the Burmese peasant certainly has suffered in the trade depressions and uncertainties of the inter-war period. Rice prices fluctuated between Rs 150 and Rs 180 in the early 1920's only to fall at the end of that decade suddenly to a level of between Rs 50 and Rs 90. In the circumstances, increasing agricultural indebtedness and the alienation of mortgaged land were inevitable: by 1939 in the richest rice-growing areas, the land owned by non-agriculturalists ranged from 50 percent to 70 percent of the total in any district. That the money-lenders were very often Indian did nothing to reduce the sense of grievance caused by the loss of land and by the heavy incidence of interest charges, at rates ranging from 12 percent to 50 percent, in times of falling prices. The Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee estimates the short-term agricultural debt alone at about Rs 120,000,000 per annum, while the total value of the rice crop in that year has been estimated at only Rs 300,000,000 after having been worth about Rs 700,000,000 in the boom year of 1927. With 65 percent of Burma's population engaged in agriculture, the period since 1930 has been marked by great discontent, manifested in a succession of riots directed chiefly against the Indians and Chinese.

Hostility to European firms also grew in this period. The first and most outstanding case of this was the agitation against the Bullinger Pool, a combination of the four chief rice-exporting European firms, formed in 1921 to "observe a common policy in rice-purchases and sales." This was generally believed to have lowered the prices received by farmers and to have injured the small rice mills of the interior owned mainly by the Burmese, Chinese and Indian millers. The committee appointed to inquire into the rice and paddy trade, as a result of the nationalist agitation of 1928 against the pool, reported that this was "an organization devised in the need of self-preservation in the fight against the too numerous small mills" and held that "it does not seem right to scrutinize too closely the tactics in a fight for existence. The Pool enjoys no legal advantage. It has no monopoly. It rests on its com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mercial reputation, its business skill, and its financial backing." Although the Pool did not survive the long depression and one of its biggest firms went bankrupt, the impression of the ruthlessness of giant enterprise still lingers in Burma, and partly explains the fear of foreign private enterprise.

In the period of economic depression, after the collapse of rice prices in 1927, the conviction spread that the country was being exploited by Indian money-lenders and by the foreign trading community. It is significant that nationalist outbreaks began only at this point. In Burma, as elsewhere, nationalism has been partly the product of economic discontent. The decade after 1930 began with a rebellion against British rule (the first since 1890) and was characterized by communal tensions culminating in repeated riots. It is significant that the agitation against the Bullinger Pool gathered force only after 1928.

III

Many of Burma's plans for economic reconstruction and development can be understood only in the light of these basic antagonisms. Socialist theory and nationalist feeling found a common ground for action both in the programs for land reform and for an increasing measure of state enterprise. The problem of the absentee landlord (very often Indian), which has so long troubled agricultural relations in Burma, is being dealt with by the compulsory acquisition of the land by the state (with compensation to previous owners) and its redistribution to the peasants. The aim is to provide each cultivator with 12 acres of land (*i.e.* as much as he can plough with one yoke of oxen), although previous owners of larger plots will be allowed to retain up to 50 acres of their land, providing they propose to cultivate it themselves.

The problems of the money-lender (long the subject of legislation), of fixing fair rates of interest, and of rent where the mortgaged land has changed hands are to be ameliorated by the provision of both short and long term state credit on a generous scale. These measures have been supported by legislation, passed in the first month of independence, making it illegal for land to be transferred to the ownership of non-nationals. Although present non-Burmese owners of non-agricultural land may retain it, they are not permitted to acquire more without a special dispensation. The application of these sections of the land program has been delayed by the civil war.

State enterprise has been extended to the export marketing of rice and timber, and the development of coöperatives in the internal distribution of imports is being encouraged. The internal purchase, milling and export sale of milled rice and other agricultural products are handled solely through the State Agricultural Marketing Board. A corresponding export agency, the State Timber Board, also handles all export sales of teak and other timbers. A Government Timber Extraction Agency has for many years been responsible for the actual working of one forest area. This organization, now part of the State Timber Board, has extended its activities to cover areas recently taken over from private firms. The whole industry is now state operated, although full working of the forests is impossible owing to unsettled conditions.

An extension of government milling activity and an increase in state operated public utilities are projected. The country's railways have always

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been run as a state monopoly, and one of the first nationalization measures of the new Union Government was the taking over of the privately owned river transport monopoly, the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company. Electrical undertakings come next on the list; the date will depend partly on the progress made with the proposed scheme of hydroelectric development and partly upon technical considerations, such as the availability of trained men.

These programs of land reform and of nationalization will redistribute Burma's national income in favor of her own nationals as against the foreigner, but the level of her aggregate income at present is only about half that of prewar. With the disruptions of civil war following upon wartime devastations, the lot of the villager has shown little, if any, improvement as a result of independence, and the Communist rebels are said to be still trying to use this to foster discontent. The main contention of the "Red Flag" Communist group is that the Government's attitude to foreign capital is weak. This group alleges that had expropriation taken place without compensation, Burma would have received more benefit from nationalization.

In fact this criticism has little validity, since the actual compensations paid have been small. The timber companies' leases had expired during the war, so that in the Government's view no compensation for loss of extraction rights was involved. Payment is being made for mills and other equipment taken over. However, under the "denial policy" in 1942 a great deal of physical capital was destroyed, for example, most of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company's river fleet. The compensation payable for the prewar equipment taken over by the Union Government is much smaller than the war-damage claims, which are being met directly by the British Government.

The real handicap to Burma's rapid economic development has been the war. Her losses in physical capital have been very great and the task of reconstruction alone is considerable. With total income at such a low level, internal savings are small and the financing of her ambitious program of reconstruction and development is a problem. To attempt to finance this development on the Russian model, without foreign borrowing, would depress the already low living standards of her people. This would strain further their loyalty to the new Constitution, and might also lead to the breakdown of her democratic framework. The present Government is supplementing the country's internal savings, produced by the state export monopolies and import control, with some foreign borrowing.

IV

Yet the problem is not merely financial. Much more serious has been the wartime interruption of all education in Burma. With its program of land reform, and the provision of agricultural credit, on the one hand; and with its two Marketing Boards, handling the greater part of postwar exports, the Government is already responsible for the organization and conduct of the more valuable half of economic activity in the country. To this must be added the new Boards of Inland Water Transport, and the state cotton mill erected in 1949, which weaves yarns for internal sale to the handloom weavers of the north. The extent of nationalization has meant that the country's supply of key executives and technicians is already seriously taxed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even before the war there were few technically trained Burmese, partly because the wage-competition of trained Indians was acute in all grades. In 1920 a Parliamentary Report stated that whereas in India "all that was not European was Indian . . . in Burma the people were in no position to compete with the influx of Indians who flooded in to exploit the resources of the country and to take up posts for which no trained Burmese were available." This trend was maintained by the policy of the Administration for reasons of budgetary economy, since it was cheaper to employ Indians who were already trained and were willing to accept lower wages. Although this policy was reversed later in the inter-war period, the number of Indians in every department of the government was still very large in 1946. Even by 1937 the proportion of Burmese students taking a scientific or technical training after school was very low. Education in Burma during the period of Japanese occupation had been at a standstill, so that a lot of leeway must be made up before the supply of trained men is adequate.

This difficulty was foreseen in Burma's original Two-Year Plan, but the seriousness of the lack of technicians has only more recently been recognized. Till trained Burmese nationals are available in sufficient numbers, foreign technical assistance is now realized to be necessary, not only to staff the state-operated services and industries, but also the university and the technical schools. Yet with the world-wide shortage of technicians, it has not proved easy to find foreigners with the right training who are willing to accept contracts of even a few years with the new Union Government, despite the high salaries offered. This may partly be due to the political unrest. Unless the Western democracies can find some solution to this problem, the slow rate of economic progress will provide the Communists with increasing political capital as time goes on. One solution canvassed is a technical service of the kind envisaged by Sir John Sargent.[1] Some help is being provided under the technical assistance program of the U.N. and more is envisaged in the new Commonwealth scheme, but the scale of such assistance needs to be considerably increased.

The difficulties that are being experienced in the development of state enterprise in Burma have led recently to a change of attitude towards foreign capital. Although no positive action was taken against private capital other than in the nationalized industries, in the first year of independence the old antagonisms prevailed and public pronouncements gave little encouragement to foreign investors. The precise relationship which would eventually develop between state and private enterprise in other industries was uncertain, but the first official statements were in conformity with the generally left-wing character of all the main political parties in Burma. The original Two-Year Plan stated that "the profit motive and other considerations which usually govern industries in capitalistic economy shall not be allowed to determine the development of basic industries in independent Burma. All such industries shall be established and developed as state enterprises. In regard to consumer goods industries the profit motive and what is described as the free choice of consumers may be allowed greater freedom—to an extent compatible with the basic features of the Plan."

[1] "Experts for Export," by Sir John Sargent, the London *Times*, March 14, 1949.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With the difficulties that have been experienced in finding technicians for the Boards of the nationalized enterprises, however, and the lack of industrial "know-how," it has been recognized in Burma that any further extension of state enterprise will be slow, and that private capital from abroad may well once again be a valuable factor in Burma's economic development. In particular, it is expected that private capital will provide in its own enterprises the managers and industrial scientists who have so far been difficult to find from abroad for the public boards. These points were publicly recognized in the "Statement of Industrial Policy," tabled by Thakin Nu in the Burmese Parliament in September 1949.

This new policy lays the Socialist Government open to renewed attack on political grounds, and the Burmese Communists are said to be trying to whip up the fear of foreign capital. Their efforts are meeting with little success as yet, since the country is weary of unrest and violence. Much will depend upon the course of events in Korea and China, but the rate and the character of economic development in Burma will clearly also prove an important factor in the future of Communism. The Union Government's proposals for land reform have gone some way to winning mass support, especially in the countryside. The Communist campaign against foreign capital is being countered by the Union Government's offer to take up a majority of shares in the new enterprises, thus retaining at least nominal control. But despite the new attitude to foreign capital expressed in the Prime Minister's statement of September 1949, private capital is quite naturally disinclined to underwrite political risks along with the usual economic ones in these unstable countries.

This is Burma's dilemma—but it is also a problem for the Western World. Stability in the face of Communism depends upon the relative rate of economic development in such backward areas. The problem is to devise institutions which will provide countries like Burma with financial and technical aid on the scale needed. For inter-governmental loans and technical services the pattern has already been set by the Commonwealth Conference (though Burma has so far elected to remain outside the scope of the Colombo Plan) and the United Nations. The machinery has begun to work. No similar progress can be reported in making possible a freer flow of private international investment. Attempts have been made by the International Bank, but its efficacy has been limited. Without some new safeguards, the deterrents to further private investment in a country with Burma's drawbacks are considerable. If machinery cannot be devised to provide some protection to private capital in such areas, the scale of investment will inevitably be small.

The struggle for stability in independent Burma has not ended with the close of her civil war. It has merely been shifted from the political to the economic plane. It is also, however, now being fought out in a larger area. Foreign economic aid is now seen to be necessary to her survival and progress. After the lessons of her first years of independence, her own leaders have now courageously recognized this.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

By Arthur L. Grey, Jr.

THE critical decision to divide Korea at the Thirty-eighth Parallel has never been fully explained and thus has been a subject of considerable curiosity and dispute during the past five years. Sufficient information is now available to refute definitely the erroneous but widespread impression that Korea's future was decided at Yalta.

Although one of the reasons why the Big Three met at Yalta in February 1945 was to secure definite assurances of Russian participation in the war against Japan and to fix its timing, the conference was not extensively concerned with the Far East[1] and gave almost no attention to Korea. The top secret document "Terms for the Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan" drawn up at Yalta did not contain a single reference to Korea, either explicitly or by implication.[2]

The question of the future of Korea seems to have been touched on in the Yalta talks in two respects only and then quite inconclusively. At one point, the trusteeship plan, to replace the old League of Nations system of mandates which had been under development for some time, was brought up and passing mention was made of a multi-power trusteeship for Korea.[3] The discussion of the trusteeship problem was concluded, however, with a formal agreement that the actual areas to be placed under trusteeship should be decided later.[4] President Roosevelt and Stalin are also known to have agreed that foreign troops would not be stationed in Korea, an understanding which had absolutely no significance in view of the later occupation by both Russian and American forces.[5]

We now know that our military experts continuously overestimated Japan's potentialities as an enemy and that, even without the atomic bomb, Japan was very near the end of her industrial and military rope in August 1945.[6] On the basis of mistaken intelligence, our leaders were led to believe that Russian participation in the Pacific war was vital as late as July 1945.[7] Thus the real significance of the Yalta conference as far as Korea was concerned was that it secured Russian entry into the war and thereby made Russian activity in Korea virtually inevitable.

It was not until several months after Yalta that a trusteeship for Korea

[1] Only the 12th and 21st of the 24 meetings of the conference dealt with the Far East. See "Summary of the Major Diplomatic Meetings at the Yalta Conference," in Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., "Roosevelt and the Russians." New York: Doubleday, 1949, p. 327–330.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 351–52.

[3] See George M. McCune with the collaboration of the present writer, "Korea Today." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 43.

[4] "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference," section on territorial trusteeship, Stettinius, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

[5] Robert E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins." New York: Harper, 1948, p. 868.

[6] Jerome Cohen, "Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction." Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949, p. 48–49.

[7] Stettinius, *op. cit.*, 96. Also see Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, "On Active Service in Peace and War." New York: Harper, 1948, p. 618–619.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was definitely decided upon, although the way had been cleared for this decision by a prior exchange of ideas between Washington and Moscow and also London and Chungking. In May 1945, at President Truman's request, Harry Hopkins made his last trip to Moscow. On May 28, Hopkins cabled the President a summary of his conversations with Stalin, including a statement that the Russian leader had definitely agreed "that there should be a trusteeship for Korea under the United States, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union."[8]

On July 26, 1945, President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Chiang Kai-shek announced the Potsdam Declaration which set forth the basis for the unconditional surrender of Japan and reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 to make Korea independent "in due course."[9] A fortnight later, the Soviet Union, in its declaration of war against Japan dated August 8, 1945, indicated its adherence to the Potsdam Declaration, and thereby to the promise to grant Korea her independence.

The second atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki on August 9, the day Russian troops first got into action in Manchuria. On August 10, the Japanese Government announced its willingness to accept unconditional surrender and asked for an armistice. Sometime within the next four days the decision was made to divide Korea at the Thirty-eighth Parallel. Occasionally this decision has been erroneously imputed to General MacArthur. As a matter of fact, it originated in Washington and was only communicated to MacArthur after being expressly approved by the President.[10]

On August 11, a draft of the instructions which MacArthur was to present to the Japanese concerning the procedure for the surrender of their armed forces was considered by the State-War-Navy Coördinating Committee. It was passed on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for "review" and "revision as deemed necessary." From August 12 to 14 the draft was in the hands of the Joint Chiefs.

Meanwhile, Russian operations in Korea began on August 12 with amphibious landings at Unggi and Najin, two seaports in extreme northeastern Korea just a little over 100 miles from the main Russian base at Vladivostok. Enough information can now be pieced together from official and unofficial sources to say quite definitely that the decision to occupy Korea south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel with American troops originated with the Joint Chiefs and more specifically in the War Department.[11]

[8] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 903.

[9] In the Cairo Declaration, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang stated that their governments, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The Potsdam Declaration stated that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out . . ."

[10] For this statement and much of the discussion that follows see Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1st Sess., Hearings on H.R. 5330, "Korean Aid." U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D. C., June 8–23, 1949, especially p. 118–119. The Committee members expressed a good deal of interest in how the Thirty-eighth Parallel demarcation line originated. Under Secretary of State James Webb yielded to this interest and furnished the members with a heretofore confidential explanation of the matter. This was the first time that a fairly complete official account of the decision was made public.

[11] John M. Allison, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 40, that the boundary was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What apparently happened was that certain staff officers in the War Department took note of the latest operations reports that Russian forces were already on the ground and realized that this precluded our accepting the surrender of all Japanese forces in Korea. It was then agreed that for tactical reasons we should occupy as much of Korea as was still feasible.[12] During the period the surrender document was being readied, Russian forces made other amphibious landings at Wonsan, the port and oil refinery center on the east cost of Korea, much further to the south than the landings of August 12. Yet there was still the possibility of American forces getting possession of Seoul, which, besides being the capital, is by far the most populous city in Korea. Thus the line of 38° North Latitude which lay somewhat north of Seoul and south of the furthermost point of reported Russian operations was selected.

Undoubtedly the Thirty-eighth Parallel was chosen in the light of the most limited tactical considerations only, for the boundary had virtually nothing to commend it. The line cuts across Korea where the country approaches its greatest breadth and at one point on the west coast it intersects and isolates from the rest of South Korea an important peninsular area which extends southward. On this peninsula, and elsewhere as well, several important towns were precariously close to the border. It was in one such town in 1948 that the first American soldier was killed in combat with North Koreans when his patrol was ambushed while on routine duty. The untenable economic situation which the line created has been discussed many times.

There can be no doubt that the Soviet Union would have been most pleased to occupy all of Korea. The record of demands and concessions at Yalta indicates that, while Korea was not discussed, the Soviet Union was interested in regaining at least as favorable a position in the Far East as that which prevailed before Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905. Following the declaration of war on August 8, 1945, Soviet forces moved very rapidly to occupy the Japanese territories in which the primacy of Russian interests was now recognized. Soviet airborne troops parachuted to effect the occupation of Dairen, Port Arthur and the Kuriles, and Soviet amphibious forces swept across the island of Sakhalin, all in a matter of days.

It should be added that Russia's territorial gains in the Far East in 1945 were not exclusively the result of the American desire for Soviet participation in the Pacific war. The United States was also responding to Chiang Kai-shek's expressed wish to improve his relations with the U.S.S.R. Chiang wanted the United States to work out some agreement with Russia which would clarify the status of the controversial areas in the Far East before the war ended, and was apparently willing to make important concessions in the hope that this would minimize the difficulties he would face after the war.[13]

---

selected by the "State-War-Navy Coördinating Committee acting on War Department recommendation."

[12] For some time after the Japanese surrender it was officially maintained in Washington that American troops entered Korea only to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops, and indeed this was the nominal reason. During the year preceding the Communist invasion, however, military spokesmen showed a willingness to explain the occupation as the "best" that could be done under the circumstances to prevent Russia from taking all of Korea.

[13] See J. Patrick White, "New Light on Yalta," *Far Eastern Survey*, May 31, 1950, especially p. 108–109. Mr. White's conclusions are based largely upon the Department of State

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From 1896 to 1898 the Korean Government was strongly susceptible to Russian influence. During this period the Korean king took refuge in the Russian legation from the Japanese who had kept him a virtual prisoner in his own palace.[14] The immoderate character of subsequent Russian demands alienated the Koreans and this influence was lost. Again, immediately before the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Russian representations in Korea were intensified and important concessions were sought, including the port of Yongampo at the mouth of the Yalu River, timber rights in the Yalu valley, and ports on Korea's south coast. If, in 1945, Russian foreign policy still reacted to its "inner drives" of the era before 1905, Korea was certain not to be overlooked.

There were, incidentally, two occasions before 1905 when the Thirty-eighth Parallel line had more than geodetic significance. In 1896, General Yamagata Aritomo, the builder of the modern Japanese army and one of the chief architects of an aggressive Japanese foreign policy, proposed to the Russian Government that Korea be divided into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence north and south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel respectively. Russia rejected this offer because she still hoped to get control of all of Korea.[15] In January 1904, just shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, Russia instructed her Far Eastern commander that any Japanese penetration north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel should be met with force.[16] Since 1945 the historical significance of the Thirty-eighth Parallel has been commented on in a number of places,[17] but our military planners in the Pentagon were no doubt unaware of these precedents when they made their "purely *ad hoc* military decision." It is also ironic to note that while our decision to occupy Korea was a purely military one—that is, made by military men—it was the Department of Defense which maintained for a year or more before the Korean war began that the country lay outside our perimeter of defense in the Western Pacific.[18] The State Department's task of explaining American commitments to Korea before Congress was made much more difficult because of the position taken by the Defense Department.

On August 15, 1945, after the directive on the Japanese surrender had been

---

white paper, "United States Relations with China," 1949, 1054 p. It should be noted, of course, that, while the Chinese attitude encouraged the drawing up of the Far Eastern agreement, the document unfortunately remained a secret from the Chinese Government for fear of security leaks at Chungking to Japan, and that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in effect bound their governments to enforce upon China an agreement to which she was not a party.

[14] A detailed account of Russia's attempts to influence the Korean Government is given in M. Frederick Nelson, "Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia." Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945, p. 232 ff.

[15] William L. Langer, "The Diplomacy of Imperialism." New York: Knopf, 1934, vol. 1, p. 406.

[16] This incident is discussed in Malozemoff, "The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War 1894–1904," an unpublshed M.A. thesis on file in the University of California Library, Berkeley, 1934, p. 112.

[17] See especially Shanon McCune, "The Thirty-eighth Parallel in Korea," *World Politics*, January 1949, p. 225.

[18] Our line of defense in the Western Pacific was declared to extend south from the Aleutians through Japan, the Ryukyus (Okinawa), and the Philippines.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"reviewed" and "revised" by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the State-War-Navy Coördinating Committee and the President, it was communicated to MacArthur in Manila and to the Russian and British Governments. Stalin requested amendments to the order and these were subsequently made, but he made no reference to the Thirty-eighth Parallel.[19]

As it happened, American forces did not reach Korea until September 8, almost a month after the Japanese had first agreed to surrender. The Soviet forces had already penetrated as far south as Seoul but withdrew north of the Thirty-eighth Parallel when the U. S. troops arrived. Informed American military opinion believes that the Soviet Union could have overrun the entire peninsula before the American occupation forces arrived from Okinawa, since Japanese resistance had virtually ceased on September 2.[20]

Why, then, did Russia accept without question the Thirty-eighth Parallel demarcation line? While a conclusive explanation cannot, of course, be given, several possible reasons can be suggested as to why this was the most practicable course for the Kremlin to follow.

On August 15, Russian troops were still encountering stiff resistance from the crack Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and in North Korea. The Soviet leaders had no way of knowing how long the Japanese troops would try to hold out—how long it would be before they complied with their Emperor's order for them to lay down their arms. Moreover, it was hardly possible on that date to judge the actual timing of the American arrival in Korea. The large American outpost on Okinawa is only about 600 air miles from Pusan, the largest port on Korea's southern coast, and 850 air miles from Inchon on the west coast near Seoul, where our troops actually landed. Thus the Kremlin would appear to have had no assurance that our forces would not be in Korea before Soviet columns could cross the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

The strength of the American resolve to occupy part of Korea was problematical. To have pressed for an all-Russian occupation would have aroused American suspicions, perhaps, without yielding any changes in the final surrender instructions dispatched to General MacArthur. Furthermore, the creation of an open breach in Allied solidarity at this time could have jeopardized the heavy concessions already won. It was of the utmost importance to the Russian leaders that they be represented on the veranda deck of the U.S.S. *Missouri* on September 2, 1945, when the Japanese surrender was formally accepted.

The fact that one temporarily secret program of concessions—the Terms for the Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan—was negotiated at Yalta proved to be sufficient ground for the frequently repeated but never substantiated charges that concessions were also made concerning Korea. Months before the secret agreement with the Soviet Union on the Far East was made public, Syngman Rhee, now the president of Korea, made the charge that Korea had been handed over to the Russians at Yalta. These assertions persisted even after the publication of the document and in the absence of any evidence.

Another source of confusion has been a failure to distinguish the decision

[19] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Korean Aid," *op. cit.*, p. 118.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 46. Testimony of Brig. Gen. Charles G. Helmick.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to divide Korea for the purposes of a joint occupation from the trusteeship issue. Trusteeship was a favorite idea of President Roosevelt, and, as early as March 1943, he suggested a trusteeship for Korea to Anthony Eden while the latter was in Washington.[21] Both Eden and Churchill expressed distaste for the whole trusteeship idea, but, appreciating Roosevelt's attachment to the scheme, committed themselves in principle to the incorporation of a trusteeship plan in the future United Nations Charter.

Trusteeship for Korea, in particular, proved to be a failure for several reasons. It would have demanded a much greater degree of coöperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two principal trustees (China and the United Kingdom were the others), than the tenuous solidarity which prevailed during World War II. The negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the two years preceding American reference of the Korean problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1947 were an early demonstration that, in the absence of any underlying community of interest, such coöperation was not possible.

Trusteeship invited both Russia and the United States to stir in the Korean pot and the results indicate that the Koreans surely would not have done worse if left strictly alone. The Koreans, having struggled for 40 years to win their independence from Japan, were openly hostile to the trusteeship plan making this independence conditional. Even the Communist-dominated political groups at first joined in the demonstrations against trusteeship when it was outlined by the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December 1945.

Contrary to the charge that American policy followed a plan laid down at Yalta, the evidence is that there was remarkably little advance agreement concerning Korea before the defeat of Japan. As was indicated above, trusteeship for Korea was still indefinite at the time of Roosevelt's death in April 1945 and was not formally established until the Moscow meeting more than three months after Korea was occupied. Unlike the Allied occupation of Germany,[22] which was preceded by considerable discussion and agreement, at Yalta and elsewhere, the future of Korea was left to a military decision rendered on the eve of the Japanese surrender. Roosevelt's death preceded both the genesis and execution of this decision.

[21] "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull." New York: Macmillan, 1948, p. 1596.

[22] See Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950, p. 580–604.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

POLICY FOR THE WEST. By BARBARA WARD. New York: Norton, 1951, 317 p. $3.75.

Miss Ward's thoughtful recommendations involve a balanced program of "containing" the Soviet Union, on the premise that it will not take a major risk; of maintaining economic and social stability at home, by utilizing the Keynesian precepts; and of improving the living standards of backward peoples, in the faith that this will be conducive to calm rather than turmoil.

DEFENCE OF THE WEST. By B. H. LIDDELL HART. New York: Morrow, 1950, 335 p. $4.00.

This well-known military analyst's prescription for a successful defense of Western Europe against Russia bears most of the characteristics which have aroused both praise and controversy in his earlier writings: his emphasis on mobility, quality and limited liability, and his tendency to override political considerations. The book is prefaced by observations on the crises and errors of World War II.

THE PRICE OF SURVIVAL. By BRIG. GEN. JOSEPH B. SWEET (RET.). Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1950, 230 p. $2.85.

An estimate, in military terms, of the Soviet and American positions as of midsummer 1950.

LE TEMPS DU CHOIX. By PIERRE BILLOTTE. Paris: Laffont, 1950, 246 p. Fr. 350.

A supporter of General de Gaulle, former head of the French military mission to the United Nations, somberly discusses the Soviet menace and the military, political and economic steps needed to check it.

POWER AND POLITICS. By HANSON W. BALDWIN. Claremont (Cal.): Claremont College, 1950, 117 p. $2.75.

Three popular lectures on international political and military problems delivered in April 1950.

IMPERIALIZM DOLLARA V ZAPADNOI EVROPE. By A. LEONT'EV. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1949, 419 p.

An exposition of the familiar attack on the United States' postwar policy in Europe, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact.

DE STALINE À HITLER. By ROBERT COULONDRE. Paris: Hachette, 1950, 334 p. Fr. 450.

The French Ambassador in Moscow from November 1936 to October 1938, and then in Berlin until the outbreak of war, has written an extremely valuable and informative volume of memoirs. Of particular interest is his account of the crumbling of the Franco-Soviet pact, France's reluctance to give it military teeth, and the obvious Soviet threat, after the Munich crisis, of a fourth Polish partition.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM NAPOLEON TO STALIN. By A. J. P. Taylor. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1950, 224 p. 12/6. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.00.)

A potpourri of sprightly essays and reviews, some concerned with recent and contemporary diplomatic questions.

SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT. By George Orwell. New York: Harcourt, 1950, 200 p. $2.75.

Selected political and literary essays by the late critic and novelist; his observations on "Politics and the English Language" should be read by all venturing into political writing.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS. By H. Lauterpacht. New York: Praeger, 1950, 475 p. $8.50.

An important book, by a professor of international law at Cambridge University, on the vital question of safeguarding individual rights through international measures. After investigating the doctrine that the individual, despite the claims of the state, may be a subject of international rights and duties, he examines and criticizes the status of human rights under the U. N. Charter and advances the principles of an International Bill of Rights.

THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Hans Kelsen. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1950, 903 p. $18.75.

The leader of the Vienna School of jurists has prepared an exhaustive and exceedingly formal analysis of the basic legal problems contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

FREIHEIT UND ANARCHIE. By Gustav Kafka. Munich (U. S. Zone): Reinhardt, 1949, 115 p.

The Four Freedoms of the Atlantic Charter are probed for their philosophical implications and political ambiguities.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, THE BRUSSELS TREATY, AND THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Sir W. Eric Beckett. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1950, 75 p. 10/6.

An address on the legal relationship between the U. N. Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty.

INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION. VOLUME IX, 1942–1945. Edited by Manley O. Hudson and Louis B. Sohn. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1950, 962 p. $4.00.

This ninth, and possibly concluding, volume of the "texts of multipartite international instruments of general interest" shows the great expansion of international organization as the war drew to a close.

IL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE TRIBUTARIO. By Manlio Udina. Padua: C.E.D.A.M., 1949, 459 p. L. 3400.

The tenth volume, dealing with taxation and financial relations, of an extensive collaborative study of international law: "Trattato di Diritto Internazionale."

STAATSVERFASSUNGEN. By Günther Franz. Munich (U. S. Zone): Oldenbourg, 1950, 465 p.

A collection of historical and contemporary constitutions of the major Powers.

L'INFLUENCE DES SYSTÈMES ÉLECTORAUX SUR LA VIE POLITIQUE. By Maurice Duverger and Others. Paris: Colin, 1950, 177 p. Fr. 350.

A series of essays on the influence of electoral systems on the political life of France, Weimar Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Switzerland.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DE LA REPRÉSENTATION. By Jean Clarise. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1949, 238 p. Fr. 600.

A study of the legal aspects of representation and its rôle in creating obligations.

A CONSTITUTION FOR THE WORLD GOVERNMENT. By Sanjib Chaudhuri. Calcutta: The Author, 1949, 246 p. Rs. 8.

The Legal Advisor to Nepal places "before the Common Man and the leaders of the Common Man a constitution for the Government of the World."

INTERNATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY. Edited by Stuart Gerry Brown. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press (for Grinnell College), 1949, 185 p. $3.50.

This collection in memory of Charles E. Payne includes essays on democracy, sovereignty, the Palestine Mandate and European union.

TOWARDS A WORLD COMMUNITY. South Hadley (Mass.): Mount Holyoke Institute on the United Nations, 1950, 184 p. $2.00.

Selected speeches on Point Four, Germany, Japan, East-West relations, and U. N.

EUROPE UNIE 1949–1950. Colmar: Alsatia, 1949, 186 p. Fr. 480.

Essays on European federation celebrating the Strasbourg meeting.

L'OCCUPAZIONE NEL DIRITTO DI GUERRA. By Francesco Capotorti. Naples: Jovene, 1949, 214 p. L. 700.

A technical study of the legal aspects of military occupation.

THE POLITICS OF MURDER. By Joseph Bornstein. New York: Sloane, 1950, 295 p. $4.00.

A case book of political murders, including those of Matteotti, Roehm, Dollfuss, King Alexander and Trotsky; interesting to read but not impressive in interpreting this sinister phenomenon.

HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR. MILITARY OPERATIONS: ITALY, 1915–1919. Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds and Major-General H. R. Davies. London: H.M.S.O., 1949, 450 p. 30/.

This volume of the official history of World War I, while giving special attention to British operations from 1917, includes an introductory sketch of Italy's entrance into the conflict and a description of the war as a whole in the Italian theater.

THE H BOMB. New York: Didier, 1950, 175 p. $2.50.

THE HELL BOMB. By William L. Laurence. New York: Knopf, 1951, 198 p. $2.75.

Two preliminary expositions and estimates. The first is a useful collection of recent statements and articles, with commentary by Major George Fielding Eliot and introduction by Albert Einstein; the second, written by a well-known science-news reporter and differing in some of its conclusions from the first, presents both the scientific and political-strategic problems involved in producing the hydrogen bomb.

THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. Washington: Combat Forces Press; New York: Rinehart, and McGraw-Hill, 1950, 456 p. $3.00.

A detailed and official presentation of the effects, from shock wave, thermal and nuclear radiation, of the atomic bomb (using the 1945 Nagasaki-type as the "nominal" bomb). This volume contains the same material as that issued in paper covers by the Government Printing Office, Washington, at $1.25.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1951. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1951, 231 p. $3.50.

The new edition of this compact and dependable reference book, giving the names

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of leading members of all governments of the world, identifying political parties and newspapers, and summarizing party programs, has been revised and brought up to date, as of January 1, 1951.

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN WORLD POLITICS. By Walter Theimer. New York: Rinehart, 1950, 696 p. $5.00.

A popular handbook, without bibliography or references, of political terms, systems, trends, problems and watchwords.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE HUMAN USE OF HUMAN BEINGS. By Norbert Wiener. Boston: Houghton, 1950, 241 p. $3.00.

The father of cybernetics examines the social implications of recent developments in communications engineering in a rather untidy, stimulating and frequently pungent series of essays.

STRATEGY IN POKER, BUSINESS AND WAR. By John McDonald. New York: Norton, 1950, 128 p. $2.50.

A pleasant popularization of some of the ideas developed in Morgenstern and Neumann's "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior."

VERNUNFT STATT TRADITION: DAS WESEN DER DEMOKRATIE. By Oskar Liebeck. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Mittelbach, 1949, 206 p.

A curiously Proudhonian essay offering a critique of social superstitions, the rage for economic planning and party politics, and proposing a new model for a democratic society.

ÜBERWINDUNG DES NIHILISMUS. By Rudolf Brunngraber. Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchverlag, 1949, 261 p. Schillings 29.

Somewhat diffuse essays on politics, literature and economics, hoping for the Good Life through man's technocratic advance.

TENSIONS THAT CAUSE WARS. Edited by Hadley Cantril. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950, 303 p. $4.00.

TENSIONS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH. By Otto Klineberg. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1950, 227 p. $2.25.

These two books originated in the 1947 resolutions of the UNESCO General Assembly authorizing a study of "Tensions Affecting International Understanding." The first contains a common statement regarding international conflicts, with separate related articles, prepared by eight leading social scientists who met in Paris in 1948. The second is an effort to make an organized inventory of what is known about this subject, partly with a view to furthering profitable research.

LE POUVOIR ET L'OPINION: ESSAI DE PSYCHOLOGIE POLITIQUE ET SOCIALE. By Alfred Sauvy. Paris: Payot, 1949, 188 p. Fr. 450.

A social-psychological study of the divorce between political power and public opinion under present economic conditions.

FREEDOM, POWER, AND DEMOCRATIC PLANNING. By Karl Mannheim. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 384 p. $5.00.

This first volume of the late sociologist's unpublished manuscripts is concerned with the problems and principles involved in achieving "a society that is planned yet democratic."

STABILITY. By F. E. Dessauer. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 273 p. $3.50.

An inquiry into the meaning and history of the idea of stability in the fields of economic, social and international relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RACE AND CULTURE. By Robert Ezra Park. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1950, 403 p. $5.00.

A collection of articles on cultural and racial problems by the late sociologist.

BOLD NEW PROGRAM. By William R. Espy. New York: Harper, 1950, 273 p. $3.00.

An enthusiastic development of the implications of President Truman's Point Four, in which the author displays the possibilities for industrial, agricultural and hygienic developments throughout the world.

PEACE BY INVESTMENT. By Benjamin A. Javits. New York: Funk (in association with *United Nations World*), 1950, 242 p. $3.50.

A plan to avert war by "the creative and conscious and cosmopolitan use of credit," for world-wide productive investment to the extent of 20 billion dollars a year.

MONETARY THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY. By Kenneth K. Kurihara. New York: Norton, 1950, 393 p. $4.00.

A Keynesian analysis of recent monetary theory and of its policy implications in the field of domestic and international equilibrium.

LES UNIONS ÉCONOMIQUES: RÉALISATIONS ET PERSPECTIVES. By Jean Van der Mensbrugghe. Brussels: Institut des Relations Internationales, 1950, 396 p. Fr. 350.

The greater part of this book is devoted to a most useful study of the Benelux experience, bringing together a large body of significant data.

SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE COLONIES. By W. R. Crocker. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 177 p. $2.75 (London: Allen and Unwin, 12/6.)

A realistic appraisal of the unavoidable importance of nationalist movements in the colonial areas and of the need to prepare for an eventual transfer of authority.

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM. Edited by Edward Mead Earle. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 510 p. $5.75.

Seventeen essays, primarily concerned with Western European and American nationalism, make up this appropriate *Festschrift* for Carlton J. H. Hayes.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVILIZATION. By Albert Schweitzer. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 347 p. $5.00.

The first American edition of essays written in the 1920's; a weak translation.

I DID NOT INTERVIEW THE DEAD. By David P. Boder. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949, 220 p. $3.50.

The painful stories of eight displaced persons, selected from wire-recording interviews made in Europe in 1946.

MÄNNER—SCHIFFE—OZEANE. By Adolf Ahrens. Worpswede (British Zone): Reitze, 1949, 310 p.

Seafaring recollections of the captain of the *Bremen*.

The Second World War

CALCULATED RISK. By General Mark W. Clark. New York: Harper, 1950, 500 p. $5.00.

General Clark adds his not inconsiderable contribution to the history of the war in North Africa and Italy. Written with great assurance, it is best for its detailed picture of the long and difficult Italian campaign. Reviewers have been less impressed with his observations on over-all strategy and the political aspects of the North African landing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE HINGE OF FATE. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1950, 1000 p. $6.00.

Like the great river he so memorably evoked, the narrative of Mr. Churchill's war memoirs rolls on. The fourth volume, covering 1942 and the first half of 1943, maintains the level of its predecessors. If the Prime Minister's own rôle seems somewhat slighter in the expanding field of conflict, he provides many valuable insights into his dealings with his two great Allies during the year when the tide turned.

HITLER DIRECTS HIS WAR. Edited by Felix Gilbert. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 187 p. $3.25.

A well-edited selection of the surviving stenographic records of Hitler's daily military conferences, of particular value in providing immediate evidence of the Führer's military views, conduct and outlook during the latter years of the war.

DEUTSCHE SCHICKSALSJAHRE. By Kurt Assmann. Wiesbaden (U. S. Zone): Brockhaus, 1950, 568 p.

The first substantial history of the war and its immediate background to come from Germany. Vice Admiral Assmann was chief of the historical section of the German Naval Command during the war and subsequently spent three and a half years in London where he had access to much Admiralty material. As a result the naval sections of his history are in general superior to his chapters on land operations (chapters relating to both have previously appeared in this journal and in the *Proceedings* of the U. S. Naval Institute). While the author has quite a bit to say about the diplomatic and political aspects of the war, it is doubtful whether his desire not to depict Hitler too blackly is really a sign of increased historical perspective.

A SHORT STORY OF 21 ARMY GROUP. By Hugh Darby and Marcus Cunliffe. Aldershot: Gale, 1949, 147 p. 5/.

THE MARINES WERE THERE. By Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart. London: Putnam, 1950, 229 p. 12/6. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.00.)

ALWAYS A FUSILIER. By C. Northcote Parkinson. London: Low, 1949, 320 p. 12/6. (New York: Macdonald, $2.65.)

THE GREEN BERET. By Hilary St. George Saunders. London: Michael Joseph, 1949, 362 p. 15/.

THE RED BERET. By Hilary St. George Saunders. London: Michael Joseph, 1950, 336 p. 15/.

Further contributions to the history of Great Britain's military achievements in the Second World War, dealing with, respectively, the operations of the British and Canadian armies in northwest Europe, 1944–45; the actions of the Royal Marines; the war history of the Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment); the exploits of the Commandos; and the history of the Parachute Regiment.

LA GUERRE AÉRONAVALE DANS L'ATLANTIQUE (1939–1945). By Rear Admiral R. de Belot. Paris: Payot, 1950, 198 p. Fr. 480.

LA GUERRE AÉRONAVALE EN MÉDITERRANÉE (1939–1945). By Rear Admiral R. de Belot. Paris: Payot, 1949, 233 p. Fr. 480.

LA BATAILLE DE L'ATLANTIQUE. By A. Thomazi. Paris: Plon, 1949, 244 p. Fr. 240.

SIX ANS DE GUERRE NAVALE: 1939–1945. By Edmond Delage. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1950, 332 p. Fr. 495.

Brief French histories of the naval war. Earlier volumes by Thomazi and Belot were mentioned here in July 1948 and July 1949.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IL VOLTO DELLA GUERRA. By Ugo d'Andrea. Turin: Società Editrice Torinese, 1949, 367 p. L. 1800.

An illustrated history of the war, emphasizing the Italian aspect.

ACK-ACK. By General Sir Frederick Pile. London: Harrap, 1949, 410 p. 18/. (New York: British Book Centre, 1950, $4.25.)

The story of Britain's antiaircraft defense during the Second World War, by the commanding officer of the A.A. Command.

OPERATION CICERO. By L. C. Moyzisch. New York: Coward-McCann, 1950, 209 p. $2.75.

High espionage: how the Germans obtained top secret information from the valet of the British ambassador at Ankara and how they failed to utilize it.

HISTOIRE DE LA PREMIÈRE ARMÉE FRANÇAISE, RHIN ET DANUBE. By General de Lattre de Tassigny. Paris: Plon, 1949, 671 p. Fr. 690.

The campaigns of the First French Army, recounted by its commander, from the landing in Provence in 1944 to the final invasion of Germany. The author has useful information on the amalgamation of the F.F.I. with the regular army.

ABWEHR CONTRE RÉSISTANCE. By Major Borchers. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1949, 206 p. Fr. 380.

A personal and somewhat fictionalized account of German counterespionage and security problems in occupied France.

VAN CAPITULATIE TOT CAPITULATIE. By D. A. Van Hilten. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1949, 327 p. Florins 22.50.

General Van Hilten has written an extensive and detailed military history of the major phases of the war in the Netherlands: the capitulation of 1940, the German occupation, and the operations in 1944–1945; numerous maps and illustrations.

MERS-EL-KÉBIR. By Pierre Varillon. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1949, 230 p. Fr. 480.

A critical account of the British attack on the French warships in July 1940.

JATKOSODAN TAISTELUT. By Y. A. Järvinen. Helsinki: Söderström, 1950, 394 p. M. 600.

An analysis of Finnish and Russian military strategy during the years 1941–1944.

STALINGRAD, WIE ES WIRKLICH WAR. By Günter Toepke. Stade/Elbe (British Zone): Kogge, 1949, 136 p.

A German participant and staff officer reviews the decisive battle.

IL DESTINO PASSA PER VARSAVIA. By Luciana Frassati. Bologna: Cappelli, 1949, 307 p. L. 900.

Wartime recollections of the Italian wife of a Polish diplomat, interesting for its picture of Poland under German occupation and for the account of the author's interviews with Mussolini.

THE CRUCIBLE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By "Colonel Yay." New York: Macmillan, 1950, 348 p. $3.75.

The excellently told story of Marking's guerrilla war against the Japanese in the Philippines, by his second in command and subsequent wife.

The United States

THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. Edited by Samuel I. Rosenman. New York: Harper, 1950, 4 v. $40.00.

These four well-edited and annotated volumes, covering the war years 1941–1945,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complete the 13 volumes of the important public pronouncements—addresses, fireside chats, press conferences, executive orders and official promulgations—of the late President from 1928 to his death.

FROM VERSAILLES TO THE NEW DEAL. By Harold U. Faulkner. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 388 p. $6.00.

THE ERA OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. By Denis W. Brogan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 382 p. $6.00.

WAR FOR THE WORLD. By Fletcher Pratt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 364 p. $6.00.

THE UNITED STATES IN A CHAOTIC WORLD. By Allan Nevins. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 252 p. $6.00.

THE NEW DEAL AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By Allan Nevins. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 332 p. $6.00.

Five welcome additions (Vols. 51, 52, 54, 55 and 56) to the well-known "Chronicles of America" series, covering the years from Versailles to the end of the Second World War. Mr. Faulkner follows the road from normalcy to depression. It was a happy thought to have an outsider, though an exceedingly well-informed and acute one—Denis Brogan—interpret the contentious question of the New Deal. Mr. Pratt has written a succinct, rapidly moving account of America's rôle in the war. The editor of the series, Allan Nevins, has undertaken, in two volumes, the difficult task of tracing the divagations of United States foreign policy. A forthcoming volume is to cover the home front during the war.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. VOLUME XI: JANUARY 1–DECEMBER 31, 1949. Edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for World Peace Foundation), 1950, 728 p. $6.00.

The latest addition to a very useful series.

THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER. By Samuel Flagg Bemis. New York: Holt, 1950, 491 p. $5.00.

Largely a reprint of Part III, covering the years 1900–1950, of the 1950 edition of the author's well-known "Diplomatic History of the United States."

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE DOLLAR. By Herbert Feis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950, 81 p. $2.25.

This small book fills a gap in the literature by telling the story of the State Department's efforts during the twenties and thirties to restrain American investors from lending abroad in circumstances that might damage American interests.

HISTOIRE ÉCONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE DES ÉTATS-UNIS DE 1919 À 1949. By Louis R. Franck. Paris: Aubier, 1950, 304 p. Fr. 480.

This well organized, clearly expressed work traces the economic and social development of the United States, with its changed position in the world economy, in the past 30 years. Almost half the book is devoted to the Rooseveltian period.

LES ÉTATS-UNIS, PREMIÈRE PUISSANCE ÉCONOMIQUE MONDIALE. By S. Wolff. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1950, 187 p. Fr. 350.

Intelligent reportage by a special correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung.*

DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN ALS WIRTSCHAFTSMACHT. By Max Biehl. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Schwab, 1949, 160 p. (New York: International News Co.).

Primarily a brief survey of the economic geography of the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

L'AMERICA E LE SUE COLONIE EUROPEE. By Roberto Mazzetti. Messina: Sessa, 1949, 280 p. L. 1000.

Unimpressive and rather conventional observations on America's European connections past and present.

AIR TRANSPORTATION. By G. Lloyd Wilson and Leslie A. Bryan. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949, 665 p. $7.65.

A substantial history and survey of commercial aviation, domestic and foreign.

THE STRENGTHENING OF AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. By A. S. Mike Monroney and Others. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949, 134 p. $2.00.

Lectures delivered at Cornell on legislative reorganization, industrial mobilization, the loyalty program, the presidency, and the formulation of foreign policy.

THE PUERTO RICAN JOURNEY. By C. Wright Mills and Others. New York: Harper, 1950, 238 p. $3.00.

A well-documented inquiry into the reasons for the Puerto Rican migration to New York City and the problems of adjustment to the new environment.

Western Europe

PADRI DELLA PATRIA. By Indro Montanelli. Milan: Mondadori, 1949, 264 p. L. 1200.

Impressionistic sketches of Churchill, Salazar, Franco, De Gasperi and De Vecchi.

DE DOLLARSCHAARSTE IN WEST-EUROPA. By H. Zoeteweij. Leyden: Stenfert Kroese, 1949, 368 p. Florins 11.75.

A substantial survey of the background to Europe's dollar problem and of the means for overcoming it in the recovery programs.

LES DOCTRINES SOCIALES EN FRANCE: VINGT ANS D'ÉVOLUTION, 1930–1950. By Albert Pasquier. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1950, 527 p. Fr. 1100.

A somewhat schematized attempt, though illustrated by extensive quotations, to trace the evolution of social doctrines in France from 1930 to 1950, a period the author regards as showing all signs of being an interregnum.

LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA IVe RÉPUBLIQUE. By Jacques Théry. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1949, 318 p. Fr. 800.

A pessimistic examination of the structure and operation of the governmental institutions in postwar France.

JOURNAL (1927–1935). By Jacques Bainville. Paris: Plon, 1949, 285 p. Fr. 420.

The beginning of the descent to the abyss as viewed from the perspective of *L'Action Française*.

UN CHEF, LE GÉNÉRAL GUILLAUMAT. By Léon Noël. Paris: Alsatia, 1949, 134 p.

A brief but appreciative biography of the French general who prepared the successful Balkan campaign in 1918.

LE MARÉCHAL AUX LIENS. By Jean Tracou. Paris: Bonne, 1949, 449 p. Fr. 500.

Extensive recollections, set down in defense of Marshal Pétain, by the Directeur du Cabinet du Chef de l'État, covering the period December 1943–August 1945.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TOUT CE QU'ON VOUS A CACHÉ. By Jacques Baraduc. Paris: Éditions de l'Élan, 1949, 318 p. Fr. 390.

A defense of Laval prepared by one of his attorneys and based on German documents indicating the Reich's mistrust of Laval and his resistance to its demands.

QUI A SAUVÉ L'AFRIQUE? By Daniel Chenet. Paris: Éditions de l'Élan, 1949, 222 p. Fr. 360.

A stout defense of Pierre Boisson, Vichy's Governor of French West Africa.

L'AGONIE DE VICHY. By Major Jean Renaud. Paris: Couronne Littéraire, 1949, 262 p. Fr. 400.

In defense of the Pétain régime, by a former director of Radio Empire.

UN COMBAT POUR LA VÉRITÉ. By Jean Marcenac. Paris: Bibliothèque Française, 1949, 326 p. Fr. 280.

The case, Kravchenko vs. *Les Lettres Françaises,* largely as reported by the latter.

FILS DU PEUPLE. By Maurice Thorez. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1949, 253 p. Fr. 150.

A political autobiography by the French Communist leader.

BENELUX: VAN NABUURSTATEN TOT UNIEPARTNERS. By M. Weisglas. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1949, 342 p. Guilders 9.50.

A solid discussion, with statistical appendix, of the background and creation of the Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg customs union.

TERRE ARCTIQUE. By André de Cayeux. Grenoble: Arthaud, 1949, 230 p. Fr. 400.

A report on the Victor expedition to Greenland in 1948.

ALL HONORABLE MEN. By James Stewart Martin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950, 326 p. $3.50.

A highly critical account of postwar decartelization policy in Germany. The author, until 1947 Director of the Division for Investigation of Cartels and External Assets in American Military Government, concludes: "We had not been stopped in Germany by German business. We had been stopped in Germany by American business."

ENGLAND AND GERMANY: AFFINITY AND CONTRAST. By Hermann Levy. Leigh-on-Sea (Eng.): Thames Bank Publishing Co., 1949, 167 p. 7/6.

The late German scholar's effort briefly to explain the differences in English and German society underlines the failure of German middle class liberalism.

ZWISCHEN WEHRMACHT UND HITLER, 1934–1938. By Friedrich Hossbach. Wolfenbüttel (British Zone): Wolfenbütteler Verlagsanstalt, 1949, 224 p.

Observations on German army organization and military politics from 1934 to 1938, by the author of the now famous memorandum who was liaison officer between Hitler and the Wehrmacht.

ERINNERUNGEN EINES MILITÄRATTACHÉS: LONDON 1933–1937. By Geyr von Schweppenburg. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1949, 171 p.

Not particularly important recollections of the first post-Versailles German military attaché in London. He emphasizes the unsuccessful efforts of the German and British General Staffs to develop peaceful and coöperative relations.

LES FINANCES DE 1939 À 1945: II. L'ALLEMAGNE. By Louis E. Davin. Paris: Médicis, 1949, 378 p. Fr. 750.

A Belgian economist's detailed survey of German wartime finance, presenting much statistical and factual material as well as a critique of German practice and a commentary on problems of inflation and credit control.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACCOUNT SETTLED. By Hjalmar Schacht. London: Weidenfeld, 1949, 327 p. 15/.

An expansion and elaboration of the banker's shrewd and successful defense at the Nuremberg trial.

THIS IS GERMANY. Edited by Arthur Settel. New York: Sloane, 1950, 429 p. $4.00.

A collection of articles by foreign correspondents.

G. L. GAISER: HAMBURG–WESTAFRIKA. By Ernst Hieke. Hamburg (British Zone): Hoffmann, 1949, 143 p.

The growth of a Hamburg trading firm from the mid-nineteenth century.

MUSSOLINI E IL SUO TEMPO. By Edoardo Susmel. Milan: Garzanti, 1950, 338 p. L. 700.

The author, a native of Fiume, exalts Mussolini and his works through the conquest of Ethiopia, but censures him for his ill-fated alliance with Germany.

MUSSOLINI PICCOLO BORGHESE. By Paolo Monelli. Milan: Garzanti, 1950, 430 p. L. 1000.

This vivid, impressionistic, unduly gossipy, but often informing biography by an Italian journalist overdoes Mussolini's "petty bourgeois" characteristics.

COLLOQUI CON UMBERTO II. By Nino Bolla. Rome: Fantera, 1949, 191 p. L. 400.

The report on a series of political conversations with Prince Umberto between 1943 and 1949, together with other documents in support of the royalist cause.

VIVA IL PAPA? O VIVA IL RE? By Giorgio Quartara. Milan: Bocca, 1949, 247 p. L. 600.

A monarchist polemic against the republic and the Christian Democratic Party.

PACE O GUERRA. By Palmiro Togliatti. Milan: *Milano-Sera,* 1949, 144 p. L. 250.

Speeches and writings of the Communist leader between October 1948 and April 1949.

L'ITALIE AU JOUR LE JOUR. By Roger Lannes. Paris: Morihien, 1949, 309 p. Fr. 540.

A French poet's perceptive travel diary of a Grand Tour in 1949.

SATURNISCHE ERDE. By Hanns Studniczka. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Schauer, 1949, 398 p.

A baroque profile of Italian life and culture.

STORIA DELL' INDUSTRIA ITALIANA CONTEMPORANEA. By Roberto Tremelloni. Turin: Einaudi, 1947, 286 p. L. 900.

This first volume of a projected series surveying the development of Italian industry since the eighteenth century extends only to the period of unification.

ANNUARIO 1950. Rome: Failli, 1949, 970 p. L. 2500.

A survey of the Italian economy in 1949 plus a report on the activities of the Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana.

ESPANSIONE COLONIALE ITALIANA (1922–1937). By Corrado Zoli. Rome: Edizioni l'Arnia, 1949, 350 p. L. 700.

In praise of Italy's colonial achievements and conquests.

L'ATTIVITÀ DELLA SANTA SEDE NEL 1949. Vatican City: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1950, 410 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE HOLY SEE AT WORK. By Edward L. Heston. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950, 188 p. $2.50.

THE VATICAN AND THE KREMLIN. By Camille M. Cianfarra. New York: Dutton, 1950, 258 p. $3.00.

THE VATICAN AND ITS ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Charles Pichon. New York: Dutton, 1950, 382 p. $4.50.

PIE XII. By Nazareno Padellaro. Paris: Julliard, 1950, 357 p. Fr. 490.

PIUS XII. By Piero Bargellini. New York: Good Shepherd Publishing Corp., 1950, 181 p. $2.25.

Of these recent works on the Vatican and the Pope, most of them in celebration of the Holy Year, the first is a useful chronology and digest of events and activities. Father Heston outlines the central organizational structure of the Roman Catholic Church. The *New York Times* correspondent, Cianfarra, reports largely on the Vatican's response to the Soviet attack on Catholicism in Eastern Europe; the French Catholic journalist Pichon reviews favorably the history of the Vatican as a Great Power, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Padellaro's somewhat anecdotal but substantial biography is also concerned with political affairs; that by Bargellini is slighter and more other-worldly.

LE PORTUGAL. By Pierre Birot. Paris: Colin, 1950, 222 p. Fr. 180.

A concise study in regional geography, demographic and economic as well as physical.

ESTUDOS DE DIREITO CIVIL, COMERCIAL E INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO. By António Manuel Pereira. Oporto: Reis, 1948, 438 p. Escudos 55.

ORGANIZAÇÃO POLÍTICA E ADMINISTRATIVA DE PORTUGAL. By António Manuel Pereira. Oporto: Machado, 1949, 347 p.

Studies on Portuguese law and administrative history.

Eastern Europe

TITO AND GOLIATH. By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 312 p. $3.50.

Mr. Armstrong has brought to bear on this study of the Tito-Stalin split and the nationalist heresy in European Communism 30 years' experience in Eastern Europe, a great deal of documentary research, plus the information gained from recent travels and interviews. The result is both a mature and timely appraisal of this vitally important breach in the Communist world and its meaning to the West.

TITO V. STALIN. By Jan Yindrich. London: Benn, 1950, 215 p. 8/6.

A sketchy account of the rift, prefaced by a report on the Danube Conference of July 1948.

THE SOVIET IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES. By Frederick C. Barghoorn. New York: Harcourt, 1950, 297 p. $4.00.

A press attaché of the American Embassy in Moscow from 1942 to 1947 makes a methodical analysis of recent developments and changes in the Soviet propaganda picture of the United States. Most interesting when drawing on his own experiences, the author sometimes fails to define the dividing line between propaganda and the views actually held by the Soviet leaders.

AMERICA FACES RUSSIA: RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM EARLY TIMES TO OUR DAY. By Thomas A. Bailey. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950, 375 p. $4.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A broad survey, based almost entirely on American sources, of United States–Russian relations from Catherine the Great to the present, with particular emphasis on American opinion during the Tsarist period.

THE AMERICAN IMPACT ON RUSSIA. By Max M. Laserson. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 441 p. $5.00.

Complementing Mr. Bailey's book, Mr. Laserson, using largely Russian sources, has made a careful study of American diplomatic and ideological influences on Russia in the century and a quarter preceding the Bolshevik Revolution.

RUSSLAND UND EUROPA. By Alexander von Schelting. Berne: Francke, 1948, 404 p. Sw. Fr. 27.

Although limited to the nineteenth century, this study of the tense development of Russia's ambivalent attitude toward the West, as reflected in Russian historical writings, is of considerable importance for an understanding of current conflicts.

"RUSSKII VOPROS" NA PARIZHSKOI MIRNOI KONFERENTSII (1919–1920 gg). By B. E. Shtein. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1949, 463 p.

A Soviet diplomatic study, utilizing extensive documentary material as well as the writings of Lenin and Stalin, of the Russian question at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and of the complex pattern of civil war and intervention on Russia's borders.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By M. N. Roy. Calcutta: Renaissance, 1949, 631 p. Rs. 18.

An old Communist, who was active in Comintern Far Eastern activities in the 1920's but who broke with the party in 1928, has compiled his observations—written between 1937 and 1947—on the nature of the Russian Revolution and Soviet policy. The book is informative, especially for the early years, but in many respects is confusing and contradictory in outlook.

JUSTICE IN RUSSIA. By Harold J. Berman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 322 p. $4.75.

The third of the Harvard Russian Research Center Studies is a cool and well-written analysis of the elements comprising Soviet law, as distinguished from the coexisting but not wholly overlapping Soviet system of force. The three major themes developed are the modifications of Marxist Socialism in Soviet development, the persistence of the Russian heritage, and the emergent concept of the "parental" rôle of law in the new society.

THE POLICE STATE: WHAT YOU WANT TO KNOW ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION. By Craig Thompson. New York: Dutton, 1950, 257 p. $3.00.

A grim but on the whole familiar picture of the Soviet régime and its intentions by the former Moscow correspondent of *Time* and *Life*.

VOLONTAIRES POUR LA POTENCE. By Sandor Garay. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1950, 191 p. Fr. 225.

An attempt to explain the confessions obtained in the Soviet trial technique, with special reference to the Rajk case.

THE SOVIET AIR FORCE. By Asher Lee. New York: Harper, 1950, 207 p. $2.75.

A compact and balanced history and appraisal by a former British air intelligence officer of recognized competence.

JOSEPH STALIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. New York: International Publishers, 1949, 128 p. $1.25.

Material for the iconologist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET TREATY SERIES. VOLUME I, 1917–1928. Compiled and Edited by Leonard Shapiro. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1950, 406 p. $10.00.

The first volume of what aims to be a collection of "every bilateral diplomatic instrument to which the Soviet Government has become a party since 1917."

SUOMEN KOHTALONAIKOJA. By Wipert von Blücher. Helsinki: Söderström, 1950, 433 p. M. 700.

The German Minister to Finland during the years 1935-1944 reveals some interesting behind-the-scenes diplomatic manœuvring to protect German interests.

FINLAND: THE ADVENTURES OF A SMALL POWER. By Hugh Shearman. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1950, 114 p. $2.25. (London: Stevens, 10/6.)

A very brief introduction, offering nothing that is new.

THE WORLD OF THE SLAVS. By Albert Mousset. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1950, 204 p. $3.00.

A brief interpretation of the vicissitudes of the Slavonic peoples and of the Pan-Slav idea, especially since 1939. A translation and revision of "Le Monde Slav," reviewed here July 1947.

CENTRAL AND SOUTH EAST EUROPE, 1945–1948. Edited by R. R. Betts. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950, 227 p. $3.50.

A number of specialists have collaborated in rather dutifully recording the course of events in the Soviet satellite zone from 1945 to 1948. The multiplicity of points of view tends to obscure the all-important feature of Soviet influence, despite the editor's effort in a concluding chapter to see "whether any pattern of cause and event is discernible."

GOSUDARSTVENNOE PRAVO STRAN NARODNOI DEMOKRATII. By N. P. Farberov. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1949, 327 p.

The Soviet line on the postwar political and constitutional developments of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, Rumanian, Hungarian, Albanian and Mongolian people's republics.

THRAKE, EINE REISE AN DEN KÜSTEN DES BALKANS. By Burkhard Nadolny. Munich (U. S. Zone): Desch, 1949, 329 p.

An anecdotal account of a journey along the Thracian coast.

GREEK MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS, 1939–1948. By Dimitrios Delivanis and William C. Cleveland. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1949, 196 p. $3.50.

A case study of inflationary developments in a small country under conditions of war and enemy occupation.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

ASSIGNMENT TO AUSTERITY: AN AMERICAN FAMILY IN BRITAIN. By Herbert and Nancie Matthews. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950, 338 p. $3.00.

The former *New York Times* London correspondent and his wife collaborate on a sketch of life in postwar Britain, the former wrestling with politics and economics, the latter shuddering slightly over queues and gray austerity. The general effect is one of fair-minded sympathy mingled with apprehension for the future and some nostalgia for the past.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASSES. By Roy Lewis and Angus Maude. New York: Knopf, 1950, 360 p. $3.75.

A pleasant and perceptive description and defense of the hardpressed but indispensable middle stratum of English society.

THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION. Edited by R. J. White. London: Kaye, 1950, 256 p. 16/.

Passages on British conservatism from Edmund Burke to Quintin Hogg.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY TOWARDS EUROPEAN AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROBLEMS, 1920–1939. By William Rayburn Tucker. Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1950, 270 p.

A methodical examination of the Labor Party's reactions to the major international problems of the inter-war years, with considerable emphasis on the illusions and inner-party conflicts obstructing the formulation of an adequate policy.

PARTNERS FOR PROGRESS. By Sir Charles Jeffries. London: Harrap, 1949, 208 p. 12/6.

An authoritative picture of the composition and functions of the British Colonial Service.

THE HISTORY OF PARTITION (1912–1925). By Denis Gwynn. Dublin: Browne, 1950, 244 p. 12/6.

A somewhat partisan history of Anglo-Irish relations, but of value in publishing materials from John Redmond's papers, especially his memoranda of the Buckingham Palace Conference.

MALTA: AN ACCOUNT AND AN APPRECIATION. By Sir Harry Luke. London: Harrap, 1949, 200 p. 15/.

A former Lieutenant-Governor of the island has written a pleasant and informative book, part history, part travel guide, but wholly appreciative.

CANADA XXe SIÈCLE. By Francisque Gay. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1949, 205 p. Fr. 250.

An enthusiastic tableau by the former French ambassador, with most emphasis on religious and educational questions.

THIS IS NEWFOUNDLAND. Edited by Ewart Young. Toronto: Ryerson, 1949, 104 p. $4.00.

An illustrated volume celebrating Newfoundland's entry into the Dominion of Canada.

THE PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. By L. F. Crisp. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, 344 p. $5.00.

A competent survey of political and constitutional developments since 1891, by the former Director-General of the Australian Department of Postwar Reconstruction.

The Middle East

THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINE. By J. C. Hurewitz. New York: Norton, 1950, 404 p. $6.00.

A thorough, scholarly, restrained—almost austere—study of the Palestine problem since 1936.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORDON AND SEARCH. By Major R. D. Wilson. Aldershot: Gale, 1949, 275 p. 10/6.

The story of the unpleasant assignment of the British 6th Airborne Division in Palestine, during the period 1945–1948.

South and Southeast Asia

A BARBARIAN IN ASIA. By Henri Michaux. New York: New Directions, 1949, 185 p. $2.50.

Altogether random but skillfully pointed observations on India, Burma, Malaya, China and Japan. The original French edition was published in 1933.

PAKISTAN: THE HEART OF ASIA. By Liaquat Ali Khan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 151 p. $3.00.

The speeches of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, together with the welcoming addresses of his American hosts, during his visit to the United States and Canada in May–June 1950.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY (ABRIDGED). By M. K. Gandhi. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1950, 253 p. Rs. 6/12. (New York: Heinman, $2.25.)

ALL THROUGH THE GANDHIAN ERA. By A. S. Iyengar. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1950, 327 p. Rs. 8. (New York: Heinman, $2.50.)

IN THE PATH OF MAHATMA GANDHI. By George Catlin. Chicago: Regnery, 1950, 332 p. $3.50.

THE LIFE OF MAHATMA GANDHI. By Louis Fischer. New York: Harper, 1950, 558 p. $5.00.

MAHATMA GANDHI: DER MANN, SEIN WERK UND SEINE WIRKUNG. By W. E. Mühlmann. Tübingen (French Zone): Mohr, 1950, 298 p.

Recent items of Gandhiana. The abridged edition of Gandhi's "The Story of My Experiments with Truth" (reviewed here in January 1949) retains the narrative chapters, but omits those containing his reflections and disquisitions. Mr. Iyengar, an Indian journalist, has written his reminiscences over the years 1915 to 1950. Mr. Catlin has performed a political philosopher's pilgrimage in the form of a travel diary and thinks to have found the answer to many of his questions in the life and thought of the late Indian leader. Of the two biographies, Mr. Fischer's is at its best in direct reportage; as an interpretation it leaves many questions unanswered. Herr Mühlmann's study is briefer, flatter, more systematically organized and is directed toward the problems of the sociology of religion and political ethics.

A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA. (1765 TO 1948). By Sri Ram Sharma. Bombay: Karnatak, 1949, 298 p. Rs. 5.

A somewhat compressed textbook centering on Indian history rather than on British colonial policy.

INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. By Lawrence K. Rosinger. New York: Macmillan (for the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1950, 149 p. $2.75.

A discreet but competent study of Indian-American relations, particularly since the Second World War.

THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF INDIA'S RAW MATERIALS. By N. V. Sovani. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1950, 332 p. $4.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An extensive analysis of the position, before, during and after World War II, of 14 raw materials figuring prominently in India's foreign trade.

BENGAL FAMINE (1943). By Tarakchandra Das. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1949, 154 p. Rs. 6.

An attempt to make a socio-economic study of the great Bengal famine of 1943, on the basis of sample investigations of people fleeing to Calcutta.

SOUTH ASIA IN THE WORLD TODAY. Edited by Phillips Talbot. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950, 253 p. $4.00.

A collection of lectures, of uneven quality, delivered in 1949 on social, economic and political forces in South Asia.

INDONESIË, NEDERLAND EN DE WERELD. By H. J. Van Mook. Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 1949, 255 p. Florins 5.50.

A brief but factual history of the war and postwar developments in Indonesia by the former Lieutenant Governor of the Netherlands East Indies.

MENS EN VRIJHEID IN INDONESIË. By C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1949, 212 p. Florins 6.90.

A discussion of democracy, individual freedom, East-West relations and Communism in their Indonesian context.

AM RANDE DES PAZIFIK. By Karl Helbig. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Kohlhammer, 1949, 324 p.

An extensive description of Southeast Asia based largely on material collected before the Second World War, with a useful bibliographical note.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

GUERRA DIPLOMATICA IN ESTREMO ORIENTE (1914–1931). By Mario Toscano. Turin: Einaudi, 1950, 2 v. L. 5400.

A well-known Italian diplomatic historian has prepared an exceedingly detailed and documented history of World War I diplomacy in the Far East. A major part of the two volumes is devoted to the negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Peking of May 1915 and to the consequences of this accord.

EAST OF HOME. By Santha Rama Rau. New York: Harper, 1950, 303 p. $3.00.

An Indian educated in the West reveals with great sensitivity and wit how, in the course of vividly described travels in Japan, China and Southeast Asia, she discovered that she is an Asian. She gently gives Westerners much to ponder.

TWO KINDS OF TIME. By Graham Peck. Boston: Houghton, 1950, 725 p. $4.00.

Mr. Peck, who was in China from 1940 to 1947 as a free-lance writer and as an official in the O.W.I., has written a lengthy, at times rambling, and very substantial portrait of Chinese society. Gaining much of its impact from a rich abundance of anecdotes and sharply drawn portraits and episodes, it is, politically, intensely hostile to the Kuomintang régime.

CHINA IM STURM. By Wolf Schenke. Hamburg (British Zone): Nölke, 1949, 326 p.

A report by a German journalist in China from 1937 to 1947, stressing the weaknesses of the Kuomintang régime and what he believes to be the national individuality and independence of the Chinese Communist movement.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MAO TSE-TUNG. By Robert Payne. New York: Schuman, 1950, 303 p. $3.50.

By no means a definitive biography, Mr. Payne's appreciative account of the Communist leader is best for its exposition of the influence of classical Chinese philosophy and literature on Mao's writing and thinking.

NEW CHINA: THREE VIEWS. By Otto B. Van der Sprenkel, Robert Guillain and Michael Lindsay. New York: Day, 1951, 241 p. $3.00.

Three views, but all generally favorable to the Mao régime. The French journalist Guillain is apprehensive of the economic prospects; Michael Lindsay is worried by certain "doctrinaire" elements in Chinese Communism; Mr. Van der Sprenkel is wholly enthusiastic and uncritical.

PEKING DIARY: A YEAR OF REVOLUTION. By Derk Bodde. New York: Schuman, 1950, 292 p. $3.75.

A Fulbright Fellow, who was studying in Peking from August 1948 to August 1949, presents the diary he kept through a year that encompassed the arrival and establishment of the Communists.

CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. By Aitchen K. Wu. New York: Day, 1950, 434 p. $6.00.

A history of Chinese-Russian diplomatic relations from 1618 to the present, by a former diplomat of the Nationalist régime. Politely written, consciously dispassionate and reflecting considerable personal experience, it has a disconcerting tendency to become opaque and noncommittal at critical points in the narrative.

THE KOREANS AND THEIR CULTURE. By Cornelius Osgood. New York: Ronald, 1951, 387 p. $5.00.

This book, which does not deal with the current conflict, is primarily an anthropological study of Korean society, based on field work in the island of Kanghwa. To this are added an analysis of the ruling class in the capital, an outline of the political and cultural history of the peninsula, and a discussion of foreign occupations.

SOURCE MATERIALS ON KOREAN POLITICS AND IDEOLOGIES. Compiled by Donald G. Tewksbury. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950, 190 p. $2.50.

A collection of 81 documents from 1871 to the present crisis.

THE RIDDLE OF MACARTHUR. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1951, 240 p. $2.75.

MACARTHUR: MAN OF ACTION. By Frank Kelley and Cornelius Ryan. New York: Doubleday, 1950, 191 p. $2.00.

Of these two efforts by able correspondents to keep abreast of the incredibly active career of Douglas MacArthur, that by Mr. Gunther is the more critical and the more concerned with the General's present responsibilities in Japan and Korea. More than half of the book by Messrs. Kelley and Ryan is devoted to his duties before Pearl Harbor.

THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN. By Robert A. Fearey. New York: Macmillan (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1950, 239 p. $3.00.

A supplement to Edwin Martin's "The Allied Occupation of Japan," this book is a steady, cautious appraisal of American occupation policy from early 1948. The author is in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs in the Department of State.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. By Douglas L. Oliver. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 313 p. $5.00.

An anthropologist's able and valuable history of the peoples of Oceania from the original migrations to the cataclysmic impact of the westerners' advent and its culmination in the profound effects of World War II.

Africa

LES SOCIÉTÉS AU MAROC. By Paul Decroux. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1950, 453 p. Fr. 1000.

A study of laws and regulations relating to commercial undertakings and corporations in the French Zone and Tangiers.

L'EST AFRICAIN BRITANNIQUE. By Louis Roux. Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques, 1950, 223 p. Fr. 650.

A general survey of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar by a former vice consul at Nairobi.

THE AFRICAN FACTORY WORKER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 221 p. $6.00.

A survey, based on two years' research in a factory at Durban, of the behavior and performance of the African worker under conditions remote from his traditional way of life.

Latin America and the West Indies

CONFERENCIA INTERAMERICANA PRO DEMOCRACIA Y LIBERTAD. Havana: Alfa, 1950, 319 p.

A collection of speeches and resolutions made at the Conference for Democracy and Liberty held in Havana in May 1950.

MI GENERACIÓN Y MI ÉPOCA. By Miguel Alessio Robles. Mexico: Editorial Stylo, 1949, 276 p.

A MEDIO CAMINO. By Miguel Alessio Robles. Mexico: Editorial Stylo, 1949, 273 p.

The first two volumes of recollections by a well-known Mexican historian.

SIEDLUNG IM SÜDAMERIKANISCHEN URWALD. By Herbert Wilhelmy, Hamburg (British Zone): Kröger, 1949, 104 p.

Problems confronting European colonization in sub-tropical Paraguay.

PASADO, PORVENIR Y MISION DE LA GRAN ARGENTINA. By J.-E. Casariego. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1949, 160 p. Ptas. 12.

A brief sketch of Argentina in terms of the "espiritu español."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1825 Jefferson Place, Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, and Lake Success imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Commercial Policy and Trade

The Use of quantitative restrictions for protective and other commercial purposes. Geneva, Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1950. 18 p. (GATT/1950–3.) 15¢.

Chemical products exportable surpluses. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1950. 159 p. (No. 2, September 1950.)

Council of Europe

Council of Europe. Consultative Assembly, 1st Session, 10th August–8th September, 1949. Strasbourg, Author, 1949.

Agendas, minutes. 151 p. $1.80. Documents. 301 p. $3.75. Reports. Pt. 1. $4.30. Pt. 2. $4.50. Pt. 3. $4.50. Pt. 4. $3.60.

Financial Policy and Exchange

First annual report on exchange restrictions. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1950. 144 p.

Report to the President on foreign economic policies [by Gordon Gray]. Washington, 1950. 131 p. 40¢.

The Austrian investment program, 1950/52. Vienna, ERP Central Office, 1950. 204 p.

United Kingdom overseas investments, 1938 to 1948. London, Bank of England, 1950. 33 p. 2s.

Germany

Educational and cultural activities in Germany today. Frankfurt, HICOG, 1950. 93 p.

A Guide to education and cultural relations. Bad Nauheim, HICOG, 1950. 72 p.

A Statistical postwar survey on the natural sciences and German universities, by Karl Ueberreiter. Washington, Library of Congress, 1950. 31 p.

Der Volkswirtschaftsplan 1950. Berlin, Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1950. 127 p. (Schriftenreihe 1.)

India

Indian Tariff Board reports. Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1949–1950.

1. Continuance of protection to the alloy, tool and special steels industry. 28 p. 2s. *2.* Continuance of protection to the artificial silk and cotton and artificial silk mixed fabrics industry. 37 p. 3s. 6d. *3.* Continuance of protection to the bicycle industry. 38 p. 3s. *4.* Expanded metal industry. 30 p. 1s. 6d. *5.* Plastics industry. 51 p. 2s. *6.* Continuance of protection to the sericulture industry. 56 p. 3s. 9d. *7.* Continuance of protection to the sewing machine industry. 27 p. *8.* Soda ash industry. 34 p. 1s. 3d. *9.* Continuance of protection to the sugar industry. Vol. I. 5s. 6d.

Indians in Malayan economy. Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1950. 57 p. 2s. 9d.

Review of the work of the Indian Tariff Board since its constitution in November, 1945. Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1949. 41 p. 2s. 3d.

International Law

Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949 for the protection of war victims. Washington, 1950. 255 p. (Dept of State. General Foreign Policy Series 34.) $1.00.

The Genocide convention. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on Executive O. Jan. 23–Feb. 9, 1950. Washington, 1950. 555 p.

Copyright protection in the Americas under national legislation and Inter-American treaties, by Manuel Canyes and others. Washington, Pan American Union, 1950. 213 p. (Law and Treaty Series 33.) $2.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL convention for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 2801. August 25, 1950. Washington, 1950. 25 p. (H. Rept. 2996.)

TRIALS of war criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council law no. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946–April 1949. Washington, 1950. v. 1 and 2. $2.75 each. v. 4. $3.50.

LABOR

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference, 34th Session, 1951. Reports V (1), VII (1), VIII (1). Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Organisation. Committee on Work on Plantations, 1st Session, Bandoeng, 1950. Report I. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 166 p.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Organisation. Petroleum Committee. Record of the second session (Geneva, November 1948). Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 146 p.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Organisation. Textiles Committee, 3rd Session, Lyons, 1950. Reports I and III. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Organisation. Textiles Committee. Record of the second session (Geneva, October–November 1948). Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 171 p.

INTERNATIONAL survey of social security. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 236 p. (Studies and Reports. New Series 23.) $1.50.

LABOUR conditions in the oil industry in Iran; Report of a Mission . . . (January–February 1950). Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 87 p. (Studies and Reports. New Series 24.) 60¢.

LABOUR-MANAGEMENT co-operation in France. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 237 p. (Studies and Reports. New Series 9.) $1.25.

MODEL code of safety regulations for underground work in coal mines for the guidance of governments and of the coal-mining industry. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 102 p.

THIRD International Trade Union Conference of the E.R.P. Report, Rome, 17–20 April 1950. Paris, Trade Union Advisory Committee, E.R.P., 1950. 112 p.

VOLLE und ungekürzter bericht der Norwegischen gewerkschafts-delegation über ihre besuche in Amerika (USA) und Russland (UdSSR). Vienna, ECA Mission für Österreich, 1950. 156 p.

LATIN AMERICA

ANNUAL report of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950. Washington, Pan American Union, 1950. 199 p.

INTER-AMERICAN Development Commission Statement of the laws . . . in matters affecting business in its various aspects and activities. Washington, Author.

Argentina. 128 p. Bolivia. 146 p. Brazil. 116 p. Colombia. 165 p. Mexico. 161 p. $5.00 each. Costa Rica. 110 p. Cuba. 94 p. Ecuador, 142 p. Nicaragua. 99 p. $3.00 each.

PEACE in the Americas; a résumé of measures undertaken through the Organization of American States . . . Washington, 1950. 29 p. (Dept. of State. International Organization and Conference Series II. American Republics 6.) 10¢.

RECENT developments in the foreign trade of Argentina. Washington, 1950. 185 p. 50¢.

THE BASIS of a development program for Colombia. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1950. 642 p. $5.00.

EVOLUCIÓN de la democracia en Santo Domingo, by R. L. Trujillo Molina. Ciudad Trujillo, Impresora Dominican, 1950. 69 p.

THE PERUVIAN economy. Washington, Pan American Union, 1950. 279 p. $1.00.

MANUAL for the use of the delegates to the Fourth Inter-American Conference on Agriculture and the Second Latin American Regional Meeting on food and agricultural programs and outlook, Montevideo, Uruguay, December 1, 1950. Washington, Pan American Union, 1950. 185 p.

PAKISTAN

REPORT of the United Kingdom Industrial Mission to Pakistan. London, 1950. 79 p. 7s.

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

ECONOMIC Survey Mission to the Philippines. Report to the President of the United States [by Daniel W. Bell]. Washington, 1950. 107 p. (Dept. of State. Far Eastern Series 38.) 55¢.

YUGOSLAV emergency relief assistance act of 1950. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 9853. Nov. 29–30, 1950. 77 p.

——. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 9853. Dec. 7, 1950. Washington, 1950. 34 p. (H. Rept. 3179.)

——. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 4234. Dec. 7, 1950. Washington, 1950. 10 p. (S. Rept. 2588.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

——. Act. Approved December 29, 1950. Washington, 1950. 2 p. (Public Law 897, 81st Cong.—S. 4234.)

ORGANIZATION for European Economic Cooperation. General memorandum on the 1950–51 and 1951-52 programmes. London, 1950. 16 pts. (Each part covers one OEEC country.) 24s. 6d.

THE ORGANISATION for European Economic Cooperation; two years of economic cooperation. Paris, OEEC, 1950. 46 p.

UNDER-DEVELOPED AREAS

NEW horizons in the East; the Colombo Plan for co-operative economic development in South and South-East Asia. London, 1950. 40 p.

POSSIBILITIES of increasing the use of tropical timber; report of a group of experts. Paris, OEEC, 1950. 95 p.

REPORT on international investment. Paris, OEEC, 1950. 117 p.

UNITED NATIONS AND AGENCIES

YEARBOOK of the United Nations, 1948–49. New York, Columbia University Press, 1950. 1171 p. (1950. I. 11.) $12.50.

REPORT of the second session of the International Rice Commission, Rangoon, Burma, 6–11 February 1950. Bangkok, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1950. 46 p. 50¢.

United Nations Conference on Road and Motor Transport, Geneva, 23 August–19 September 1949. Final act and related documents. Lake Success, 1950. 114 p. (1950. VIII. 2.)

UNITED Nations European Social Welfare Seminar, Paris, 28 November to 10 December 1949. Lake Success, 1950. 102 p. (1950. IV. 9.) 60¢.

WORLD iron ore resources and their utilization. Lake Success, 1950. 74 p. (1950. II. D. 3.) 80¢.

ANNUAL bulletin of transport statistics 1949. Geneva, Economic Commission for Europe, 1950. 57 p. (1950. II. E. 2.) 50¢.

UNITED STATES

EXTENSION of authority to maintain a domestic tin-smelting industry. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 3666. June 20–22, 1950. Washington, 1950. 45 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 3666. June 23, 1950. Washington, 1950. 5 p. (S. Rept. 1864.)

EXTENSION of rubber act of 1948. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 7579 and S. 3294. June 5–8, 1950. Washington, 1950. 120 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 7579. June 12, 1950. Washington, 1950. 7 p. (S. Rept. 1786.)

DEFENSE production act of 1950. Report from the Committee of Conference, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 9176. August 31, 1950. Washington, 1950. 40 p. (H. Rept. 3042.)

INVESTIGATION of the preparedness program. First report of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., under the authority of S. Res. 93. Sept. 14, 1950. Washington, 1950. 44 p. (S. Doc. 230.)

SELECTIVE service extension act of 1950. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 2861 and H. R. 6826. June 1–8, 1950. Washington, 1950. 98 p.

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 6826. June 27, 1950. Washington, 1950. 4 p. (H. Rept. 2345.)

SUSPENSION of one-year enlistments. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 4027. August 10, 1950. Washington, 1950. 10 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 4027. August 10, 1950. Washington, 1950. 3 p. (S. Rept. 2264.)

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., August 28, 1950. Washington, 1950. 14 p. (S. Rept. 2449.)

UNIVERSAL military training. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 4062. August 22–23, 1950. Washington, 1950. 100 p.

GENERAL appropriation bill, 1951. Report from the Committee on Appropriations, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 7786. March 21, 1950. Washington, 1950. 337 p. (H. Rept. 1797.)

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 7786. August 24, 1950. Washington, 1950. 72 p. (H. Rept. 2991.)

PROTECTING the internal security of the United States. Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 4037. August 28, 1950. Washington, 1950. 21 p. (S. Rept. 2369, Pt. 2.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 9490. Sept. 19, 1950. Washington, 1950. 68 p. (H. Rept. 3112.)

INTERNATIONAL Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 3934. July 18, 1950. Washington, 1950. 10 p. (S. Rept. 2095.)

——. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 6304. July 25, 1950. Washington, 1950. 6 p. (H. Rept. 2741.)

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 3934. August 29, 1950. Washington, 1950. 7 p. (H. Rept. 3018.)

A WATER policy for the American people. The report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission. Washington, 1950. v. 1.

ALASKA statehood. Hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 331 and S. 2036. April 24–29, 1950. Washington, 1950. 531 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 331. June 29, 1950. Washington, 1950. 42 p. (S. Rept. 1929.)

CIVIL government for Guam. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 185, S. 1892 and H. R. 7273. April 19, 1950. Washington, 1950. 69 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 7273. July 20, 1950. Washington, 1950. 18 p. (S. Rept. 2109.)

——. Act. Approved August 1, 1950. Washington, 1950. 11 p. (Public Law 630, 81st Cong.—H. R. 7273.)

HAWAII statehood. Hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 49, S. 156 and S. 1782. May 1–5, 1950. Washington, 1950. 550 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 49. June 29, 1950. Washington, 1950. 2 pts. (S. Rept. 1928.)

HAWAII Civil Liberties Committee. Report by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., June 23, 1950. Washington. 1950. 55 p.

PORTO RICO constitution. Hearings before the Committee on Public Lands. House, 81st Cong., on H. R. 7674 and S. 3336. July 12, 1949, March 14–June 8, 1949. Washington, 1950. 190 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 3336. June 6, 1950. Washington, 1950. 31 p. (S. Rept. 1779.)

AMENDING the merchant ship sales act of 1946. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 3419. May 27, 1949. Washington, 1949, 45 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 3419. June 27, 1950. Washington, 1950. 5 p. (S. Rept. 1915.)

MERCHANT Marine study and investigation. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Senate, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 50. June 21, 1949–April 28, 1950. Washington 1949–1950. 7 pts.

——. Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 50. August 30, 1950. Washington, 1950. 387 p. (S. Rept. 2494.)

II. PAMPHLETS

ALGUNOS ASPECTOS DE LA GEOPOLITICA BOLIVIANA, by F. J. Carles. Buenos Aires, Instituto de Derecho Internacional, 1950, 89 p.

AMERICAN ARMED INTERVENTION IN KOREA. London, Soviet News, 1950. 28 p. 1d.

ANLAGEVERMÖGEN UND DEKAPITALISATION DER DEUTSCHEN INDUSTRIE, by Ernst Eisendrath. Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirschaftsforschung, 1950. 136 p.

APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, by P. S. Joshi. Kimberley, Diamond Fields Advertiser, 1950.

AREA RESEARCH; theory and practice, by J. H. Steward. New York, Social Science Research Council, 1950. 164 p.

THE AUSTRIAN ECONOMY SINCE 1945, by K. W. Rothschild. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 82 p. 7s. 6d.

BEHIND THE HEADLINES. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 15¢ each.

Vol. 10, no. 4. The rights of women, by Anne Francis. 20 p. *no. 5.* Korea and world politics, by M. S. Farley and V. M. Dean. 19 p. *no. 6.* The dilemma of South Africa, by Arthur Keppel-Jones. 20 p.

BOMBE OU PAIX ATOMIQUE? by Dominique Desanti and Charles Haroche. Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1950. 139 p. 120 fr.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, by R. G. Menzies. Sydney, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 26 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE BRITISH FOREIGN SERVICE, by F. T. Ashton-Gwatkin. Syracuse, University Press, 1950. 94 p. $1.00.

CONCERNING MARXISM IN LINGUISTICS, by J. V. Stalin. London, Soviet News, 1950. 40 p. 6d.

DER DAUERNDE FRIEDE, by Rudolf Laun. Hamburg, Universität Hamburg, 1950. 44 p.

DE HITLER À TRUMAN, by Jean Baumier. Paris, Editions Sociales, 1950. 150 p. 160 fr.

DOCUMENTS ON REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE WESTERN EUROPE, 1940–1949. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 85 p. 8s. 6d.

DOLLAR SHORTAGE AND OIL SURPLUS IN 1949–1950, by Horst Mendershausen. Princeton, Princeton University, 1950. 34 p. (Essays in International Finance, 11.)

THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN, by Mushtaq Ahmad. Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 29 p. An. 12.

EL EMPLEO Y LA POBLACIÓN ACTIVA DE CUBA, by Hugo Vivó. Havana, Asociación Nacional de Industriales de Cuba, 1950. 88 p.

FÖRENTA STATERNA, by Brita Skottsberg and Sven Ahman. Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1950. 131 p. Kr. 4.

FURTHER FACTS AND FIGURES RELATING TO THE DECONCENTRATION OF THE I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, by Hermann Gross. Kiel, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, 1950. 60 p.

GRUNDLAGEN EINER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG, by Georg Pankow. Zurich, Leemann, 1950. 72 p.

HEADLINE SERIES. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1950. 35¢ each.

83. Which way to world government, by A. M. Lilienthal. 62 p. *84.* Toward a Far Eastern policy, by E. O. Reischauer, 61 p.

HEADS IN THE SAND, by R. W. G. Mackay. Oxford, Blackwell, 1950. 43 p. 1s.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENOCIDE IN THE BALTIC STATES, by Aleksander Kaelas. Stockholm, Estonian Information Centre, 1950. 57 p. 40¢.

HUMAN RIGHTS—WORLD DECLARATION AND AMERICAN PRACTICE, by R. N. Baldwin. New York, Public Affairs Committee, 1950. 32 p. (Public Affairs Pamphlets 167.) 20¢.

INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND THE U. S. CONSTITUTION, by Oliver Schroeder, Jr. Cleveland, Western Reserve University, 1950. 75 p. $1.00.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 11th Conference, Lucknow, 1950. Conference papers. $15.00 set (available separately.) *Secretariat papers. 1.* Problems of labour and social welfare in Southern and Eastern Asia, by International Labour Office. 27 p. *2.* Soviet Far Eastern policy since Yalta, by Max Beloff. 35 p. *3.* Position of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, by Victor Purcell. 78 p. *4.* Some political aspects of Far Eastern development, by E. S. Kirby. 55 p. *5.* Patterns of Far Eastern industrial development, by George Rosen. 32 p. *6.* Some aspects of Indonesian politics and nationalism, by G. M. Kahin. 47 p. *7.* Notes on nationalism and communism in the Far East, by W. M. Ball. 41 p. *8.* Nationalism in Malaya, by T. H. Silcock. 48 p. *9.* Recent political and economic developments in China, by S. B. Thomas. 130 p. *10.* Nationalism and political development, by Ivor Jennings. 52 p. *11.* Effects of Western civilization on Indonesian society, by W. F. Wertheim. 83 p. *Australian papers. 1–4.* Australian population policy and its relation to demographic problems in Asia, by W. D. Borrie. Australian foreign policy and the Indonesian dispute, by H. A. Wolfson. Australia and the peace settlement with Japan, by N. D. Harper. Australia's economic interests in the Far East. 47 p. *Canadian paper. 1.* Canadian interests and policies in the Far East since World War II, by D. H. Gardner. 15 p. *French paper. 1.* Vietnam and France, by Philippe Devillers. 51 p. *Indian papers. 1.* India's foreign policy, by V. P. Dutt. 45 p. *2.* India's recent economic and social development, by N. V. Sovani. 63 p. *Japanese papers. 1.* Japan's economy present and future, by Shigeto Tsuru. 18 p. *2.* Japan's role in Asiatic trade, by Kenji Katayama. 54 p. *3.* Nationalism in post-war Japan. 25 p. *New Zealand paper. 1.* New Zealand's interests and policies in the Far East, by Samuel Leathem. 24 p. *Pakistan paper 1.* Problems of economic reform and development in Pakistan, by A. F. A. Husain. 23 p. *Philippine papers. 1.* Chances for survival of democracy in the Philippines, by Enrique Fernando. 27 p. *3.* Social and cultural development of the Philippines, by Richardo Pascual. 37 p. *United Kingdom papers. 1.* Outline of British policy in East and Southeast Asia, 1945–May 1950, by A. S. B. Oliver. 83 p. *2.* Economic developments since 1937 in Eastern and Southeastern Asia and their effects on the United Kingdom, by A. G. Donnithorne. 50 p. *United States papers. 1.* United States and Far East, by H. M. Vinacke. 53 p. *2.* American policy in Southeast Asia, by L. S. Finkelstein. 66 p. *3.* Commentaries on American Far Eastern policy. 65 p.

JONGSTE STAATKUNDIGE ONTWIKKELINGEN IN EGYPTE, by L. Adam. Leiden, University, 1950. 46 p.

KEYNES, FOSTER AND MARX. Part 1: State Capitalism and Progress, by Earl Browder. Yonkers, N. Y., Author, 1950. 56 p. 25¢.

KIELER STUDIEN. Kiel, Instituts für Weltwirtschaft, 1950.

9. Strukturwandlungen und nachkriegsprobleme der wirtschaft Dänemarks, by Wolf von

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arnim. 65 p. DM. 3.50. *10.* Strukturwandlungen und nachkriegsprobleme der wirtschaft islands, by Hilde Wander. 41 p. DM. 2.

KOMMUNIST-KINA OG KRIGEN I KOREA, by Edm. Grut. Copenhagen, Udenrigspolitiske Selskabs Skrifter, 1950. 39 p. Kr. 2.

LET'S JOIN THE HUMAN RACE, by Stringfellow Barr. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950. 30 p. 25¢.

DIE MITTELSTUFE DER VERWALTUNG; bericht über eine arbeitstagung. Frankfort, Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1950. 116 p.

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS IN RELATION TO HUMAN RESOURCES AND POPULATION PROBLEMS. New York, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1950. 153 p. 50¢.

A NEW DANGER FOR WORLD'S PEACE—RED BULGARIA, by Ivan Docheff. N. pl., n. pub., 1950. 116 p.

A NOTE ON BALANCED CULTIVATION; report of the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee. New Delhi, All-India Congress Committee, n.d. 58 p. Rs.1.

NOTES ON ARGENTINA'S BILATERAL COMPENSATORY TRADE AGREEMENTS, by H. B. Carnes. New Orleans, Tulane University, 1949. 76 p.

NOTES POUR SERVIR À L'HISTOIRE DE L'OCCUPATION ALLEMANDE L'A.O.K. 7 ET LE GÉNÉRAL DOLLMANN AU MANS (1942–1944), by M. Lardry. Le Mans, Monnoyer, 1948. p. 135–184.

OUR IMMEDIATE PROGRAM. New Delhi, All-India Congress Committee, 1950. 99 p. Rs.2.

OUR 100 LEADING IMPORTS IN *1949.* Washington, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1950. 87 p. $1.00.

PAYING FOR DEFENSE. New York, Committee for Economic Development, 1950. 43 p.

THE PERVERSION OF EDUCATION IN RUMANIA. Washington, Rumanian National Committee, 1950. 96 p.

POLICIES AND CONTROLS IN A WAR-BURDENED ECONOMY; a report of the Committee on Economic Policy. Washington, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1950. 21 p. 25¢.

POLITISCHE ERZIEHUNG UND BILDUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND; ein bericht über die Konferenz von Waldleiningen 1949. Frankfurt, Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1950. 131 p.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF FOREIGN AREA STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES; a post-conference report, by Richard H. Heindel. New York, Committee on World Area Research, 1950. 64 p.

PROBLEM PAPERS. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1950. 60¢. each

1. The security of the Middle East. 66 p. *2.* Anglo-American economic relations. 74 p.

PROS AND CONS OF COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS' POLICIES. New York, National Industrial Conference Board, 1950. 95 p. (Studies in Business Economics 25.) 50¢.

SALAZAR, by Raul Romano. Lisbon, Academica de D. Felipa, 1949. 73 p.

DER SCHUTZ DES WETTBEWERBS IN DER SOZIALEN MARKT-WIRTSCHAFT; bericht über eine arbeitstagung. Frankfurt, Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1950. 148 p. DM. 2.50.

THE SIXTEEN REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET UNION. London, Soviet News, 1950. 96 p. 1s.

SOCIAL SCIENCE TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA, by H. E. Davis. Washington, American University, 1950. 136 p. $2.50.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE KOREAN QUESTION (Documents). London, Soviet News, 1950. 99 p. 2s.

SOVJETUNIONEN, by Alf Edeen. Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1950. 125 p. Kr.4.

SPEAK UP—NOW OR NEVER, by J. P. Warburg. New York, Current Affairs Press, 1951. 27 p. 50¢.

SUDAFRIKA "WEISSEN MANNES LAND," by Fritz and Heinrich Spiesser. Haag/Amper, Linck, 1949. 111 p. DM. 3.90.

TWO WORLDS IN FOCUS; studies of the cold war. London, National Peace Council, 1950. 133 p. 5s.

VERSTAATLICHUNGSMASSNAHMEN UND ENTSCHÄDIGUNGSPFLICHT NACH VÖLKERRECHT, by R. L. Bindschedler. Zurich, Polygraphischer Verlag, 1950. 127 p. (Zürcher Studien zum Internationalen Recht 18.) 9 sw. fr.

WELTREVOLUTION DURCH WELTGESCHICHTE, by Klaus Mehnert. Kitzingen-Main, Holzner, 1950. 84 p. (Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Europa-Akademie 9.)

WHAT ABOUT COMMUNISM? by A. M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York, Public Affairs Committee, 1950. 32 p. (Public Affairs Pamphlet 164.) 20¢.

WHAT CAN UNITE THE WORLD? by Kathleen W. MacArthur. New York, Church Peace Union, 1950. 53 p. 35¢.

WHO'S THE ENEMY—THE COMMUNISTS OR THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE? New York, Russian National Anti-Communist Organizations in America, 1950. 23 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1949

By RICHARD P. STEBBINS

With an Introduction by GEORGE F. KENNAN

THIS fourth volume in the well-known Council on Foreign Relations new postwar series provides a comprehensive survey of world conditions on the eve of the Korean hostilities. It tells how the United States and the other free nations, confronted with a challenge whose revolutionary nature was clear, endeavored to readjust their policies and develop a coordinated defense without sacrificing economic benefits or democracy at home. It recounts the vicissitudes of the East-West political struggle in Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Greece, describes the clash of great-power interests in the turbulent Middle East, and appraises the course of the revolutionary movement in China and Southeast Asia.

"This series has become a valuable institution. Every year since 1931, except during the war, it has reviewed the course of America's foreign relations, putting the year's developments into perspective in a scholarly, authoritative manner. The latest volume, covering 1949 and part of 1950, comes at a particularly appropriate time. One hopes that everybody taking part in the national debate about isolationism will read it. The quality of the debate would be improved."—*N. Y. Herald Tribune*

"It is the kind of book which in an ideal democracy every active citizen should read."—*The Review of Politics*

"The value of this continuing series is greater from year to year, because this country has been plunged deeper into world affairs."—*Cincinnati Enquirer*

Thoughtful citizens will welcome this clear, objective and expert interpretation of the antecedents of the present world crisis.

At all bookstores, $5.00

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS FOR THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
58 EAST 68 STREET • NEW YORK 21

London: ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The largest fleet of intercontinental airliners in the world is operated by the Pan American World Airways System.



Pan American Clippers* are ready for double-duty —civilian or military!

● Today Pan American Clippers are proving they are an integral part of America's air arm—mobilized for emergency, even in the midst of civilian operations.

Every 24 hours Pan American Clippers log an average of almost 163,000 miles . . . more than six times the distance around the world at the equator. More than twice as many double-decked "Strato" Clippers are flown by Pan American than by any other airline in the world.

And you can fly to all six continents—to 71 countries and colonies—by the World's Most Experienced Airline. Remember, last year, *as in all previous years,* more people traveled overseas by Pan American than by any other airline. In aviation, it's experience that makes the difference!

*Trade Mark, Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

PAN AMERICAN
WORLD AIRWAYS

WORLD'S MOST EXPERIENCED AIRLINE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED